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Recent history of many developed and developing countries highlights the importance
of two factors for uninterrupted economic growth: first, a main lesson of the financial
meltdown of 2007 and 2008 is that systemic exposures in the financial sector can endanger
financial stability with large potential costs for taxpayers. Such systemic exposures before
and during the global financial crisis were U.S. sub-prime mortgages and heavy reliance
on short term whole-sale funding. A second lesson comes from the European sovereign
debt crisis. Once the abundance of cheap funding, characterizing the years before 2007,
was no longer available and some European sovereigns started to face difficulties in
financing their expenditures, a dangerous dynamic started. A weakening of the fiscal
position of the sovereign endangered financial stability by making bank defaults more
likely (for example through losses suffered by banks on their sovereign debt portfolios),
while the necessary recapitalization of some banks put a large burden on government
finances, creating a “vicious circle”. The second lesson is thus that fiscal policy and
financial stability are intertwined.
This dissertation is a collection of essays in these two areas of financial stability.
The first part deals with systemic risk in the banking sector. First, it asks whether
countercyclical macroprudential policy tools can be an effective way of reducing cycli-
cality in bank lending. One such tool is the countercyclical capital buffer, which will be
soon introduced in Basel III, an international standard of bank regulatory rules. The
main finding is that these policies can be counterproductive and may incentivize more
intertwined banks, and hence, increase systemic risk. The next paper investigates, and
provides some evidence of, the possibility that banks actively change their portfolios in
order to influence the likelihood of joint bank failure.
The second part of this dissertation studies the connection between public finance
and financial stability. The third paper looks into the interaction between bank capital
regulation and taxation and finds that banks trade off leverage risk against portfolio
1
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risk in response to higher corporate income tax rates. Finally, the fourth paper analyses
banks’ excessive holdings of domestic government debt as one of the sources of the
interrelated public finance and bank stability. Two possible explanations of banks’ home
bias are tested: voluntary government bond hoarding as a result of risk shifting and
government induced bond buying. In what follows I explain each chapter in more details.
The first paper presents a model in which flat (cycle-independent) capital require-
ments are undesirable because of shocks to bank capital. There is a rationale for coun-
tercyclical capital requirements that impose lower capital demands when aggregate bank
capital is low. However, such capital requirements have a cost as they increase systemic
risk taking: by insulating banks against aggregate shocks (but not bank-specific ones),
they create incentives to invest in correlated activities. As a result, the economy’s sen-
sitivity to shocks increases and systemic crises can become more likely. Capital require-
ments that directly incentivize banks to become less correlated dominate countercyclical
policies as they reduce both systemic risk-taking and procyclicality.
The second paper seeks to test a theory of strategic interaction among banks. This
theory, the last bank banking theory, asserts that bank decisions are strategic substitutes.
This is because healthy banks benefit from the failure of their peers and making different
investments and drawing on different funding sources reduces the likelihood of joint
failure. I exploit the deregulation of US interstate banking that occurred during the
80s and early 90s to test whether banks choose more heterogeneous loan portfolios and
funding strategies in order to reduce the likelihood of joint failure. I find that banks
involved in distressed mergers did increase the overall heterogeneity of their business
models. Banks achieved this by choosing more diverse asset compositions.
The third paper investigates the interaction between taxation and bank regulation.
The tax benefit of interest deductibility encourages debt financing, but regulatory and
market constraints create dependency between bank leverage and asset risk. Using a
large international sample of banks I find that banks located in high-tax countries have
higher leverage and lower average asset risk-weights. I argue that this finding is induced
by capital regulation. While the estimated overall effect of taxation on bank risk is
modest, it induces significant portfolio reallocation toward less lending. These results
suggest that any elimination of the tax bias towards debt may not bring the expected
benefits for bank stability.
2
Introduction
The fourth paper documents that the largest European banks hold sovereign debt
portfolios heavily biased toward their domestic governments. This bias is stronger if
(1) both the sovereign and the banks are weak, (2) the sovereign is weak and share-
holder rights are strong, and (3) the sovereign is weak and the government has positive
ownership in the bank. Furthermore, the home bias is positively valued by the market
as reflected by a positive association between the home bias and Tobins q. The home
bias premium is small when public finances are weak –keeping bank risk constant, but
when both the sovereign and the banks are weak, the premium is positive. These results







Requirements and Systemic Risk
Abstract We present a model in which flat (cycle-independent) capital requirements are
undesirable because of shocks to bank capital. There is a rationale for countercyclical
capital requirements that impose lower capital demands when aggregate bank capital is
low. However, such capital requirements also have a cost as they increase systemic risk
taking: by insulating banks against aggregate shocks (but not bank-specific ones), they
create incentives to invest in correlated activities. As a result, the economy’s sensitivity
to shocks increases and systemic crises can become more likely. Capital requirements that
directly incentivize banks to become less correlated dominate countercyclical policies as
they reduce both systemic risk-taking and procyclicality.
2.1. Introduction
A key focus of the debate on the design of future financial regulation is on whether the
financial system responds efficiently to shocks. While prior to the crisis of 2007-2009
the general view was that the economy adjusts optimally in the advent of shocks, there
is a growing consensus that this view is inappropriate when it comes to the financial
system. In particular, there is concern that the financial system exacerbates shocks,
leading to excessive lending in boom times and sharp contractions in credit when condi-
tions deteriorate. A common explanation for this is that agents in the financial system
tend to be subject to constraints that can increase the impact of shocks, such as bor-
rowing constraints that fluctuate with asset prices, risk-sensitive capital requirements or
5
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remuneration schemes based on relative performance.
In response to the experience of the recent crisis, there is now a broad move towards
policies that mitigate procyclicality, the tendency of the financial system to amplify
shocks over the cycle. For instance, the new Basel Accord incorporates capital buffers
that are built up in good times and can be run down when economic conditions deterio-
rate. In addition, the liquidity coverage ratio of Basel III – which aims at safeguarding
banks against short-term outflows – contains a countercyclical element to the extent
that such liquidity buffers are relaxed in bad times. On the accounting side, there is a
discussion about whether mark-to-market accounting – which has the potential to am-
plify the impact of asset price changes – should be suspended when prices are depressed.
There is also a growing debate about whether monetary policy should “lean against the
wind” with respect to the financial cycle, that is, raise interest rates when the economy
experiences excessive credit expansion and asset price inflation, but lower interest rates
in times of significant contraction in lending or general stress in the financial system.
In this paper we argue that procyclicality cannot be separated from a second dimen-
sion of systemic risk: the extent to which institutions in the financial system are cor-
related with each other.1 Such correlation can arise through various channels: herding
in investment activities, the use of common funding sources, interconnectedness through
interbank linkages, but also through convergence in risk management practices and trad-
ing strategies. In particular, we show that there is a two-way interaction between these
two dimensions of systemic risk: macroprudential policies that target procyclicality, such
as countercyclical capital requirements, affect the correlation of risks in the financial sys-
tem and correlation (and policies that mitigate it) influence procyclicality. It is thus not
possible to address the two dimensions of systemic risk in isolation, which has profound
implications for the design of macroprudential regulation.
We consider an economy in which banks face shocks to their capital. There is a
role for capital requirements because capital reduces moral hazard at banks (akin to
Holmström and Tirole (1997)). Flat capital requirements create a very simple form
of procyclicality: when there is a negative shock to bank capital it becomes expensive
to fulfill the requirements, reducing welfare by more than the elimination of capital
1It is common in the literature to see procyclicality and common risk exposures as the two key –
but separate – dimensions of systemic risk (e.g., Borio, 2003).
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requirements would. We show that welfare-maximizing capital requirements – for given
correlation of risks in the financial system – are countercyclical: when there is sufficient
capital in the economy, it is optimal to require banks to hold capital to contain moral
hazard, while when capital is scarce it becomes optimal to forego the benefits of capital.
Effectively, countercyclical capital requirements increase welfare by mitigating the impact
of aggregate shocks to bank capital.
This result no longer holds in general when the correlation of risks is endogenous. We
allow banks to choose between a common and a bank-specific project. Since a bank’s
capital is determined by prior returns on its activities, capital conditions become more
correlated when banks invest in the same project. At the same time, correlation makes
it also more likely that banks fail jointly. In this case there is a cost as there are no
longer sufficient funds in the economy for undertaking productive activities. Banks do
not internalize this cost, and hence may choose more correlation than socially optimal.
Countercyclical capital requirements worsen the problem of excessive correlation.
The reason is simple: they insulate banks against common shocks, but not against bank-
specific ones. The expected cost from exposure to aggregate risk hence falls relative to
bank-specific exposures, increasing banks’ incentives to invest in the common project. A
bank that continues to focus on bank-specific activities would run the risk of receiving
a negative shock when aggregate capital is plenty, in which case it would be subject to
high capital requirements precisely when it is most costly.
Countercyclical capital requirements thus trade off benefits from reducing the impact
of a shock for given exposures in the financial system with higher correlation of risks
in the financial system. Their overall welfare implications are hence ambiguous. Per-
versely, countercyclical policies may even increase the economy’s sensitivity to aggregate
conditions. The reason is that by inducing banks to become more correlated, they make
the financial system more exposed to aggregate shocks, which may result in a greater
likelihood of joint bank failures. We show that the appeal of capital requirements that
depend on the state of the economy is further reduced when there are commitment prob-
lems in capital regulation. This is because a regulator would always face the temptation
of lowering capital requirements ex-post when capital is scarce – even though this may
not be optimal ex-ante. Carrying out countercyclical policies in a discretionary fashion
7
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– as envisaged by Basel III2 – can hence induce inefficiencies.
There is an alternative macroprudential policy in our model: a regulator could di-
rectly incentivize banks to become less correlated (for example, by charging higher capital
requirements for correlated banks). We show that such a policy (if feasible) dominates
countercyclical policies. This is because it addresses the two dimensions of systemic risk
at the same time: it discourages correlation but also makes the system less procycli-
cal as more heterogenous institutions will respond less strongly to aggregate shocks. In
contrast – as discussed before – countercyclical policies improve systemic risk along one
dimension at the cost of worsening it along another one.
The key message of our paper is that the two dimensions of systemic risk (common
exposures and procyclicality) are inherently linked. The consequence is that policies
addressing one risk dimension will also affect the other – and possibly in undesired ways.
While our model is set in the specific context of capital requirements and banks, the basic
message also applies to other forms of countercyclical policies, such as macroeconomic
stabilization policies. For example, a policy of “leaning against the wind” insulates
banks against aggregate fluctuations in interest rates3 and likewise increase incentives
for taking on common risk.
Our paper connects two strands of literature. The first investigates whether bank-
ing regulation should respond to the economic cycle.4 Kashyap and Stein (2004) argue
that capital requirements that do not depend on economic conditions are suboptimal
and suggest that capital charges for a given unit of risk should vary with the scarcity
of capital in the economy. Repullo and Suarez (2013) demonstrate that fixed risk-based
capital requirements (such as in Basel II) result in procyclical lending. They also show
that banks have an incentive to hold pre-cautionary buffers in anticipation of capital
shortages – but that these buffers are not effective in containing procyclicality. As a
result, introducing a countercyclical element into regulation can be desirable. Malherbe
(2013) considers a macroeconomic model where a regulator trades off growth and fi-
nancial stability and finds that optimal capital requirements depend on business cycle
characteristics. Mart́ınez-Miera and Suarez (2012) consider a dynamic model where
2See BCBS (2010).
3Recent literature also suggests that central banks may want to vary interest rates in an (effectively
countercyclical) way in order to reduce the cost of financial crises (e.g., Diamond and Rajan (2011) and
Freixas et al. (2011)).
4See Galati and Moessner (2011) for a general overview of macroprudential policies.
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(fixed) capital requirements reduce banks’ incentives to take on aggregate risk (relative
to investment in a diversified riskless portfolio). The reason is that capital requirements
increase the value of capital to surviving banks in a crisis. This in turn provides banks
with incentives to invest in safer activities in order to increase the chance of surviving
when other banks are failing (the “last bank standing” effect).
A second strand of the literature analyzes the incentives of banks to correlate with
each other. In particular, it has been shown that inefficient correlation may arise from
investment choices (e.g., Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007), diversification (Wagner, 2011;
Allen et al., 2012), interbank insurance (Kahn and Santos, 2010) or through herding
on the liability side (Segura and Suarez, 2011; Stein, 2012; Farhi and Tirole, 2012). In
Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007), regulators cannot commit not to bail out banks if they
fail jointly. Anticipating this, banks have an incentive to invest in the same asset in
order to increase the likelihood of joint failure. In contrast, the effect in our paper is not
driven by commitment problems but arises because there are benefits from letting capital
requirements vary with the state of the economy. Another difference to Acharya and
Yorulmazer (and most other papers on herding) is that correlation in the banking system
– by itself – can be desirable as capital requirements that vary with aggregate conditions
then better reflect the individual conditions of banks (by contrast, if bank conditions are
largely driven by idiosyncratic factors, varying capital requirements with the aggregate
state provides limited benefits). Farhi and Tirole (2012) consider herding in funding
choices. They show that when the regulator lacks commitment, bailout expectations
provide banks with strategic incentives to increase their sensitivity to market conditions.
While in Farhi and Tirole (as well as in Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007)) bank choices
are strategic complements, in our setting they are not.
Our paper also relates to the long-standing literature on macroeconomic stabilization
policies – as for example analyzed in the context of a textbook IS-LM model. This
literature has focused on the ability of stabilization policies in insulating the economy
from (aggregate) shocks – taking as exogenous the risk exposures of firms (or banks) in
the economy. Since stabilization policies reduce the cost of aggregate shocks in a similar
way to countercyclical capital requirements, our analysis suggests that they may also
have (potentially unintended) effects by changing the incentives of firms and banks to
expose themselves to the aggregate cycle.
9
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 contains the model.
Section 2.3 discusses the results. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2. Model
2.2.1. Preview of the model
We present a simple model in which there is a role for state-dependent capital require-
ments as well as endogenous systemic risk. The scope for variable capital requirements
comes from shocks to bank capital. In particular, a low return on an (existing) project
reduces a bank’s capital.5 Since the cost of equity financing is higher than deposit fi-
nancing in our model, it is costly to use capital as a tool for mitigating moral hazard at
the bank. When many banks have low capital, it may then be optimal for the regulator
to reduce capital requirements.
Systemic costs arise because when banks fail at the same time, there is a shortage of
funds to undertake productive opportunities in the economy. In our model this is because
of the existence of a technology that requires a fixed amount of funds.6 Systemic risk and
capital requirements interact because banks can affect the correlation of their projects.
In particular, anticipation of capital requirements determines whether banks want to
invest in the same project or not. This in turn affects the likelihood of systemic crises,
i.e. events when banks jointly fail.
2.2.2. Setup
The economy consists of two bankers, a consumer and a producer. There are three dates
(0, 1, 2).
Bankers (denoted with A and B) each have an endowment of one at date 0 and











2, with α > 1. (2.1)
5Our view of bank capital is based on Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Gertler and Karadi (2011) and
Mart́ınez-Miera and Suarez (2012) in that (inside) bank capital derives from accumulated bank profits.
6More broadly, systemic costs would arise whenever the economy’s production function (or the
utility of agents) is convex.
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At date 0 banker A has access to two projects: an economy-wide project (the “com-
mon” project) and a project that is only available to him (the “alternative” project).
The project choice is not observable. Banker B has only access to the common project.7
The returns on the common and the alternative project are independently and identi-
cally distributed. Each banker can undertake only one project; we can hence summarize
the projects in the economy by C (correlated projects) and U (uncorrelated projects).
A project requires one unit of funds at date 0. At date 1, it returns an amount x̃,
which is uniformly distributed on [x,x] (and hence has a mean of µ := x+x
2
). At this
date the banker can also decide to exert effort. Effort increases the expected return on
the project at date 2 but comes at a private cost of z > 0. At date 2 a project fails with
probability pF , in which case its return is zero. With probability pH the project reaches
a high state and returns RH (RH > 1). With probability pL (pF +pL+pH = 1) it reaches
the low state and returns RL (RL < 1). If effort had been chosen, the likelihood of the
high state increases by 4p (> 0) and the one of the low state decreases by 4p.
The producer has a technology available which at date 2 converts m (m > 0) units
of funds into m+ κ (κ > 0) units. The technology cannot be operated with more or less
than m units. There is no storage technology in the economy.
At date 0 the banker has to decide to what extent to (initially) finance the project
with own funds, denoted k0. The remaining financing needs (1 − k0) can be raised in
the form of one-period deposits from the consumer. Deposits are fully insured8 and the
deposit insurance fund is financed by lump sum taxation from the consumer at date
2. At date 1, the deposits mature and the banker decides what amount of it to renew
7This is without loss of generality since there is no benefit to having two alternative assets in our
economy.
8Deposit insurance simplifies the analysis by making the interest on deposits independent of the
expected likelihood of project success. It is not the key source of inefficiency in the economy (which is
the systemic externality on the producer).
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(because of the interim return, he may only partly renew the debt). If he wants to
maintain a capital level of k in the bank he pays off k − k0 of debt and consumes the
remainder (x− (k − k0)).
There is a regulator who maximizes utilitarian welfare. The regulator sets capital
requirements at t = 1 (there is no scope for separate capital requirements at t = 0). The
purpose of capital requirements is to induce efficient effort in the economy. We assume
that the return on the common (economy-wide) project is observable (but not the one
on the bank-specific project). The regulator can hence condition capital requirements
on the return of the common project.9
We make the following additional assumptions.
Assumptions
1. 4p(RH −RL) > z,
2. 4p(RH − 1 + x) < z,
3. RL > m.
Assumption 1) ensures that effort is efficient. Assumption 2) is a condition that will
ensure that the interim return (by itself) never suffices to induce effort. Assumption 3
states that the low-state output of a single bank is sufficient to operate the producer’s
technology.
Timing
The sequence of actions is as follows. At date 0, the regulator announces how date-1
capital requirements will be set depending on the interim return of the common project,
xC . These capital requirements can be summarized by a function k(xC) (the special case
of flat capital requirements arises when k does not depend on xC). Following this, bank
A makes its project choice. After the project choice has been made, banks learn the
date-1 interim return of their project xi and decide on the amount of equity financing
ki0 and raise d
i
0 = 1 − ki0 of deposits. At the end of the period, the consumer and the
bankers consume.
9This captures that a regulator may be able to set capital requirements based on the state of the
economy, but not on the conditions at an individual bank.
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t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Regulator announces k(xC).
Banker A chooses project.
Bankers learn about xi
and invest ki0 in the banks.
Bankers and consumers
consume.
Interim returns xi realize.
Bankers invest additional ki − ki0.





The producer raises funds.
Production may take place.
All agents consume.
Figure 2.1: Timeline
At date 1, the interim return xi realizes. Each banker decides how much capital
he wants to maintain (ki), observing the regulatory constraint ki ≥ k(xC). The banker
hence renews an amount di = di0−(ki−ki0) of deposits. Following this, banks decide about
monitoring their projects and consumption takes place by bankers and the consumer.
At date 2, the returns Ri (Ri ∈ {0, RL, RH}) realize. Each banker repays the con-
sumer – in case there are sufficient funds. Any shortfall is financed by the deposit
insurance fund. Following this, the producer makes an offer to the consumer and/or the
bankers for m unit of funds. If he succeeds, the producer operates his technology and
repays the funds. In the final stage of date 2, all agents consume. Figure 1 summarizes
the timing.
2.2.3. Benchmark: Project choice is observable
To establish a benchmark, we first analyze an economy in which the project choice is
observable and can hence be determined by the regulator. The regulator’s actions at the
beginning of date 0 hence consist of setting capital requirements k(xC) and the project
type for bank A.10 We solve the model backwards.
At date 2 the producer needs m > 0 funds to operate his technology. If the projects
of both banks have failed, there are no funds in the economy. The technology can then
not be operated and the producer’s consumption is hence zero. However, if there is no
joint failure, total funds are at least RL, which is larger than m by Assumption 3. The
producer can then raise m units of funds by offering a return of one per unit of funds to
the consumer. After operating his technology and repaying the funds, he is left with κ,
which he then consumes.
10The benchmark is not identical to the constrained-efficient outcome in the economy – a regulator
could always resolve the moral hazard problem by allocating the date-1 endowment of the consumer to
the bankers.
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At the end of date 1, each banker has to make the effort choice. Since a banker’s
pay-off is RH − di in the high state and max{RL− di, 0} in the low state (as he possibly
defaults), the condition that effort is undertaken is
4 p(RH − di −max{RL − di, 0}) ≥ z. (2.4)
When di is such that there is no default in the low state (di ≤ RL), the effort condition
boils down to 4p(RH − RL) ≥ z, which is fulfilled by Assumption 1. When there is
default in the low state (di > RL), we have from (2.4) that the expected benefit from




− (RH − 1). (2.5)
In this case the banker will exert effort if and only if k ≥ k̄.
At the beginning of date 1, a banker has to decide how much capital to maintain in the
bank by renewing (a part of the) deposits. The interest rate on deposits is zero because
of deposit insurance. The banker has a strict preference for deposit financing over equity
financing because he is impatient (α > 1) and because deposits are mispriced due to
deposit insurance. He will hence only keep the minimum capital required: ki = k(xC).
He thus does not renew k − ki0 (we will use from now on k as a shortcut for the rule
k(xC)) of the initial amount of deposits and consumes x
i − (k − ki0).
At the end of date 0, the banker chooses the amount of own funds (capital) to finance
the project. Like at date 1, deposit can be raised at an interest of zero. Given that the
banker is impatient, he will only use capital to the extent that is required to fulfill
regulatory requirements at date 1. Hence, if xi ≥ k(xc) (that is, if the date-1 return
alone is sufficient to fulfill capital requirements), he will use debt finance only: ki0 = 0.
By contrast, if xi < k(xc), he will use an amount of capital that, together with the interim
return xi, just allows him to fulfill the capital requirements at date 1: ki0 = x
i − k(xC).
The regulator’s problem
The regulator maximizes welfare W , consisting of the utilities of bank owners, the con-
sumer and the producer.
We first derive a banker’s utility. The consumption of banker i is 1 − ki0 at date 0,
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xi− (k−ki0) at date 1 and max {Ri − di, 0} at date 2. The banker’s total utility is hence
ub,i = α2(1− ki0) +α(ki0− (k−xi)) + max {Ri − di, 0}−Mz, where M ∈ {0, 1} indicates
whether effort is exerted. Recalling that ki0 = max(x
i − k(xC), 0) and ki = k(xC) (and
hence also that di = 1− ki = 1− k(xC)) this can be rewritten as
ub,i = α2 − (α2 − α) max
{
k − xi, 0
}
− α(k − xi) + max
{
Ri − (1− k), 0
}
−Mz. (2.6)
The utility of the consumer (before contribution to the deposit insurance fund) is simply
one as he does not have a time preference and the interest rate is zero. The losses to the
deposit insurance fund is max{dA −RA, 0) + max{dB −RB, 0). Using dA = dB = 1− k,
we can write consumer’s total utility as
uc = 2−max{1− k −RA, 0)−max{1− k −RB, 0). (2.7)
Let us define the total utility of a bank as the utility of its banker minus the impact of
the bank on the deposit insurance fund. Recalling that the latter is max{d − R, 0} =
max{1− k −R, 0}, total utility for a bank of type t is given by
uTt (k(xC)) := u
b
t −max{1− k −Rt, 0}, (2.8)
where t = C (t = U) indicates that the bank operates a correlated (uncorrelated) project.
Taking expectations at date 0 we obtain for the total expected utility:
UTt (k(xC)) := E[α
2 − (α2 − α) max {k − xt, 0} − α(k − xt) +Rt + (k − 1)−Mz]. (2.9)
The producer consumes κ whenever at least one bank survives, otherwise he obtains
zero. His utility is hence
cp2 =
 κ if RA +RB > 0,0 otherwise. (2.10)
Recalling that the producer obtains κ if at least one bank does not fail, we have for his
15
Chapter 2: Countercyclical Capital Requirements and Systemic Risk
expected utility in the correlated and the uncorrelated economy:
UpC = (1− pF )κ (2.11)
UpU = (1− p
2
F )κ. (2.12)
We can write welfare in the economy as the sum of the total (expected) utilities (UT (k))
at the two banks, the consumer’s endowment (2) and the producer’s utility (Up). We
obtain in the case of a correlated and an uncorrelated economy:
WC(k(xC)) = 2U
T
C (k) + 2 + (1− pF )κ (2.13)
WU(k(xC)) = U
T
C (k) + U
T
U (k) + 2 + (1− p2F )κ. (2.14)
The regulator’s problem can then be formalized as maxt∈{C,U},k(xC) Wt(k).
We first solve for the welfare-maximizing policy function, k∗(xC), for given project
choice in the economy (C or U).
Proposition 2.1. Optimal capital requirements take the form
k∗(xC) =
 k̄ if xC ≥ x̂∗0 otherwise, (2.15)
where x̂∗ is given by
x̂∗ =
 x̂C = (
1
α
+ 1)k − 4p(RH−RL)−z





+ 1)k − 4p(RH−RL)−z
α2−α
)
− µ if projects are uncorrelated.
(2.16)
Proof. Conditional on the effort choice, capital requirements k reduce welfare because
of the banker’s impatience. When k ≥ xt, this is because higher capital requirements
require the banker to give up date-0 consumption for date-2 consumption (from equation
(2.6) we have for the utility impact: ∂u
b
∂k
= −α2). When k < xt, this is because the banker




It follows that the only benefit of capital requirements is to induce effort. This implies,
first, that it is not optimal to set capital requirements such that the bank does not
default in the low state (if there is no default, the banker strictly prefers to exert effort
by Assumption 1 and capital could be reduced without any cost). We can hence presume
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default and the effort choice is governed by the critical capital level k defined by (2.5).
Second, any level of k in the ranges k ∈ (0, k) and k ∈ (k,∞) is also suboptimal, because
in these intervals capital can equally be reduced without affecting the effort choice. Thus,
the regulator has to consider only two levels of capital requirements: k = 0 and k = k.
We next derive the net (social) benefit from effort at a bank for a given xC . For this
define (equivalently to UTt (k(xC))) with Ũ
T
t (k(xC), xC) = E[u
b
t −max{1− k−Rt, 0}|xC ]
the utility from pay-offs at a bank conditional on xC . The net benefits from effort are
then given by ŨTt (k, xC)− ŨTt (0, xC). Denoting these benefits by 4ŨTt (xC), we obtain:
4 ŨTt (xC) = 4p(RH −RL)− z − (α2 − α)(k − E[xt|xC ])− (α− 1)k. (2.17)
The first two terms (4p(RH − RL) − z) are simply the benefit from effort in the
absence of an incentive problem. The other two terms are the costs of inducing effort
through capital requirements. They arise because capital requirements force the banker
to shift an amount of consumption k from date 1 to date 2, the cost of which is (α−1)k.
In addition, if the interim return at date 1 is insufficient to fulfill capital requirements
(xt < k), he also has to give up consumption at date 0. The cost arising from this are
(α2 − α)(k − E[xt|xC ]).
Noting that E[xC |xC ]) = xC and E[xU |xC ]) = µ, we can see that the benefits from
effort are strictly increasing in xC for a common project and independent of xC for an
alternative project. Since at least one project in the economy is common, it follows
that effort benefits in the economy are always increasing in xC . Hence, there will be a
threshold x̂ , such that for xC ≥ x̂ it is optimal to set k = k and for xC < x̂ it is optimal
to set k = 0. When both banks are operating the common project, the policy maker is
indifferent to inducing effort when 24 ŨTC (x̂) = 0. Solving this yields x̂C . When one
project is alternative, the policy maker is indifferent if 4ŨTC (x̂) + 4ŨTU = 0. Solving
yields x̂U . Q.E.D.
Proposition 2.1 implies that optimal regulation is countercyclical in the following
sense. When the economy is in a good state (that is, when the common project pays off
well in the interim), it is optimal to set high capital requirements (k = k). Conversely,
in bad states, it is optimal to set low (zero) capital requirements (k = 0).
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Corollary 2.1. Optimal regulation is countercyclical, that is,
Cov(k∗(xC), xC) > 0. (2.18)
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition for this result is the following. While the benefits from effort are
independent of the state of the economy, the cost of inducing effort is higher in bad
states. This is because capital at banks is then low (because of low interim returns),
making it more costly to induce effort using capital requirements.11 For sufficiently low
capital it becomes then optimal to forego the benefits of effort.
Another implication of Proposition 2.1 is that the critical state of the economy where
capital requirements should be lowered depends on the correlation of projects. This has
the following consequences for optimal countercyclicality:
Corollary 2.2. The optimal degree of countercyclicality is lower in the uncorrelated
economy unless we are in the special case where µ equals ( 1
α
+ 1)k − 4p(RH−RL)−z
α2−α . In
this special case, countercyclicality is the same as in the correlated economy.
Proof. See appendix.
The reason for this result is that while in the correlated economy countercyclical
capital requirements lower capital costs at both banks, in the uncorrelated economy
they only do so at one bank. The gains from countercyclicality are thus lower in the
uncorrelated economy and hence it is optimal to choose a lower degree of it.
Proposition 2.1 states the optimal policy rule for capital for given projects. Whether
it is optimal to have correlated or uncorrelated projects in the economy can then be
determined by comparing the welfare levels that obtain in either case, presuming that
the regulator implements the respective policy rules of Proposition 2.1.
In order to obtain an intuition for the determinants of the optimal project choice,
let us presume for a moment that the regulator imposes the same capital requirement
rule – characterized by a threshold x̂ ∈ (x, x) – irrespective of the correlation choice. In
11Capital requirements are here more costly in bad states since the pool of capital is then lower. A




this case we obtain from comparing (2.13) and (2.14) that a correlated economy provides
higher welfare than an uncorrelated economy if and only if





where kx̂(xC) denotes the policy function of the form of equation (2.15) with threshold
x̂.
The right-hand side of (2.19) is the expected cost of choosing correlated projects. It
arises because there is a higher likelihood of joint bank failure in the correlated economy
(pF instead of p
2
F ). Joint failures are costly because the producer can then no longer
operate his technology and the surplus κ is lost.
The term UTC (kx̂(xC)) − UTU (kx̂(xC)) on the left-hand side of (2.19) represents the
gains from correlation. These gains arise because in a correlated economy both banks
can profit from countercyclical capital requirements (while in the uncorrelated economy
only one bank can benefit). Using (2.9) we have that
UTC (kx̂(xC))− UTU (kx̂(xC)) = (α2 − α)E[max {kx̂(xC)− xU , 0} −max {kx̂(xC)− xC , 0}].
(2.20)
For k = 0 both terms in the squared brackets are zero, while for k = k they are positive
(because of Assumption 2). We can hence simplify











UTC (kx̂(xC)) − UTU (kx̂(xC)) is hence strictly positive whenever the policy rule is coun-
tercyclical (Cov(kx̂(xC), xC) > 0). The reason is that under countercyclical capital
requirements common projects have lower costs as such capital requirements tend to be
low when capital from common projects is scarce.12
When the regulator tailors capital requirements to the correlation choice, additional
effects arise because optimal capital requirements depend on correlation in the economy.
From equations (2.13) and (2.14) we then have that welfare in the correlated economy
12The insight that correlation can be beneficial can be applied to other contexts as well. For instance,
a monetary union benefits from its members being similar since interest rates set by the central bank
then more easily reflect the individual conditions of the members.
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is higher if and only if
2UTC (kx̂C (xC))− UTC (kx̂U (xC))− UTU (kx̂U (xC)) > (pF − p2F )κ. (2.22)
From this one can derive Proposition 2.2:
Proposition 2.2. Correlation is optimal if and only if








dxC > (pF − p2F )κ. (2.23)
Proof. See appendix.
As to be expected, condition (2.23) states that in order for correlated projects to
be optimal, the costs of correlation in terms of a higher likelihood of joint failure,
(pF − p2F )κ, have to be low. Interestingly, for sufficiently small κ (the cost of a sys-
temic crisis), correlation is always optimal.
2.2.4. Optimal capital requirements when project choice is unobservable
We now assume that the regulator cannot observe the project type. The consequence is
that the correlation choice has to be privately optimal for bank A. Specifically, at date 0
the regulator announces the policy rule k(xC) and bank A chooses a project depending
on this policy rule. We constrain the analysis of capital requirements to step functions
as in (2.15).
The financing decisions at date 0 and 1 are unchanged. At date 1, a bank will use
an amount of equity financing to just fulfill the capital requirements (k = k(xC)), while
at date 0 a bank will have equity funding only to cover shortfalls at date 1 (k0,t =
min{k(xC))− xt, 0}). The effort choices of banks at date 1 are the same as well: a bank
monitors if and only if capital requirements are at least k̄, as defined in equation (2.5).
There is also no change in the behavior of the producer.
This leaves to analyze the project choice of bank A. When deciding in which project
to invest, the bank takes as given the policy rule kx̂(xC). Writing the expression for
banker’s utility (equation (2.6)) for a correlated and an uncorrelated project, taking
difference and taking expectations at t = 0, we obtain the expected gains from choosing
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the common project (as opposed to the alternative one):
U bC(kx̂(xC))−U bU(kx̂(xC)) = (α2−α)E[−max {kx̂(xC)− xC , 0}+ max {kx̂(xC)− xU , 0}].
(2.24)
Note that equation (2.24) is identical to the total utility difference from pay-offs at the
bank (see equation (2.20)) under a fixed policy rule. Using (2.21) we hence have that




Assuming a (weak) preference for uncorrelated projects, we obtain for the correlation
choice:
Proposition 2.3. Banks choose correlated projects if and only if the policy rule is coun-
tercyclical (Cov(kx̂(xC), xC) > 0).
Proof. Follows directly from (2.25). Q.E.D.
The project choice is, however, not necessarily socially efficient. This is because a
banker ignores the impact on the producer – who suffers in the event of joint failure.
Since the likelihood of joint failure is higher for correlated projects, choosing the common
project is associated with a negative externality.
This will result in an inefficient project choice whenever the policy rule is counter-
cyclical (and bank A hence chooses correlation) but no correlation is welfare-optimal:
Corollary 2.3. For a given policy rule kx̂(xC), banks may choose correlated projects even
though no correlation leads to higher welfare. This occurs precisely when Cov(kx̂(xC), xC) >
0 and condition (2.23) is not fulfilled.
It follows that there are situations where the welfare level of the benchmark case can
no longer be obtained. In fact, this happens whenever in the benchmark uncorrelated
projects are welfare-maximizing. Since welfare-maximizing regulation (in the benchmark
case) requires countercyclical capital requirements, banks would find it privately optimal
to choose correlated projects, necessarily resulting in lower welfare:
Corollary 2.4. Whenever condition (2.23) is not fulfilled, attainable welfare is lower
than in the benchmark case.
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The regulator’s problem
When correlation is optimal in the benchmark case (that is, condition (2.23) is fulfilled),
the regulator can still obtain the same level of welfare as before. For this he simply sets
(countercyclical) capital requirements to x̂C and banks (efficiently) choose correlated
projects. In the case where the benchmark stipulates no correlation, we know that we can
no longer reach the welfare level of the benchmark case as optimal capital requirements
are countercyclical and would hence induce banks to choose correlated projects (Corollary
2.4). This still leaves open what the regulator should do in this case.
Suppose first that the regulator implements correlation in the economy. In this case
the regulator is not constrained by banks’ private incentives (since banks have a bias
towards correlation). The regulator can hence set a threshold identical to the one in
the benchmark case: x̂ = x̂C . Consider next that the regulator wants to implement
an uncorrelated economy. In this case, the regulator is constrained by the incentive
compatibility constraint of bank A. Proposition 2.3 tells us that he then has to choose
a policy that is not countercyclical. Since procyclical policies cannot be optimal, he will
hence choose flat (state-independent) capital requirements. This implies that effort is
either never or always induced.
Proposition 2.4 derives next the condition for when it is optimal to implement a
correlated economy.







dxC −max{4ŨTU , 0}
)
≥ κ(pF − p2F ). (2.26)
The optimal policy rule is then x̂C. Otherwise, no correlation is optimal and the policy
rule is flat and given by
̂̂xU =
 x if 4 ŨTU > 0,x otherwise. (2.27)
Proof. See appendix.
Note that Proposition 2.4 implies that whenever it is optimal to implement uncorre-
lated projects, the regulator has to reduce the countercyclicality of capital requirements
(compared to the benchmark case).
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2.2.5. The role of commitment
We have assumed that at the beginning of date 0, the regulator can commit to a policy
rule. In this section we relax this assumption. We assume that the regulator decides on
the policy rule at the same time as when projects are chosen. Specifically, the regulator
and bank A play Nash at date 0: the regulator maximizes welfare taking the project
choice of bank A as given, while banker A maximizes his utility taking the policy function
as given.
Consider first a (candidate) equilibrium with correlated projects. In such an equi-
librium, the best response of the regulator is x̂C (since x̂C , by Proposition 2.1, is the
optimal policy given that projects are correlated). Since x̂C is countercyclical, it is also
optimal for bank A to choose the common project (Proposition 2.3). Correlation and a
policy rule of x̂C thus form an equilibrium.
Consider next a (candidate) equilibrium with uncorrelated projects. The regulator’s
best response to an uncorrelated economy is x̂U . However, since this policy is coun-
tercyclical, a bank would want to choose the common project. An equilibrium with
uncorrelated projects hence cannot exist.
We summarize:
Proposition 2.5. When the regulator lacks commitment, the unique equilibrium is one
with correlated projects and a policy rule of x̂C.
In the case where no correlation was optimal without commitment problems, welfare
is now lower compared to the commitment case. Lack of commitment thus amplifies the
cost of countercyclical policies arising from banks’ correlation incentives.
2.3. Discussion
In this section we first discuss robustness of several aspects of the model. Following this,
we discuss some implications of the model, including for policy.
Funding choices and the interim return. We assumed that banks make funding
choices at date 0, knowing the return at date 1. This is not essential for the results. If
x becomes known only at date 1, a bank has to use an amount of equity financing at
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date 0 that is sufficient for fulfilling capital requirements in all states of the world at
date 1. Countercyclical capital requirements will lower this amount by reducing capital
demands in states of the world where the capital stock is low.13
Strategic interactions among banks. There is no role for strategic interaction
among banks in our model. To see this, consider that bank B also has a project choice.
Since the policy rule k(xC) is set before the project choices, the project choices of bank A
and B are not interdependent. Hence, their strategies do not affect each other. Introduc-
ing a strategic interaction could either strengthen or weaken the correlation externality.
For example, if banks benefit from bail-outs in the event of joint failures (Acharya and
Yorulmazer, 2007), this will further increase their correlation incentives. Alternatively,
higher correlation among banks can result in interbank externalities by eliminating the
possibility for other banks to buy up assets of troubled banks (Wagner, 2011). Such
interbank externalities will tend to result in higher correlation than socially optimal.
Strategic incentives may also reduce correlation incentives because a surviving bank
may enjoy higher benefits when the other bank fails. This may for instance arise be-
cause of reduced competition (the “last-bank-standing effect”, see Perotti and Suarez,
2002).
Cycle-dependent gains from consumption. We have assumed that the banker’s
marginal utility at each date is constant, and hence independent of the state of the
economy. It is conceivable that in bad (aggregate) states, the marginal utility is higher
(because consumption is then lower). This would strengthen the rationale for counter-
cylical policies as it gives rise to an additional reason for lowering capital requirements
(which have the effect of reducing consumption of the banker) in downturns.
Cycle-dependent monitoring benefits. In our model the benefit from monitoring is
independent of the state of the economy. One may envisage a setting where monitoring is
more effective in bad states of the world as assets are then more risky. This effect, if strong
enough, could in principle lead to the optimality of procyclical capital requirements. In
this case there would no longer be a trade-off between effort provision and correlation
13For a correlated bank, the capital needed to be transferred to date 1 is maxxC∈[x,x]{k(xc) − xC}.




Deposit insurance. Assuming the presence of a deposit insurance system has simpli-
fied the analysis but is not crucial for the results. In the absence of deposit insurance,
there is no need for regulators to impose capital requirements for the purpose of inducing
efficient effort. Rather, depositors themselves can require bankers to hold certain levels
of capital at date 1 (if contractionally feasible). However, such capital requirements will
not be socially efficient because they do not address the externality on the producer
(there will still be a tendency for inefficiently high correlation in the economy). Hence
a rationale for regulation of capital at banks remains. The determination of optimal
capital requirement will then be subject to the same trade-off as in the model (efficient
effort versus systemic risk-taking).
Systemic externality. Our assumption that the producer can extract the full sur-
plus on production is an extreme one. For the externality to hold, however, it is only
important that banks (individually) can not extract the full surplus. In principle, the
technology could also be operated by one of the banks. The externality would then be-
come an interbank externality. This is because one bank would ignore that if it decides
to become correlated with the other bank it reduces the likelihood that the other banks
has sufficient resources to carry out the project.14
Interbank markets. The capital endowments of banks can differ at date 1. Neverthe-
less, there are no gains from trade and hence no scope for interbank markets where banks
can borrow and lend to each other. This is because addressing the moral hazard problem
requires inside equity, funds obtained from the other bank cannot improve incentives.
Bank-specific capital requirements. The cost of countercyclical policies (in the
form of higher correlation) could be avoided entirely if capital requirements can be made
contingent on bank’s individual project returns (xA and xB) instead of the return on the
common project only (as we have assumed). In this case regulators can isolate each bank
against shocks to its own capital, and there is hence no longer an incentive to increase
exposure to common risk. However, such capital requirements do not seem attractive for
14Calculations available on request from the authors.
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several reasons. First, they have high informational requirements as the regulator then
needs to observe individual bank conditions. Second, there are issues of inequality and
competition as weaker banks would be subjected to less stringent regulation. Third, it
creates obvious moral hazard problems to the extent that banks can influence the return
on their projects.
Reducing procyclicality versus reducing cross-sectional risk. Our model sug-
gests that if tools are available that can directly influence the correlation choices of
banks,15 they are to be preferred over countercyclical measures. This is because reduc-
ing correlation has two benefits. First, it lowers the likelihood of a systemic crisis (joint
bank failure) and the costs associated with it. Second, it lowers the sensitivity of bank
capital to shocks (the volatility of aggregate bank capital is lower in the uncorrelated
economy), reducing the need for countercyclical policies.
Countercyclical capital requirements, in contrast, have the cost of increasing corre-
lation risk – as we have shown. Perversely, they can even increase the sensitivity of the
economy to aggregate conditions. To see this, consider that starting from flat capital
requirements, the regulator (marginally) increases countercyclicality. The economy will
then move from an uncorrelated to a correlated equilibrium (Proposition 2.3). This will
increase the likelihood of joint failures but also increase the sensitivity of aggregate bank
capital to shocks. The latter occurs because shocks now affect both banks equally –
while the (marginal) increase in countercyclicality will only have a second-order effect.
Managerial herding. The mechanism that leads to higher correlation in our model
(arising because countercyclical policies reduce expected capital costs at banks) is only
one of the many possible ways this may happen. For instance, countercyclical policies
may also be conducive to herding by bank managers. This is because such policies make
it more likely that following alternative strategies results in underperformance relative
to peers as the manager then cannot benefit from the smoothing of shocks enjoyed by
other banks that expose themselves predominantly to aggregate shocks.
15Examples of such tools include capital requirements based on measures of banks’ systemic impor-




Countercyclical policies in developing countries. Our analysis suggests a posi-
tive relation between the extent to which regulators use macroprudential tools to offset
economic fluctuations and the extent to which banks correlate with each other. While
with the exception of Spain, capital requirements have not been consistently used for
macroprudential purposes, Federico et al. (2012) show that many developing countries
have made active use of reserve requirements over the business cycle. Defining coun-
tercyclicality as the correlation of reserve requirements with GDP, they find that the
majority of these countries used reserve requirements in a countercyclical fashion.
Figure 2.2 plots their measure of countercyclicality against the average pairwise cor-
relation of banks in the respective countries.16 Consistent with the predictions of our
model, we can indeed observe a positive relationship between countercyclicality and
bank correlation: the correlation coefficient is 0.38 (albeit insignificant due to the small
number of observations).
2.4. Conclusion
We have developed a simple model in which there is a rationale for regulation in reducing
the impact of shocks on the financial system. In addition, in this model aggregate risk
is endogenous since banks can influence the extent to which they correlate with each
other. We have shown that countercyclical macroprudential capital requirements – while
reducing the impact of shocks on the economy ex-post – provide banks with incentives
to become more correlated ex-ante. This is because such capital requirements lower a
bank’s cost from exposure to aggregate risk – but not the cost arising from taking on
idiosyncratic risks. The overall welfare implications of countercyclical policies are hence
ambiguous.
Our results have important consequences for the design of macroprudential policies.
First, policy makers typically view different macroprudential tools in isolation: there are
separate policies for dealing with procyclicality (e.g., countercyclical capital buffers) and
correlation risk (e.g., higher capital charges for Systemically Important Financial Insti-
tutions as under Basel III). Our analysis suggests that there are important interactions
16Correlations are calculated based on the weekly stock returns of all listed banks in the year prior
to September 2012. Six countries had to be dropped due to an insufficient number of listed banks.
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among these tools. In particular, policies that mitigate correlation are a substitute for
countercyclical policies since lowering correlation also means less procyclicality (while
the reverse is not true). This suggests that if regulators prefer to employ a single pol-
icy instrument (for political or for practical reasons), they should focus on reducing
cross-sectional risk rather than on implementing countercyclical measures.
Second, Basel III envisages countercyclical capital buffers that are imposed when (na-
tional) regulators deem credit expansion in their country excessive.17 Such discretionary
buffers create a new time-inconsistency problem since a regulator will always be tempted
to lower capital requirements in bad times, while it will be difficult for regulators to with-
stand pressure and raise capital requirements in boom times. Our analysis suggests in
that context that providing domestic regulators with the option to modify capital re-
quirements during the cycle may be counterproductive for the objective of containing
systemic risk as it may increase banks’ correlation incentives.
Finally, while our model considers capital requirements as a policy tool, any alter-
native policy that smooths the impact of aggregate shocks will likewise suffer from the
problem that it increases correlation incentives in the economy. Our argument hence
applies to a wide range of policies, ranging from countercyclical liquidity and reserve
requirements, suspension of mark-to-market pricing in times of stress to general macroe-
conomic stabilization policies (such as “leaning against the wind” by the central bank).
17BCBS (2010) and Drehmann et al. (2011) recommend the buffer be linked to the gap between the
credit-to-GDP ratio of a country and its trend. Repullo and Saurina (2011) warn that overreliance on
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0 for x̂∗ ∈ (x, x). Q.E.D.




x−x (see proof of Corollary
2.1) we have that the covariance attains its minimum at x̂ = x+x
2
= µ and is a monotonous
function on the intervals [x, µ] and [µ, x]. The corollary then follows from the fact that
for x̂C < µ we have x̂U < x̂C and that for x̂C > µ we have x̂U > x̂C . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.2. If x̂C > µ (and hence x̂C < x̂U since we have x̂U = 2x̂C − µ by
equation (2.16)) we obtain
UTC (kx̂C (xC)) = U
T







Using in addition equation (2.21) (written for x̂ = x̂U) to substitute U
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C (kx̂U (xC)) −
UTU (kx̂U (xC)), we can rewrite equation (2.22) as








dxC > (pF − p2F )κ. (2.29)
Similarly, if x̂C < µ (and hence x̂C > x̂U), we can rewrite equation (2.22) as








dxC > (pF − p2F )κ. (2.30)
Combining (2.29) and (2.30) gives (2.23). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.4. The optimality of correlation when condition (2.23) is fulfilled
(that is, correlation is optimal in the benchmark case) is obvious as then the incentive
constraint of bank A is irrelevant. Consider next that condition (2.23) is not fulfilled.
If the regulator wants to implement correlation, he is still not constrained by the
incentive constraint of bank A, and can hence choose the same policy as in the benchmark
case: x̂ = x̂C . If he wants to implement an uncorrelated outcome, he has to choose a
policy that is either procyclical or flat. Procyclical policies are always dominated by flat
policies as the former require higher capital when capital is scarce but have no benefits.
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The regulator hence chooses a flat policy, of which there are two: either he always sets
k = 0 (that is, a threshold of x̂ = x) or k = k (that is, a threshold of x̂ = x). Which of the
two dominates depends on whether in expectation it is beneficial to always induce effort
or not, that is, on the sign of E[4ŨTC (xC)] +E[4ŨTU (xC)] = 4ŨTC (µ) +4ŨTU = 24 ŨTU .
If 4ŨTU > 0, then setting k = k is optimal, otherwise k = 0 is optimal.
In order to determine whether correlation is optimal, we have to compare welfare for
the threshold x̂C (correlation) with welfare under the two flat capital requirements (no
correlation). Thus, we have to compare WC(kx̂C (xC)) with the maximum of WU(kx(xC))
and WU(kx(xC)). The three respective welfare levels are given by:






dxC − pFκ (2.31)
WU(kx(xC) = 2(α + µ+ pHRH + pLRL)− p2Fκ (2.32)
WU(kx(xC) = 2(α + µ+ pHRH + pLRL) + 24 ŨTU − p2Fκ. (2.33)





Figure 2.2: The relationship between the countercyclicality of reserve requirements and
cross-bank correlation
Countercyclicality of reserve requirements is the correlation between the cyclical component of reserve
requirements and real GDP (source: Federico et al. (2012)). Cross-bank correlation is the average
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Bank Heterogeneity and Mergers:
Evidence Using the Deregulation
of US Inter-state Banking
Restrictions
Abstract This paper seeks to test a theory of strategic interaction among banks. This
theory, the last bank banking theory, asserts that bank decisions are strategic substitutes.
This is because healthy banks benefit from the failure of their peers and making different
investment and funding decisions reduces the likelihood of joint failure. I exploit the
deregulation of US interstate banking that occurred during the 80s and early 90s to test
whether banks choose more heterogeneous loan portfolios and funding strategies in order
to reduce the likelihood of joint failure. I find that banks involved in distressed mergers
did increase the overall heterogeneity of their business models. Banks achieved this by
choosing more diverse asset compositions.
3.1. Introduction
In the years after the latest financial crisis, which revealed a large systemic exposure
in the financial sector, understandably a lot of attention is focused on the reasons of
high interrelatedness among banks. Less attention is payed to the incentives for banks
to choose uncorrelated strategies and to become resistant to systemic shocks. On one
side of the table are theoretical models and a growing empirical literature that finds that
banks do indeed herd, and that large banks exploit implicit bailout guarantees, which
all increase systemic risk.
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On the other side are a few papers that argue that banks also have a reason to try to
survive systemic crises, because that offers them rents once a shock hits. The last bank
standing channel put forth by Perotti and Suarez (2002) and Mart́ınez-Miera and Suarez
(2012) postulates that increased market power and/or scarcity rents of capital following
the failure of competing banks induces at least some banks to try to survive the failure
of their peers. This paper seeks to find evidence for the last bank standing channel using
the elimination of cross-state bank merger restrictions in the United States as the source
of exogenous variation.
Prior to the mid 70’s most states in the US had state laws forbidding out-of-state
banks to enter their local markets. Beginning with the mid 1970s, however, several states
passed bills permitting the acquisition of in-state banks by banks chartered in a different
state. This state-by-state process culminated in the passing of a federal law, the 1994
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, which came into force in
1997, eliminating almost all restrictions on cross-state banking acquisitions.
This policy change affected the incentives of banks vis-à-vis other banks in the
same state differently from banks across states. Based on this observation I estimate
a difference-in-difference model to explore whether the balance sheets of affected bank-
pairs diverged over time relative to the balance sheets of unaffected banks, consistent
with the prediction of the last bank standing channel. While cross-state banking re-
strictions existed banks chartered in one state were not permitted to open branches or
acquire the assets of banks in states other than their own. This implies that banks had
no incentives to strategically interact with banks chartered in other states. After the
lifting of the restrictions, however, the expected failure of some banks might have created
potential gains for other banks – irrespective of being located in the same state or not.
Because these benefits could only be realized by solvent, healthy banks, the last bank
standing channel predicts that banks changed their business models relative to their
cross-state peers after deregulation to reduce the likelihood of joint distress. In contrast,
banks are not expected to have changed their business models compared to their peers
within the same state, and can thus serve as a control group.
The basic approach of this paper is a difference-in-difference estimation, where I
compare the balance sheets of pairs of banks located across and within states, before
and after deregulation. I measure balance sheet differences using a measure similar to
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that employed by Cai et al. (2011). I also account for the possibility that some banks
follow a herding strategy. Since this decision is unobservable, I proxy banks’ decision to
try to be last banks standing by being involved in distressed mergers. Distressed mergers
are mergers that involved regulatory intervention and often result in arrangements that
compensate the buyer for future losses suffered on the acquired assets, thus making the
deals more attractive to shareholders. Finally, using non-distressed mergers helps control
for different time trends between cross-state and intra-state bank pairs. The baseline
model of the paper is thus a difference in double-difference model: a difference over time,
between cross-state and within-state, and distressed and non-distressed mergers.
The main finding of this paper is that the dissimilarity between balance sheets of
banks later involved in distressed mergers increased after deregulation for banks located
in different states, relative to same-state bank pairs and banks involved in non-distressed
mergers. Additionally, I also show that the variable I use to measure balance sheet differ-
ences predicts distressed mergers, i.e. two banks are more likely to merge in a distressed
merger (both relative to non-merging banks and banks that merge without regulatory
involvement) if they had more different balance sheets ex ante. I rule out several sources
of potential biases. Firstly, restricting the sample to mergers creates static selection
bias. I control for this bias by including merger fixed effects. Second, the difference-in-
difference approach controls for the apparent concern that bank heterogeneity influences
the likelihood of mergers and the risk of interpreting the causality of results in the wrong
way. Third, I exclude a long period before the date of mergers to mitigate the possibility
that negative shocks and slow adjustment lead to the acquisition of failing banks and
simultaneously increase the heterogeneity measure.
These results are consistent with an endogenous choice of banks to choose an asset
and liability mix that increases the probability that they acquire banks in distress, or
alternatively, that they are acquired when they are facing bankruptcy. In additional
tests I find that deregulation had an impact especially in states that removed cross-state
banking restrictions relatively early. More precisely, I find a significant relative increase
in the difference between the balance sheets of banks involved in cross-state, distressed
mergers in states that deregulated before 1986. In turn, I do not detect a significant
change in the sample of mergers involving banks in states that deregulated after 1986.
This suggests that banks did not anticipate the first wave of deregulation, unlike the
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removal of the restrictions in states that deregulated relatively late, which allowed them
to adjust their balance sheets before the new rules took effect. Alternatively, it is also
possible that the relative benefits of being last bank standing decreased over time. In
an additional test I exclude mergers that occurred after 2006 and I find even stronger
effects consistent with the last bank standing channel. This evidence is also consistent
with declining benefits of business model diversity over the last decades in the US,
however, an alternative explanation is that distressed mergers in the far future are less
precise proxies of banks’ decision to choose a last bank standing strategy.
These results have implications for competition policy and bank regulation. Firstly,
there is only limited evidence on strategic interaction among banks and how this depends
on the likelihood of joint bank failures (Bonfim and Kim, 2012; Jain and Gupta, 1987).
My results suggest that banks respond to changes in their payoffs in systemic crises by
changing their systemic exposures. The changes in their payoffs can be a result of various
policies, such as liquidity provisioning (Farhi and Tirole, 2012), countercyclical capital
requirements (Horváth and Wagner, 2013; Repullo and Suarez, 2013) or other macro
macroprudential tools, such as Pigovian taxes (Perotti and Suarez, 2011). Secondly, the
results show how competition and merger policy interact with bank regulation. A very
restrictive merger policy may have a negative effect on systemic risk by weakening the last
bank standing channel. Similarly, a fully competitive market may not only exacerbate
banks’ individual risk shifting problem, but may also create more systemic risk. An
optimal policy should therefore balance the risk benefits of bank mergers through the
last bank standing channel and contained competition with the social costs of reduced
competition.
This paper relates to several strands of literature. There are several papers analyzing
bank consolidation following deregulation in the US. For instance, Wheelock and Wilson
(2000) investigate the determinants of US bank failures and acquisitions. They find that
less efficient banks are more likely to fail and banks closer to insolvency are more likely
to be acquired. This paper shows that even if ex ante banks have the same amount of
insolvency risk, heterogeneity may arise across banks, because banks can endogenously
choose states of the world in which they approach insolvency.
There is a substantial amount of work done on the relationship between bank effi-
ciency and geography. Berger and DeYoung (2001) find that geographic distance has a
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negative effect on bank performance, although the authors argue that this effect is mod-
est and that some banks may efficiently operate in geographically dispersed multi-bank
holding company structure, while for others a single-market operation is optimal. Uysal
et al. (2008) on the other hand find that local mergers (within a geographic distance
of 100km) offer significantly larger gains than distant ones and argue that information
advantages facilitate the acquisition of local targets. Ferrier and Yeager (2007) find that
local mergers enhance performance within bank holding companies and reduce efficiency
outside BHCs. It appears thus, that while geographic proximity is beneficial for bank
post-merger performance, cross-state bank mergers may also provide benefits. Indeed, I
also find that while most mergers in the sample happen locally, there was a significant
amount of cross-border merger activity after deregulation.
A closely related paper is Goetz et al. (2013) who estimate the effect of geographic
diversification of bank holding company assets across the US on their market valuations.
The authors, like this paper, exploit the process of interstate banking deregulation for
identification purposes and find that an exogenous increase in bank diversification reduces
bank valuation. This effect should reduce banks’ incentives to engage in cross-state
banking to the extent that it results in more geographic complexity within the banking
organization. My results suggests that the valuation reducing effect of this channel was
dominated by the gains of mergers possibly by avoiding bankruptcy costs.
There is a vast literature on the mergers of banks and more generally, non-financial
firms. The literature mostly agrees that on average acquiring banks experience a reduc-
tion in bank valuation (either as seen from stock price changes as in Lobue (1984), Desai
and Stover (1985), James and Weir (1987); Neely (1987); Trifts and Scanlon (1987) or
DeLong (2001a) or by inferring from declining performance measures post merger as in
Rhoades (1986, 1990, 1993, and 1997), Spindt and Tarhan (1992), Linder and Crane
(1993), Peristiani (1993), or Rose (1987)), while target banks gain from the merger.
There is also evidence, however, that there is substantial heterogeneity in mergers and
some characteristics make it more likely that the acquirer benefits from the transaction
(Houston and Ryngaert, 1994; Al-Khasawneh and Essaddam, 2012). However, these
studies do not investigate returns to acquirers and targets in distressed bank mergers,
which to my knowledge is unchartered area.
There is, albeit, evidence on the valuation effects of mergers in other industries. Clark
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and Ofek (1994) find no evidence of successful restructuring through mergers using a
sample of 38 mergers. Using larger samples, however, several papers find that when
the assets of bankrupt or distressed firms are acquired, the acquiring firms experience
positive valuation effects (Bartunek et al., 1995; Hotchkiss and Mooradian, 1998; Jory
and Madura, 2009) as do target firms (Hotchkiss and Mooradian, 1997). Jory and
Madura (2009) also find that the positive valuation effects are especially large when the
acquiring firm is in the same industry as the target firm. This evidence suggests, that
there might be gains from the acquisition of distressed banks, to be reaped by either the
acquirer or the target bank, or both.
I proceed in Section 3.2 by introducing the origins and history of US inter-state
banking restrictions. Section 3.3 discusses the hypotheses and the econometric approach.
Section 3.4 describes the data used in this study, and Section 3.5 presents the results of
the difference-in-difference model. Section 3.6 provides evidence of the appropriateness
of the bank balance sheet heterogeneity measures. I conclude in Section 3.7.
3.2. An overview of the history of US interstate banking deregulation
Kroszner and Strahan (1999) provide a detailed overview of the origins of the interstate
banking restrictions and the process of their dismantling. The authors relate the origins
of the restrictions to the inability of states to freely issue fiat money and taxing interstate
commerce. States derived a sizable portion of their revenues from charter license fees
paid by banks. Since banks chartered in other states were exempt from paying such fees,
each state had an inherent interest in preventing their domestic banking sector from
competition by cross-state banks so as to maximize revenue from local banks. Some
states restricted even intra-state branching, which prevented banks with several banking
units to set up a unified operation, including a common back-office. Each banking unit
of a multi-bank holding company essentially represented a separate bank, each having
to meet regulatory standards on a stand-alone basis.
Until the early 1970s most US states had restrictions on intra-state branching as
well as interstate banking. Between about 1970 and 1992 almost all states removed
these restrictions in a sequential process. This happened on a bilateral basis: states
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passed laws allowing banks chartered in other states to acquire banks in their jurisdiction
if the host state passed a similar law. The first such law was passed by Maine in
1975 allowing out-of-state banks to acquire in-state Maine banks starting 1978. After
that many states entered into reciprocal arrangements, by 1992 most states had some
arrangement allowing inter-state banking.
This process culminated with a national law, the 1994 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking
and Branching Efficiency Act, which effectively removed all restrictions on inter-state
banking at the national level. The Act came into force in 1997. Interestingly, federal
legislators amended the Bank Holding Company Act in 1982 as part of the Garn-St
Germain Act, after which failed banks and thrifts could be acquired by any bank holding
company, regardless of any state regulation. This does not affect my analysis, since the
sample excludes bank holding companies.18
It is essential for the identification strategy in this paper that deregulation be exoge-
nous with respect to bank heterogeneity. Several papers investigate the origins of the
restrictions and the drivers of deregulation. Economides et al. (1995) show that small
banks lobbied for general deposit insurance and strict branching restrictions in order to
protect themselves from competition by larger, more efficient banks. The lobbying power
of small banks proved strong over the decades before deregulation took off as suggested
by White (1998), who shows that small banks successfully lobbied to increase deposit
insurance limits up until the 1980s.
Strahan (2003) argues that several events contributed to a shift in the political balance
between advocates and opponents of the restrictions. The Office of the Comptroller
exploited a loophole in the laws to allow nationally chartered banks to branch freely
under certain circumstances (see Strahan, 2003), which created a precedent. The failure
of many savings and loan associations in the 1980s also changed the public perception
of the laws, since they prohibited a better diversified, more resilient banking sector.
In the 1970s and 1980s, however, the political landscape changed as a result of tech-
nological change. As Kroszner and Strahan (1999) explain, technological and financial
innovations, such as cash machine tellers and credit scoring reduced the relative advan-
tage of local banking, which tipped the balance to expansion-oriented, large banks in
18Any bias from banks endogenously converting to bank holding company structure should reduce
the likelihood that I find a significant result and so I am not concerned about this particular possible
bias.
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the political struggle between opponents and supporters of geographic restrictions. As
evidence they show that states with fewer small banks deregulated sooner, as well as
states where small banks are financially weaker. Thus, while deregulation itself was a
result of an exogenous process (technological advances), the timing of its implementation
seems to be endogenous.
This means, that cross-sectional comparisons between states the deregulated and
did not deregulate may give results that are difficult to interpret in a causal sense.
To illustrate the problem, take banks in a single year. If one were to find that banks
in states that already deregulated have more heterogenous balance sheets relative to
banks in states that prohibit entry by banks chartered in other states, then it could be
that banks chose to become more diverse after deregulation. However, it could also be
that bank size and balance sheet heterogeneity are positively correlated and large banks
successfully lobbied for deregulation.
Differencing, however, takes care of such concerns. In the regressions I exploit varia-
tion over time, similarly to Strahan (2003), who uses a difference-in-difference approach
to estimate the effect of deregulation on economic performance. In the example above
if banks did not change their balance sheets over time and the cross-sectional correla-
tion between deregulation and balance sheet diversity is a result of banks’ lobbying for
early deregulation, then the difference-in-difference estimator should correctly yield a
zero coefficient on the parameter of interest.
3.3. Hypotheses and econometric approach
In this section I describe the economic channel I aim to identify, then I explain how
the lifting of the cross-state banking restrictions in the US can be used as a natural
experiment for this purpose.
3.3.1. Last bank standing channel
The last bank standing theory predicts that bank decisions are strategic substitutes
because surviving banks can benefit from the failure of their peers. For example healthy
banks can reap the gains from increased market power as a result of fewer competing
banks on the market; they can take over distressed banks’ assets at fire sale prices; or
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through mergers, potentially backed by regulatory assistance. As an example of the last
channel, in the US the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) signs so called
loss-sharing agreements with acquirers of distressed banks. In these agreements the
FDIC takes over some of the future losses on the loans in the acquired banks’ books.
So while a failed bank may have negative market value, its acquisition can be a positive
NPV transaction for the acquirer.
Bank decisions being strategic substitutes means that banks have an incentive to
avoid investing in the same assets, lending to the same industries or choosing similar
funding strategies. The reason for this is simple: the gains from surviving the failure
of another bank can only be realized if the acquiring bank itself is not facing financial
difficulties: a distressed bank is less likely to be able to fill the gap in credit supply created
by the distress of other banks because of funding constraints, while bidding for fire-sale
assets is also more difficult for the same reason. Since common exposures on both the
asset and liability sides of banks’ balance sheets increase the likelihood of experiencing
distress at the same time, the last bank standing channel asserts that banks invest in
different assets, lend to different sectors and/or choose different funding strategies. For
example, a bank that wants to benefit from such a contrarian strategy may choose not
to extend commercial loans if other banks have large exposure to that sector. Keeping
a larger equity buffer or relying less on short-term wholesale funding is another strategy
to avoid joint failure.
3.3.2. Empirical strategy
Empirically identifying strategic interaction is a difficult task, because the expected
pattern, say healthy banks acquiring the assets of failing banks, can also be a result of
luck, risk aversion or other exogenous factors. In this paper I use the lifting of the cross-
state banking restrictions in the U.S. as a source of exogenous variation. The idea behind
this is that this policy change arguably changed the incentives of banks to strategically
interact if they were located in different states. In particular, take two banks from
different states. Before the policy change they operated in separate markets and as such
they did not directly compete with one another and could not acquire the assets of the
other bank. Consequently, they had no incentive to strategically interact. This changed,
however, with the implementation of bilateral agreements between states to allow state-
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chartered banks to mutually enter the other state’s market. Once such an agreement
between two states was in effect the scope for banks of these states to strategically
interact widened. This suggests that banks located across state borders might have
increased the difference between their business models after the policy change in order
to avoid joint distress. The policy change did not affect the regulatory environment for
banks vis-à-vis other banks located in the same state, since acquisition of other same-
state chartered banks’ assets and direct competition was already allowed before. This
suggests that banks had no incentive to change the composition of their balance sheets
relative to other banks of the same state.
The empirical strategy of this paper rests on the hypothesis that banks increased the
relative dissimilarity of their business models compared to banks located in other states,
while they did not do so relative to their peers in the same state following the lifting
of cross-state banking restrictions. To capture this difference I estimate a difference-in-
difference model on quarterly merger level observations, where I compare the change of
the similarity of bank balance sheets of pairs of banks located in different states, from
before to after the policy change, with the change in the similarity of pairs of banks
located in the same state. In principle one could use the sample of all pair-wise relations
between banks to test the hypothesis that banks’ balance sheets became more diverse
across states relative to intrastate bank relationships. This is technically challenging,
since the number of all pairwise combinations of banks is large. This problem could be
alleviated by looking at more aggregated measures of bank balance sheet diversity, for
instance at the county instead of bank-pair level. However, there is also a theoretical
argument for restricting the sample of all possible cross-state pair-wise bank relations
for the purpose of identifying the last bank standing channel. The argument is that
not all banks are expected to follow this strategy. In fact, there is a large literature,
which argues that bank decisions are strategic complements as a result of which banks
follow similar investment and funding strategies. The herding literature argues that
strategic complementarity arises because of bailout policies Acharya and Yorulmazer
(2007), managerial incentives Rajan (1994), or portfolio diversification Wagner (2010).
It is likely that in reality at least some banks choose a herding strategy to take
advantage of the gains that it provides. For example in Mart́ınez-Miera and Suarez
(2012) banks can invest in a systemic asset, which yields the same return for all banks
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that invested in it, and in idiosyncratic assets with uncorrelated returns. They show
that in equilibrium a fraction of banks invest in systemic assets, taking advantage of
risk-shifting due to limited liability; while the rest of the banks choose non-systemic in-
vestments, capitalizing on high rents received when systemic banks are undercapitalized.
The last banking standing strategy and herding may thus coexist. This, however, makes
identification more difficult, since we do not observe banks’ strategy choice. To overcome
this problem I use the outcome of being involved in a distressed merger as a proxy for
a bank’s decision to aim to become a last bank standing. I operationalize this idea by
restricting the sample to pairs of banks that merged while one of them was in distress.
Additionally, in some specifications I also include non-distressed mergers. These obser-
vations are useful because they help eliminate differences in time trends between intra
and inter-state bank-pairs. I explain this in greater detail below.
To summarize, I expect that by comparing pairs of banks that were later involved
in a distressed merger I find that the difference between their business models increased
after the lifting of cross-state banking restrictions if they were located in different states
relative to pairs of banks chartered in the same state. The setting in this paper is some-
what different from a traditional natural experiment setup, in which a group of subjects
receive treatment and one looks for a change in behavior after the intervention. In this
case the intervention removes a special treatment by allowing cross-state banks to have
the same status as intra-state acquirers. Another difference is that after the treatment
banks eventually merge, which is endogenous with respect to banks’ heterogeneity de-
cision. Therefore, restricting the sample to distressed mergers creates a selection bias.
This bias is similar to an omitted variable bias Heckman (1979). Note that sample se-
lection in this case is static, because it depends on bank characteristics at the time of
the merger. Thus, merger fixed effects can control for selection bias.
3.4. Data
The sample consists of all bank mergers in the United States since 1976 up to 2013.
Information on the mergers of banks and bank holding companies (BHC) is published
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. I exclude bank holding companies for several
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Figure 3.1: Timeline








reasons. Firstly, the multi-bank structure of some BHCs creates complications about
the calculation of the distance measures, for instance it is not clear if I should use
consolidated balance sheet data for BHCs when I compare them with stand-alone banks
or treat each subsidiary as a separate observation. Second, the 1982 Garn-St Germain
Act allowed BHCs to acquire failing banks across states before the majority of state level
deregulation started.
I match the merger database with balance sheet data from Call Reports. Next, I
drop all banks from the sample that changed location from one state to another during
the sample period. One concern about the econometric setup is that as a bank receives
negative shocks to its balance sheet it becomes more likely to become a target in a dis-
tressed merger. To tackle this endogeneity problem I exclude 20 quarters of observations
prior to the merger, based on the assumption that a bank can recapitalize or readjust
its loan portfolio in five years if it intends to. Finally, I exclude observations more than
50 quarters before and after the date of deregulation. I do so to make the panel more
balanced, as there are only few observations at either end of the sample period. Fig-
ure 3.1 explains the timeline of events: the pre and post-deregulation period each consist
of 50 quarters, unless the merger happened sooner than 70 quarters after deregulation,
in which case the post-deregulation period ends 20 quarters before the merger date.
Finally, I winsorize all bank level data at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce
potential biases due to outliers. In the final sample I have 149,788 quarterly balance
sheet observations spanning the years from 1976Q2 through 2000Q4 of banks merged
during the years of 1976 through 2013.
The main dependent variable is a measure of how different banks’ business models
are. To construct this variable I first define and calculate a set of balance sheet ratios
and financial variables, which then I aggregate into an overall index. This index reflects
the distance between the financial ratios of two banks. For banks i and j in quarter t it
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(xift − xjft)2, (3.1)
where f indexes financial variables denoted by x. This approach is similar to Cai et al.
(2011) who use this measure to measure the similarity of banks’ loan portfolios. In their
case x is the share of loans a bank extended to firms in a given sector relative to total
loans.
I follow two general criteria to select the dimensions (x) along which I compare banks:
1) they should be commonly used variables to describe bank balance sheet decisions
both on the asset and liability sides19, and 2) they should have sufficient data coverage
throughout the sample period. The second criterion is important, because some of the
variables were not reported in early years in the Call Reports. After reviewing data
availability I arrived at the following bank characteristics:
The shares of lending to the real estate, agriculture, commercial, household, credit
card, and all other sectors relative to total loans are the first set of financial ratios.
Next, total loans to total assets measures how much a bank is involved in traditional
loan extension and how much it relies on fee generating business. Fixed assets to total
assets is a proxy for the size of a bank’s branch network, which is related to how it
acquires deposits and retail customers. The last asset side component is credit growth,
which is excess credit growth of a bank relative to the median county level credit growth,
capturing a bank’s aggressiveness in loan expansion.
On the liability side I include leverage, defined as total liabilities to total assets,
to reflect a bank’s capitalization level, which is the primary buffer for banks to absorb
losses. Deposits to total liabilities is a measure of how much stable funds a bank has
and finally deposit growth is excess growth of deposits relative to the median bank in
19 Most of the theoretical literature took the approach of modeling the endogenous correlation of
shocks to banks’ balance sheets as a portfolio choice decision (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007; Acharya,
2009; Farhi and Tirole, 2012). For example, in Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) banks choose the
industry in which they invest, which determines the correlation of their portfolio returns. However,
endogenously correlated bank funding shocks are also possible and plausible. The choice between more
whole sale, short term funding and stable deposit funding can be one such example. An early version
of Chapter 2 featured a theoretical model in which banks chose the correlation between their funding
costs. In addition, while the correlation of shocks is assumed to be determined on the asset side in the
above cited papers, strategic complementarities may arise on the liability side, as in Farhi and Tirole
(2012). In their paper banks herd on excessively relying on short debt financing in expectation of a
bailout when a systemic shock arrives.
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the county of residence.
I then aggregate these components into an overall index of dissimilarity of two banks’
business models (Total distance) and two subindices measuring dissimilarity on the asset
(Asset distance) and liability sides (Liability distance).
Next, data on the time of state-by-state deregulation are obtained from Amel (1993).
This contains for each state the year of the first bilateral agreement with another state
allowing inter-state banking. The dummy variable Post indicates that the state where
the target bank is chartered had at least one bilateral agreement allowing cross-state
banking in a given quarter. Table 3.A2 in the Appendix lists the years of deregulation
for each state.
I also create several dummy variables for bank-pair characteristics. Cross-state is a
dummy variable indicating that banks are chartered in different states. Distressed is a
dummy variable, which indicates that there was regulatory involvement in the merger.
Among the control variables are bank and county characteristics separately for ac-
quiring and target banks. Bank size (Acquirer) is taken to be the natural logarithm
of total assets of the acquirer. Bank size (Target) is similarly calculated for the target
bank. I control for differences in size because small banks may choose to follow a herd-
ing strategy to exploit too-many-to-fail subsidies, and because large banks may have
better diversification opportunities, which would also affect the similarity of their loan
portfolios.
Average total/asset/liability distance (Acquirer) and Average total/asset/liability
distance (Target) are included to capture county level trends in bank heterogeneity. It
is calculated as follows. Suppose bank i acquired bank j. Then for each bank i that
reported Call reports (thus including those that never merged) I calculate the average
pairwise distance measure yklt between all other banks (i.e. for all i, j 6= {k, l}) in the
county of bank i. This yields a bank specific, county level measure of bank heterogeneity
for the acquirer bank. Average distance figures are obtained similarly for target banks.
Next, the number of banks in the county of a target bank’s location (No banks (Tar-
get)) proxies for competition and thus the potential benefits from a merger, suggesting
a negative relationship between the number of banks and the incentives to try to merge
with a failing bank. Contrary to this channel, a higher number of banks in the vicinity
of target banks may increase the chances of a bailout should a systemic failure occur,
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which benefits the acquirer if it is correlated with the target bank. The number of banks
in the county of the acquiring bank (No banks (Acquirer)) controls for differences in the
likelihood of being able to acquire a failing bank as well as the potential benefits from a
merger, since a higher number of local banks increases the number of potential bidders.
Finally, I include merger, time and in some specifications state-time dummies. The lat-
ter control for macroeconomic factors, such as GDP growth and inflation, which may
be correlated with both bank heterogeneity and the propensity to merge. Other factors
that influence the likelihood of mergers that are constant over time, such as geographic
distance, are controlled for by merger fixed effects.
Table 3.1 shows descriptive statistics of the main variables. Figures 3.2-3.4 show the
evolution of average bank distance measures for four subsamples depending on wether
the banks were involved in a distressed merger and whether they were located in the same
state. Figure 3.2 shows that throughout the sample period non-distressed, intra-state
mergers involved more similar banks than other types of merger. Prior to deregulation
all bank-pairs seem to have been on a similar trajectory in terms of the diversity of
their business models. After deregulation, banks that were later involved in distressed
mergers, across states, chose different business models as measured by the distance index.
This tendency remained throughout the post-deregulation era, except for a brief interim
period. The slightly higher balance sheet difference for this short period is a result of
two trends. Banks located in different states became more similar over time, which may
be the result of better geographic diversification after deregulation and an increase in
the diversity of banks that later merged in an intra-state, distressed merger.20
Figure 3.3 shows similar tendencies in bank asset heterogeneity to what we have seen
in Figure 3.2. The graph of Liability distance in Figure 3.4 reveals small differences
between the four groups of merging banks. In particular, the difference between the
liabilities of banks involving cross-state mergers is larger than that of banks that merged
within a state. This can indicate that there were cross-border barriers to accessing local
funding markets and banks could have gained access to more diversified funding through
merger.
20It is difficult to pin down the exact reasons of short term fluctuations in the balance sheet distance
variables, because various state and country level macroeconomic shocks also affect them. I control for
these shocks in the regressions.
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3.4.1. Parallel paths assumption
The interpretation of the empirical results in this paper rests on the parallel paths
assumption. In a typical case this means that the outcome variable of the treatment
and control groups follow the same trends before and after the treatment in the absence
of treatment. Since the outcome variable of the treated group without treatment is
not observable post-treatment, this assumption is not testable. Instead, it is common
practice to test the equality of the trends of the treatment and control groups pre-
treatment.
While I assume a version of the parallel paths, which I formally spell out in sec-
tion 3.5, in this paper the pre-treatment equality of trends is not testable. The reason
for this is that the policy-change removed a source of heterogeneity, and as a result,
the “treatment” and control groups are expected to be heterogenous before, and in the
absence of immediate adjustment, after the policy change. Instead, I compare groups
of banks near the end of the sample period, by which time I assume all adjustment has
taken place. The results are presented in Tables 3.3 and 3.4.
Table 3.3 shows the number of observations, means and standard deviations of balance
sheet variables, also used to calculate the balance sheet distance variables, at the end of
1999, for four subsamples: acquiring banks involved in distressed, cross-state mergers;
distressed intra-state mergers; non-distressed, cross-state mergers and non-distressed,
intra-state mergers. Table 3.4 shows the same statistics for various groups of target
banks. The tables show that there is limited variation in the means of the variables
across groups. For example, the means of the Share of real estate loans (relative to total
loans) are 0.544, 0.588, 0.593 and 0.599 in the four groups of acquiring banks. In about
half the cases the F tests on the joint equality of the means are accepted, in the other
half they are rejected (not reported). Still, the message of these tables is that the four
groups of acquired banks, and the four groups of target banks, which form the basis of




In this section I present how bank balance sheet differences changed after deregulation for
different groups of banks depending on whether they were located in different states and
whether they merged in a distressed merger. The prediction of the last bank standing
channel is that the differences of the balance sheets of banks located in different states
increased relative to same-state banks, especially in the sample of banks that merged in
distress.
3.5.1. Changes in the unconditional means of bank business model distance
Table 3.2 shows the unconditional changes in the three balance sheet distance variables
for various subgroups. The mean of Total distance for distressed, cross-state mergers be-
fore deregulation is 0.423, which increased by 0.0239 on average in the post-deregulation
period. This is consistent with these banks changing their balance sheets to position
themselves to be able to benefit from the potential failure of other banks. However, this
could also be a result of sample selection: more different banks being more likely to
merge in a distressed merger. Thus, this has to be compared against the change in Total
distance for banks involved in distressed mergers within the same state, which is 0.0153.
Overall, the increase in the unconditional mean in Total distance is thus larger for the
focus group than for the control group.
The change of Total distance between banks that were involved in non-distressed
mergers is much smaller. Among cross-state banks the change is in fact negative (-0.02),
while slightly positive among bank-pairs in the same state (0.007). It is worth noting
that the changes among same-state banks, in either distressed or non-distressed mergers,
are closer to zero than either group of cross-state pairs of banks. This is encouraging,
because bank-to-bank differences within the same state should have been affected the
least by the policy for the natural experiment to be valid.
Turning to Asset distance, I find similar patterns to those obtained for Total distance.
On the other hand, banks were less different even before deregulation, and the changes
are also much less significant, on the liability side. Finally, Liability distance for all four
groups of bank-pairs seems to have followed similar trends, as the respective changes from
before deregulation to after deregulation are 0.003 for cross-state, distressed mergers;
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intra-state, distressed mergers; and intra-state, non-distressed mergers; and 0.005 for
cross-state, non-distressed mergers.
While comparing unconditional means is illuminating, it does not provide an exact
estimate of the effect of the policy change. In the next section I present the results of
the difference-in-difference regressions, which are better suited for this purpose.
3.5.2. Difference-in-difference regressions
In regression (1) of Table 3.5 the dependent variable is the overall distance measure and
the sample includes all distressed mergers. The variable of interest is Post×Cross-state
and it obtains a negative, albeit insignificant coefficient of -0.0235. This negative result
could be because deregulation affected cross-border bank heterogeneity differently from
intra-state heterogeneity. I later explore this possibility in regressions (2)-(4). Still in
regression (1), Post has a positive, but insignificant coefficient, which is consistent with
the hypothesis that banks located within the same state had no incentives to increase
or decrease the relative distance of their business models from one another. Next, both
target size and acquirer size are negatively related to the heterogeneity between merging
banks (as shown by the negative coefficients on Size (Target) and Size (Acquirer)), but
this effect declines with size as captured by the negative coefficients on the quadratic
terms. This pattern is consistent with larger banks’ better diversification opportunities,
which results in more similar business strategies for these banks. There also seems to
be a positive peer effect, in that mergers taking place in counties where banks’ balance
sheets are more diverse themselves involved more heterogeneous banks in the transaction
as shown by the positive and significant coefficients on Average total distance (for both
target and acquiring banks). This is consistent with herding behavior. Lastly, the num-
ber of banks in the county of either the target or the acquirer bank is negatively related
to bank balance sheet differences. This is expected, as a higher number of competitors in
the vicinity of the target should ceteris paribus lower the benefits from bank take-overs
and hence the incentives to distort the optimal business mix in expectation of a possible
merger.
It is possible that I do not detect a significant change in bank balance sheet differences
among cross-state bank-pairs, because there was a general trend among banks of different
states to become more similar. Such a tendency could be explained by an increase
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in competition closer to state borders as well as banks’ increased options to diversify
geographically (cf. Goetz et al., 2013). I control for differences in trends between inter
and intra-state bank-pairs by extending the sample to include non-distressed mergers.
Triple differencing then eliminates trends under the assumption that same-state (cross-
state) banks involved in distressed mergers would have followed the same trend paths as
same-state (cross-state) banks involved in non-distressed mergers, had deregulation not
taken place. To see how, assume that the distance between bank i and j’s balance sheet





























where y is the balance sheet distance measure as defined before, superscript d (n) de-
notes distressed (non-distressed) mergers and superscript i (x) indicates that the banks
involved in the merger are located in the same (different) state(s). For simplicity as-
sume that there are only two time periods, t = 1 before deregulation and t = 2 after







ijt are random error terms. The critical assumption
is that intra-state (cross-state) bank-pairs follow the same trends irrespective of wether
they were involved in distressed or non-distressed mergers. Triple differencing then elim-

















In column (2) of Table 3.5 I report the results of estimating a regression of Total
distance on the triple interaction between Cross-state, Post and Distressed. In addition
to the control variables of regression (1) I also add the interaction between Post and
Distressed and two sets of state-time dummies for target and acquiring banks. These
dummies capture all time varying macroeconomic factors that might be related to the
balance sheets of banks and thus the distance measure. For example, an economic
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downturn can push some banks into distress and simultaneously increase the correla-
tion between banks. The sample now includes all mergers in the US between 1976 and
2013. The triple interaction obtains a positive coefficient of 0.0477, which is signifi-
cant at ten percent. Post × Cross-state obtains a negative and significant coefficient
(−0.0623). These results suggest that overall cross-state bank heterogeneity decreased
after deregulation relative to intra-state bank heterogeneity. This effect is significantly
smaller among banks that were later involved in distressed mergers, which is consistent
with the last bank standing channel. Furthermore, the coefficient of Post×Distressed
is insignificant and negative. Thus, banks involved in intra-state distressed mergers did
not become significantly more different after the policy change, which is expected given
that their incentives were not changed. As in regression (1) I find that overall bank
heterogeneity increased over time in the sample of merging banks as witnessed by the
positive coefficient of Post. The other variables obtain very similar coefficients compared
with those in regression (1): the signs, magnitudes and significance levels are all very
similar. This suggests that bank business model differences of banks later involved in
distressed mergers do not correlate significantly differently with observables then those
of banks later involved in non-distressed mergers. This justifies the pooling of distressed
and non-distressed mergers in regressions (2)-(4).
Let us consider now the magnitudes of the estimated effects. The interpretation of
the coefficients is not easy because of the triple-differencing. For simplicity let us just
take the coefficient of the triple interaction. The estimated effect of deregulation on Total
distance that cannot be explained by trends in balance sheet difference of banks that
merged in distress and were located across states, and of banks that merged in ordinary
mergers, is then 0.0477, as seen in regression (2) of Table 3.5. Thus, the increase in bank
heterogeneity attributable to other factors, including the last bank channel, is about 27%
of one standard deviation of Total distance, which equals 0.174 (as seen in Table 3.1).
I next look at Asset distance and Liability distance. This breakdown sheds further
light on the behavior of banks involved in distressed mergers. Regression (3) of Table 3.5
is analogous to regression (2) with the exception that the dependent variable is the Asset
distance index. The main variable of interest, Post×Cross-state×Distressed, obtains a
positive and significant (at ten percent) coefficient of 0.0550. As before, I find that banks
involved in intra-state non-distressed mergers became more different after deregulation
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as shown by the positive coefficient on Post. Cross-state merging banks on the other
hand became more similar, as the sum of the coefficients on Post×Cross-state and Post
is negative (−0.214 = −0.0575+0.0361). Lastly, In regression (4) the dependent variable
is the liability distance measure. In this case I do not find a positive effect, the relevant
coefficient estimate is negative (-0.00449) and insignificant. Meanwhile, the tendencies
among cross-state non-distressed mergers and intrastate mergers are very similar to the
case when asset, rather than liability distance, is considered. This is shown by the
significant coefficients of Post×Cross-state and Post, -0.0192 and 0.0271, respectively.
3.5.3. Robustness checks
In this section I carry out a number of additional tests to confirm the robustness of the
results. First, I shorten the period during which banks’ balance sheets are analyzed to
include 30 quarters before and after deregulation, while still excluding at least 20 quarters
before the date of a merger. Second, I exclude mergers that occurred during 2007 or
later. The latter serves two purposes: on the one hand the industry might have changed
during the time period between the elimination of cross-state banking restrictions and
the second half of the 2000s. This period is at least a decade long if one counts from
the passing the Riegle-Neal Act, which removed barriers to cross-state banking federally,
and nearly three decades long in some states that deregulated early. It is not likely that
banks that were potential targets remain so for such a long period. Second, the cut-off
year serves to exclude the effect of the crisis.
The results are presented in Table 3.6. In regressions (1)-(3) I reestimate regressions
(2)-(4) of Table 3.5, but the regressions include at most 30 quarters of observations
before and after the end of the year in which the state of the target bank deregulated. In
regression (1) Total distance is the dependent variable and the variable of interest is the
triple interaction of Distressed, Post and cross-state. This obtains a positive coefficient
of 0.0441, which is significant at 10 percent. In regression (2) the dependent variable
is Asset distance and the coefficient of the triple interaction term is also positive (at
0.0480) and significant. Lastly, in the Liability distance regression in column 3 the triple
interaction obtains an insignificant coefficient. Thus, the result, that banks involved in
cross-state, distressed mergers had more different balance sheets after deregulation than
banks that merged inside a state or not in distress, seems robust to the length of the
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observation period around deregulation.21
In the right hand side panel the observation period is ±50 quarters around the end of
the year of deregulation, as in Table 3.5, but the sample excludes mergers after 2006. In
regression (4) total distance is regressed, among other variables, on the triple interaction
of Distressed, Post and cross-state, which has a coefficient of 0.122, significant at the
5 percent level. Replacing the dependent variable by asset distance yields a similarly
significant coefficient on the triple interaction of 0.108. Finally, in the liability distance
regression the triple interaction has a coefficient of 0.0643, also significant at five percent.
Compared to the analogous regressions in Table 3.5, when the full sample is considered,
the estimated effect of the deregulation seems larger, as evidenced by the larger coef-
ficient estimates of the triple interactions. In addition, while the triple interaction has
a negative, insignificant coefficient in the liability distance regression (regression (4) in
Table 3.5), this coefficient is positive and significant when the mergers close to the end
of the sample period are ommitted (see in regression (3) in Table 3.6). This pattern
is expected since banks, that merged close to the end of the sample period, may not
have anticipated a potential merger so far in the future at the time of deregulation, or
alternatively, they may not have been competitors then. This suggests that they might
have lacked an interest to play a strategic game to become last bank standing, in turn
explaining the stronger results in the right panel of Table 3.6, when only mergers closer
to deregulation are considered.
3.5.4. The effect of early deregulation
In this section I investigate whether banks in states that deregulated early changed their
balance sheets after deregulation has occurred more relative to banks in states that were
slow to deregulate. This is expected if banks, in states that entered into agreements
with other states to allow cross-state banking relatively late, anticipated deregulation,
and changed their lending and funding activities before the new laws were in effect.
Banks in states that were early adopters, on the other hand, might not have expected
deregulation, suggesting that any adjustment took place after deregulation. To answer
this question I split the sample into target banks that are headquartered in states that
21In unreported regressions I find qualitatively similar results when the observation period is ±20
or ±40 quarters around the year of deregulation. In particular, in both the total and asset distance




deregulated before the end of 1986 and banks located in all other states. 1986 yields
an approximately equal number of states that are early adopters (28 states) and late
adopters (23 states).
Table 3.7 shows the results of regressions analogous to regressions (2)-(4) of Ta-
ble 3.5, for the two subsamples. In regressions (1)-(3) the sample is restricted to mergers
where the state of the target bank deregulated before 1986. In the total distance and
asset distance regressions, in columns (1) and (2), the triple interactions obtain positive
coefficients at 0.0561 and 0.0623, respectively, both significant at ten percent. The coef-
ficient in the liability distance regression, on the other, yields a negative and insignificant
coefficient on the focus variable.
Turning to the sample of mergers, where the target banks’ states deregulated after
1986, in regressions (4)-(6) I find no significant coefficients on the triple interactions
regardless of the balance sheet distance variable. To be precise, in columns (4)-(6) we
can see that when total distance or asset distance is regressed on the interaction of
Distressed, Post and cross-state, the estimated coefficients are positive, but about an
order smaller than in regressions (1)-(2), in which the sample is restricted to states that
deregulated early. When the dependent variable is liability distance the magnitude of
the relevant coefficient is about the same in regression (6) as in regression (3), and is
also insignificant. These results suggest that banks did not anticipate the relaxation of
cross-state banking restrictions in the early phase of the deregulation, and hence, did
not adjust a priori. Conversely, banks might have anticipated that further elimination
of the restrictions was coming ahead after the initial wave of deregulation, and adjusted
already before the new agreements were implemented.
3.6. Probability of merger
The aim of this section is to test if the distance measures predict distressed mergers. I
test this by running probit regressions. Before describing the specifics of the regressions,
I explain the construction of the sample used in this section.
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3.6.1. Sample and methodology
Since the total number of possible bank relations is large (N(N−1)/2), I create a sample
from random draws that has a manageable size. First I take all target banks from the
merger sample used in the previous sections. Then I randomly select (with replacement)
40 banks for each failing and non-failing target bank, where failing targets are those
involved in distressed mergers and non-failing target banks are all other targets. Since
most mergers happen locally or within small distances, I limit the sample of “acquirer
candidates” to banks headquartered at most 250km away from the target bank. Without
this restriction I would have a diminishingly small proportion of actual mergers in the
sample.
I then create a dummy variable, which takes the value of one if the randomly selected
bank-pair actually merged and zero otherwise. Similarly, I create a dummy variable,
which I call Distressed, to indicate that the target bank was a failing bank. Finally,
I calculate the distance variables for all bank pairs and calculate the average distance
during the post-deregulation period for each bank-pair. Using the thus obtained cross-
sectional sample I estimate the likelihood of mergers conditional on the distance variables
and their interactions with Distressed.
3.6.2. Results
Columns (1) to (3) of Table 3.8 present the results of probit regressions using the three
distance measures: total distance, asset distance and liability distance, in this order. I
find that for both total distance and asset distance more similar banks are more likely
to merge if the target bank was not failing as suggested by the negative and significant
coefficient on the business model distance variable. For failing target banks, however,
more different banks seem more likely to be successful bidders. In regressions (1) and
(2) the coefficients of the interaction between either Total or Asset distance and the
distressed dummy are positive and significant at least at 10 percent. The total impact
of business model distance is also positive, although the t-tests cannot reject the null of
it being significantly different from zero (the tests yield a p value of 0.22 in both cases).
Nonetheless, consistent with my expectations, the results suggest that more different
banks are more likely to be able to acquire failing banks. Consistently with the results
in the previous section, where I did not find a significant impact of deregulation on
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Liability distance, I do not find a significant relationship between this distance measure
and the likelihood of a distressed merger.
The results in this section can be used to provide an estimate of the impact of
deregulation on the likelihood that a bank successfully acquired a distressed bank in
another state. To calculate this figure I take the average of Total distance in the group
of cross-state, distressed mergers before deregulation, which equals 0.423 as seen in
Table 3.2. Using the estimates of regression (1) in Table 3.8, the estimated conditional
likelihood that a bank acquired a distressed bank is Φ(−2.269−0.461+(−0.432+0.711)∗
0.423) = 0.0045, where Φ denotes the cumulative density function of the standard normal
distribution. Adding the effect of deregulation, which is the coefficient on the triple
interaction in regression (2) in Table 3.5, yields an increased probability of Φ(−2.269−
0.461 + (−0.432 + 0.711) ∗ (0.423 + 0.0477)) = 0.0047. This means that the adjustment
in banks’ balance sheets after deregulation, possibly as a result of the last bank standing
channel, increased the probability that they can acquire a failing bank by about 2 basis
points, or 4% = (0.0047-0.0045)/0.0045. This may seem a small change at first glance,
but it can be economically significant. The reason for this is that this estimate is for
any year, when on average few banks go bankrupt. In a crisis bank failures are much
more likely, so the increase in the conditional probability of acquiring a failing bank in
a systemic crisis is probably much larger.
3.7. Conclusions
In this paper I introduced a new measure of bank business model difference based on
balance sheet data. This measure predicts distressed bank mergers in the sense that
the more different two banks are the higher the conditional likelihood that they merge
given that one of the banks is in distress. Furthermore, using this measure I showed that
banks located across state borders became more different after the lifting of cross-state
banking restrictions in the US, if they were later involved in distressed mergers, relative
to banks involved in distressed mergers within the same state. This suggests that there
were gains for certain banks from becoming more different from their cross-state peers
once they were allowed to acquire banks in other states. Furthermore, the adjustment
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took place on the asset side of banks’ balance sheets.
The results suggest that there is scope for policies that aim at containing ex ante
systemic risk by reducing the incentives for banks to engage in excessive systemic risk
taking. One way of achieving this is through competition policy: allowing banks to
acquire failing banks at attractive prices could improve financial stability. One can push
this even further by subsidizing the acquisition of failed banks, for which there are various
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Table 3.A2: Year of deregulation by state
The table shows the year when a state first entered an arrangement with another state to allow inter-
state banking in the other state’s jurisdiction.
State Year State Year
Alabama 1987 Montana 1993
Alaska 1982 Nebraska 1990
Arizona 1986 Nevada 1985
Arkansas 1989 New Hampshire 1987
California 1987 New Jersey 1986
Colorado 1988 New Mexico 1989
Connecticut 1983 New York 1982
Delaware 1988 North Carolina 1985
District of Columbia 1985 North Dakota 1991
Florida 1985 Ohio 1985
Georgia 1985 Oklahoma 1987
Hawaii 1997 Oregon 1986
Idaho 1985 Pennsylvania 1986
Illinois 1986 Rhode Island 1984
Indiana 1986 South Carolina 1986
Iowa 1991 South Dakota 1988
Kansas 1992 Tennessee 1985
Kentucky 1984 Texas 1987
Louisiana 1987 Utah 1984
Maine 1978 Vermont 1988
Maryland 1985 Virginia 1985
Massachusetts 1983 Washington 1987
Michigan 1986 West Virginia 1988
Minnesota 1986 Wisconsin 1987
Mississippi 1988 Wyoming 1987
Missouri 1986
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Table 3.A3: Call report items used to calculate financial ratios
Variable Call report cell id
Total loans rcfd2122 + rcfd2165 prior to July 1,




Real estate loans rcfd1410
Loans to agriculture rcfd1590
Commerical loans rcfd1600
Household loans rcfd1975






Figure 3.2: Total distance over time
The graph plots the average of Total distance among groups of merging banks. Total distance is the
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Figure 3.3: Asset distance over time
The graph plots the average of Asset distance among groups of merging banks. Asset distance is the
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Figure 3.4: Liability distance over time
The graph plots the average of Liability distance among groups of merging banks. Liability distance is
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of the main variables
# of obs Mean SD Min Max
Total distance 149647 0.378 0.174 0.0241 1.540
Asset distance 149647 0.356 0.168 0.0101 1.447
Liability distance 149647 0.0984 0.0907 0.000442 0.860
Average total distance (Acquirer) 149647 0.379 0.110 0.0443 1.277
Average total distance (Target) 149647 0.376 0.106 0.0443 1.373
Average asset distance (Acquirer) 149647 0.357 0.101 0.0286 1.237
Average asset distance (Target) 149647 0.356 0.0981 0.0335 1.237
Average liability distance (Acquirer) 149647 0.104 0.0668 0.00178 0.680
Average liability distance (Target) 149647 0.0988 0.0642 0.00166 0.856
Size (Acquirer) 149647 11.58 1.717 7.244 19.18
Size2 (Acquirer) 149647 137.2 41.97 52.48 367.8
Size (Target) 149647 10.30 1.217 6.400 17.69
Size2 (Target) 149647 107.6 26.36 40.96 312.8
No banks (Target) 149647 25.98 57.69 2 378
No banks (Acquirer) 149647 25.78 56.90 2 378
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Table 3.5: Regressions on bank business model heterogeneity
The dependent variable in regressions (1) and (2) is Total distance, which is the Euclidean distance
between all financial ratios, as listed in Table 3.A1 in the Appendix, of a pair of banks. The dependent
variables in regressions (3) and (4) are Asset distance and Liability distance, respectively, which are
the Euclidean distances between asset-side and liability-side financial ratios, as listed in Table 3.A1 in
the Appendix, of a pair of banks. Post is a dummy variable indicating that the state where the target
bank is chartered had at least one bilateral agreement allowing cross-state banking in a given quarter.
Cross-state is a dummy variable indicating that banks are chartered in different states. Distressed is a
dummy, which indicates that there was regulatory involvement in the merger. Bank size is the natural
logarithm of total assets. Average total, asset and liability distance are the average of the pairwise
total, asset and liability distances, respectively, in the county of a bank’s headquarter. No banks is the
number of banks in the county of a bank’s residency. (Target) and (Acquirer) indicate that a variable is
a target or an acquirer bank characteristic. Standard errors are clustered at the merger level. t statistics
are shown in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.








(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post × Cross-state -0.0235 -0.0623∗∗∗ -0.0575∗∗∗ -0.0192∗∗∗
(-0.90) (-5.38) (-4.82) (-4.02)
Post × Cross-state × Distressed 0.0477∗ 0.0550∗ -0.00449
(1.72) (1.91) (-0.45)
Post × Distressed -0.000871 -0.00180 0.00313
(-0.06) (-0.13) (0.81)
Post 0.0173 0.0426∗∗∗ 0.0361∗∗∗ 0.0271∗∗∗
(1.02) (6.76) (5.69) (9.68)
Size (Acquirer) -0.147∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗ -0.0883∗∗∗ -0.0423∗∗∗
(-3.08) (-4.78) (-4.07) (-4.14)
Size2 (Acquirer) 0.00537∗∗∗ 0.00443∗∗∗ 0.00371∗∗∗ 0.00213∗∗∗
(2.90) (5.08) (4.15) (5.16)
Size (Target) -0.256∗∗∗ -0.208∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗
(-4.04) (-7.90) (-6.22) (-11.52)
Size2 (Target) 0.00965∗∗∗ 0.00676∗∗∗ 0.00523∗∗∗ 0.00535∗∗∗
(3.34) (5.49) (4.22) (8.66)
Average total distance (Acquirer) 0.295∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗
(7.74) (17.67)
Average total distance (Target) 0.235∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗
(5.97) (16.41)
Average asset distance (Acquirer) 0.250∗∗∗
(14.77)
Average asset distance (Target) 0.239∗∗∗
(14.68)
Average liability distance (Acquirer) 0.311∗∗∗
(26.59)
Average liability distance (Target) 0.248∗∗∗
(23.33)
No banks (Target) -0.000254 -0.0000457 -0.0000490 -0.0000206
(-1.02) (-0.38) (-0.38) (-0.44)
No banks (Acquirer) -0.000368∗∗ -0.000206∗ -0.000205∗ -0.0000693
(-2.29) (-1.79) (-1.71) (-1.35)
Observations 24359 149788 149788 149788
Adjusted R2 0.105 0.085 0.072 0.104
Merger effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State of acquiror × time effects No Yes Yes Yes
State of target × time effects No Yes Yes Yes
69













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 3: Bank Heterogeneity and Mergers
Table 3.8: Probit regressions of the likelihood of merger
The dependent variable in all regressions is a dummy variable indicating that a pair of banks merged.
Distressed is a dummy, which indicates that there was regulatory involvement in the merger. Total
distance is the Euclidean distance between all financial ratios, as listed in Table 3.A1 in the Appendix,
of a pair of banks. Asset distance and Liability distance are the Euclidean distances between asset-side
and liability-side financial ratios, respectively, as listed in Table 3.A1 in the Appendix, of a pair of banks.
t statistics are shown in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.
(1) (2) (3)












Distressed -0.461∗∗ -0.500∗∗ -0.111
(-2.29) (-2.50) (-0.97)
Constant -2.269∗∗∗ -2.231∗∗∗ -2.521∗∗∗
(-40.01) (-39.93) (-85.49)
Observations 44860 44860 44860
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Chapter 4
The Interaction of Bank
Regulation and Taxation
Abstract The tax benefit of interest deductibility encourages debt financing, but regu-
latory and market constraints create dependency between bank leverage and asset risk.
Using a large international sample of banks in this paper I find that banks located in
high-tax countries have higher leverage and lower average asset risk-weights. I argue
that this finding is induced by capital regulation. While the estimated overall effect of
taxation on bank risk is modest, it induces significant portfolio reallocation toward less
lending. These results suggest that any elimination of the tax bias towards debt may
not bring the expected benefits for bank stability.
4.1. Introduction
There is consensus among researchers that bank capital structure is an important de-
terminant of financial stability as better capitalized banks tend to be more resilient.
This realization motivates a large literature trying to understand the determinants of
bank capital structure, one of which is corporate income taxation (CIT). A tax bias
arises, because in most countries debt financing has a tax advantage through interest
deductibility relative to equity financing. It is not surprising then, that taxation was
identified as one of the possible sources that might have indirectly contributed to the
financial crisis of 2007 and 2008 through its impact on bank leverage (De Mooij, 2012;
Slemrod, 2009; Turner, 2010). While there is some recent work assessing the effect of
taxation on bank capital structure (Keen and de Mooij, 2012; De Mooij et al., 2013; Gu
et al., 2012; Hemmelgarn and Teichmann, 2013), the implications of corporate income
taxation have not been fully explored for bank risk. In particular, most papers neglect
the effect of taxation on bank portfolio risk, with one notable exception by Devereux
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et al. (2013). In this paper I estimate the impact of corporate income taxation on bank
leverage and portfolio risk, taking into account that they might be jointly determined.
A main reason for the interrelatedness of bank leverage and portfolio risk is bank
regulation. This directly forces weakly capitalized banks to trade off leverage and asset
risk in order to comply with the minimum capital requirements under the widely adopted
Basel rules, defined as the ratio of qualifying bank equity and risk weighted assets. This
trade-off may be present even if the constraint is not binding, as long as banks want
to hold precautionary capital buffers in order to avoid non-compliance costs as a result
of unexpectedly falling below the regulatory minimum requirement.22 The second aim
of this paper is to shed light on whether capital regulation can explain how corporate
income taxation affects leverage and portfolio risk.
The main findings of this paper are as follows. Firstly, I find that in countries where
CIT rates are higher banks have higher leverage ratios and that in these countries banks
hold less risky assets. Using a data set that includes 17,003 banks from 71 countries
and spans the years 1997-2011, I find 0.9-1.1 percentage points higher leverage ratios
on average (conditional on a wide range of bank and country characteristics) for banks
located in countries with 10 percentage point higher tax rates. These estimates lie in the
range found by previous papers using bank level data (0.14-0.31 in Keen and de Mooij
(2012) and De Mooij et al. (2013) and 0.1 in Hemmelgarn and Teichmann (2013)) and
country level data (0.04-0.09 in De Mooij et al. (2013)). As a novelty, I also find that
a 10 percentage point increase in the tax rate is associated with a 2-7 percentage point
decrease of the average risk-weighted assets (RWA) of banks. This association cannot
be fully attributed to risk-weight manipulation, since as I show, CIT also has a negative
relationship with the volume of relatively risky bank lending and a positive relationship
with portfolio quality.
Next, I show that the negative association between asset risk and CIT is stronger in
countries where regulators are more stringent and for banks that are more constrained
by regulatory pressure to meet capital requirements. Furthermore, I also explore how the
leverage and asset volatility of non-financial firms is related to CIT and I find a positive
association in both relations. Since non-financial firms are not subject to risk-dependent
22Banks may also want to voluntarily trade off leverage and asset risk in order to reduce bankruptcy
costs, as in Allen et al. (2014). Banks, as well as non-financial firms, choose a capital structure that
balances the marginal costs of equity financing with the marginal expected bankruptcy costs.
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capital constraints they do not seem to be forced to reduce asset risk in high-tax countries
to be able to lever up. These results suggest that the regulatory constraint for banks
is operational, which is in contrast with other papers that argue that the regulatory
constraint is weak, for example, Gropp and Heider (2010).
Finally, looking at the overall impact of taxation on bank stability, I find no evidence
that corporate income taxation makes banks less safe. In fact, regressions of banks’ Z-
score –a measure of the likelihood of bank failure– on CIT suggest a risk reducing effect
of taxes, but the results are not robust. Overall, the results suggest that the elimination
of the debt bias may not bring the expected benefits, since banks may substitute leverage
risk for asset risk.
This paper bridges and extends two strands of literature. The first of these aims at
quantifying the effect of CIT on bank capitalization. This literature is itself part of a
larger research agenda, which seeks to understand whether banks have optimal capital
ratios and if so, what their determinants are. Theoretical work includes Orgler and
Taggart (1983), Myers and Rajan (1998), Calomiris and Kahn (1991), Diamond and
Rajan (2000), and Allen et al. (2011). Empirical evidence is consistent with theories
of optimal capital structure (Schaeck and Čihák, 2012; Flannery and Rangan, 2008;
Marcus, 1983); and the literature has also converged to a set of factors that are reliable
determinants of bank (and non-financial firm) leverage (c.f. Gropp and Heider, 2010;
Frank and Goyal, 2009; Berger et al., 2008). While evidence on the tax bias is abundant,
most papers discard financial firms from the analysis (see e.g. the reviews of Graham,
2006; Auerbach, 2002).
There are a few recent papers that focus on banks. Keen and de Mooij (2012) find
a long run CIT impact on bank leverage close to what the literature covering non-
financial firms has found. Hemmelgarn and Teichmann (2013) look at how banks change
their leverage, dividend policy and earnings management in reaction to tax rate changes
and find a positive, but somewhat lower tax elasticity of leverage for banks. De Mooij
et al. (2013) go one step further and estimate the effect of CIT on the likelihood of
financial crises through increased leverage. Gu et al. (2012) concentrate on multinational
banks’ cross-boarder debt-shifting incentives. Building on Huizinga et al. (2008), who
estimated similar effects using a sample of non-financial firms, they find that, beside
local tax rates, home-host country tax rate differences induce banks to allocate more
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capital to subsidiaries where CIT rates are lower. A common feature of these papers is
that they treat asset risk as an exogenous variable23, and little or no attention is paid
to the simultaneous determination of asset risk and leverage. This paper extends this
literature by treating both leverage and risk as endogenous variables.
Closest to this paper is Devereux et al. (2013), who estimate the impact of levies
imposed on bank liabilities in a number of European countries. As the present paper,
these authors estimate leverage as well as asset portfolio risk regressions and find that
higher levies induced banks to reduce leverage and increase asset risk; an analogous
result to those presented here. There are a number of differences that distinguish our
papers. While Devereux et al. (2013) look at levies imposed on liabilities, this paper
uses corporate income taxes, which are more universal. Also, their sample consists of
large European banks, while my sample covers a significantly larger range of countries
and banks and a longer sample period. Using cross-country variation in the regulatory
environment I can thus investigate the interaction between regulation and taxation more
deeply, allowing me to identify the source of the trade-off between leverage and asset
risk.
This paper also contributes to the literature trying to understand how banks co-
ordinate capital and risk adjustments and what role capital regulation plays in this
relationship. Using a partial adjustment model with simultaneous equations for capital
and risk adjustments, originally developed by Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and then applied
by Jacques and Nigro (1997), Aggarwal and Jacques (2001), Rime (2001), Heid et al.
(2004) and Jokipii and Milne (2011), this literature generally finds a positive relationship
between the short run adjustments of capital and asset risk. I extend this literature by
adding taxes to the determinants of target leverage and portfolio risk and, to my knowl-
edge, for the first time the simultaneous equations/partial adjustment model is applied
to an international sample of banks.
Recent work has also been done on the determinants of banks’ RWA density (risk
weighted assets to total assets). Le Leslé and Avramova (2012) list several bank and
country level factors that can potentially influence RWA density. Mariathasan and Mer-
rouche (2013) provide evidence that banks regulated under Basel II took advantage of
23Keen and de Mooij (2012) treat risk as an exogenous variable in their theoretical model, and as an
endogenous explanatory variable in their empirical work, but they neglect the effects of CIT on bank
risk.
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advanced methods to calculate regulatory capital, which allowed them to lower their
capitalization levels. This eventually led to an increased likelihood of failure during
the financial crisis. My paper adds to our understanding of what determines banks’
management of risk weighted assets.
I proceed as follows. In section 4.2 I motivate the hypotheses of this paper and in
section 4.3 I explain the applied econometric approach. In section 4.4 I describe the
data used in the regressions. In section 4.5 I show that leverage and asset risk are differ-
ently related to CIT and in section 4.6 I explore how regulation interacts with taxation
and subsequently look at non-financial firms’ leverage and asset volatility. Section 4.7
presents results of regressions on overall bank risk and section 4.8 discusses the results
and concludes.
4.2. Hypotheses and theoretical framework
In this section I motivate the hypotheses with the help of a few simple accounting
relationships and a simplified regulatory constraint akin to what is applied under the
Basel regime. The key feature is that regulatory requirements are defined by leverage
and a regulatory measure of bank risk.
4.2.1. The interaction between capital regulation and taxation
For simplicity let us assume that there are only two types of liabilities, equity capital K
and debt D, and N types of assets, denoted by Ai, i ∈ {1 . . . N}. Each asset type’s risk
is measured by a (regulatory) risk weight ωi. The following accounting identity must




Ai = K +D, (4.1)
where A denotes total assets. The leverage ratio is then defined as l = D/A and portfolio
risk as r =
∑
i ωiAi/A.
Banks are required to hold at least a certain amount of capital. This constraint can
79














where k is the minimum capital adequacy requirement. This form of capital constraint is
similar to that implemented under the Basel accords. Under Basel I and the basic forms
of Basel II banks are required to hold at least 8% eligible capital relative to risk weighted
assets.24 Notice that a binding capital requirement constraint implies that leverage l and
asset risk r become substitutes in the sense that banks can choose higher leverage levels
by lowering asset risk.
Later, in the econometric part I assume that banks choose a target leverage ratio.
While in a Modigliani-Miller world target leverage is irrelevant, in reality firms (including
banks) balance the costs and benefits associated with deviations from the MM world.
Such deviations may arise as a result of agency problems, the tax bias and bankruptcy
costs, leading to an intermediate level of optimal leverage. In particular, corporate
income taxes are expected to increase the optimal debt level, because of the tax benefits
of debt as a result of interest deductibility.
Similarly, I assume that banks have a target asset risk level. Factors that can be re-
lated to risk taking include firm governance characteristics and the ownership structure
(by influencing the type and severity of agency problems within firms), size (through
too-big-to-fail subsidies), the business mix, and the regulatory environment. The opti-
mal asset risk level may also depend on taxes. The main channel taxes are expected to
influence bank risk taking works through banks’ profitability. The literature establishes
a link between risk taking and bank charter value due to moral hazard. Since corpo-
rate income taxes reduce profitability, banks might respond by taking more overall risk,
possibly by increasing asset risk.
To summarize, the main hypothesis of this paper is that banks choose higher levels
of leverage in countries where CIT rates are higher; and reduce asset risk in order to
24I do not distinguish between different forms of eligible regulatory capital. Under Basel I and II Tier
I capital comprises mostly common equity, while Tier II capital denotes various forms of hybrid capital
elements, such as subordinated debt. Hybrid capital forms have the benefit that interest repayments on
them are generally interest deductible, while they qualify as regulatory capital – up to a certain limit.
As a result, as Keen and de Mooij (2012) show, banks have a tendency to choose the maximum amount
of hybrid capital funding up to the allowed limit to meet regulatory requirements, the level of which is
not effected by CIT. Therefore, abstracting from this capital element has little bearing on the estimated
tax effects on bank capital structure.
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alleviate regulatory pressure on their capitalization.
4.3. Econometric approach
From the previous discussion it follows that equilibrium leverage and asset risk are jointly
determined. Instead of attempting to estimate structural equations of leverage and asset
risk I estimate reduced form, static and dynamic, regressions to establish the relationship
between tax rates between leverage and asset risk.
4.3.1. Long run estimates of tax elasticities
I obtain baseline OLS estimates of the long run reduced form tax elasticities by estimating
the following static regressions:
yij = α + γCIT i + δX ij + λY i + εij, (4.3)
where yijt is either leverage or one of the risk/asset composition measures of bank j
in country i in year t, CITit is the statutory corporate income tax rate, Xijt and Yit
are collections of bank and country level control variables, respectively, εij is an error
term, and upper bars denote time-averaged variables. The baseline risk measure is risk-
weighted assets over total assets (r in the previous section) and I employ two additional
asset composition variables to try to break down the adjustment of risk-weighted assets
to total assets into a “quality” and a “quantity” effect. This separation rests on the
observation that banks hold large amounts of government securities, which fetch zero
or low risk weights. The “quality” effect then refers to the riskiness of the risky asset
portfolio, while the “quantity” effect relates to the size of the risky portfolio.
Unfortunately, banks do not report risk weights separately for different asset types,
thus I cannot measure the impact of taxation on risk weights of different asset classes
directly. Instead, I proxy the average risk weight of risky assets by the share of non-
performing loans, while the loans-to-assets ratio proxies the size of banks’ risky portfo-
lio.25 These measures can also be thought of as alternative measures of bank asset risk.
25This is a precise measurement in the special case when there are only two asset types, a risky asset
with risk weight ωr and a riskless asset ωi = 0. Then asset risk is r = ωrAr/A which depends on the
amount of risky assets and the risk weight.
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There is a tradition of proxying bank risk with the share of non-performing loans. There
is also recent evidence that banks that had higher loans to assets ratios performed worse
during the financial crises in 2007 and 2008 (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012).
4.3.2. Partial adjustment and simultaneous regressions
It is common in the literature to assume that capital structure adjustment is not immedi-
ate (c.f. Gropp and Heider, 2010; Berger et al., 2008). Following these papers I estimate
dynamic versions of (4.3), which allow for sluggish adjustment of the dependent vari-
ables. The underlying assumption is that banks have leverage and risk targets and in
each period they aim to close a constant fraction of the gap between the target and
actual leverage and risk levels, if they differ. I explain these assumptions in section 4.9.1
of the Appendix in greater detail. The estimated partial adjustment model is:
yijt = α + βyijt−1 + γCITit + δXijt + λYit + ηt + µij + εijt, (4.4)
where εijt is a potentially serially correlated idiosyncratic error term. The OLS and
within estimators yield biased estimates of the coefficients in (4.4) because yijt−1 is
correlated with the fixed effects in the error term, which cannot be removed by simple
demeaning. To overcome this difficulty I employ the system-GMM estimator developed
by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).
This estimator eliminates bank fixed effects through first differencing, while the resulting
endogeneity due to differencing is resolved by instrumenting with lags. The advantage
of the GMM estimator is that it exploits both the time and cross-sectional variations of
the data, while still controlling for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity. I employ
the two-step GMM estimator to allow for a non-spherical error covariance structure and
calculate standard errors clustered at the country level. Furthermore, the finite sample
correction to the two-step covariance matrix derived by Windmeijer (2005) is applied.
4.4. Data
I construct an unbalanced dataset spanning the period 1997-2011 covering 17,003 banks
from 71 countries, based on data from Bankscope of Bureau van Dijk. This database
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contains bank balance sheet and income statement data from annual reports. In order to
have a more homogenous sample I exclude financial institutions other than commercial
banks, saving banks, and cooperative banks (e.g. investment banks and mortgage banks).
Next, I restrict the sample to unconsolidated balance sheet data. This reflects that
corporate income taxes are country specific, while consolidated accounting data are often
multinational. To reduce the bias due to misreporting and outliers I winsorize all bank
level variables at the 1% and 99% levels. Additionally, I remove all banks from the
database with negative equity, as these banks might exhibit exceptional balance sheet
ratios.
This leaves 148 608 bank-year observations, but due to limitations of Bankscope the
sample size drops to 106 688 bank-year observations in the RWA density regressions,
and to 103 624 bank-year observations in the regressions on the share of non-performing
loans. About two thirds of the banks in the sample are located in the United States,
which potentially has a sample bias effect on the results if US banks respond to taxation
differently from banks in other countries. To avoid drawing conclusions from potentially
biased results, I also report the main results using a restricted sample excluding US
banks.
Table 4.1 shows summary statistics for all variables and the Appendix provides details
about the definition and data sources of the variables. The main dependent variables
are the Leverage ratio, which is defined as liabilities over total assets and RWA density,
defined as risk weighted assets to total assets. Additionally, I replace RWA with two
alternative measures of asset composition: Loans (relative to total assets); and NPL, the
natural logarithm of the share of non-performing loans to total loans.26 These variables
are closely related to bank asset risk. While Loans measures banks’ exposure to risky
assets relative to other, less risky assets, such as government bonds, NPL is a measure
of the quality of banks’ loan portfolios.
Table 4.1 shows that Leverage has a mean of 0.89. Mean RWA density is 0.68, close to
the mean of Loans at 0.62. There is a close association between RWA density and the loan
ratio as shown by the high correlation between them (0.75, see Table 4.2). The share of
non-performing loans (before taking logarithm) is close to 3% with a standard deviation
26I took the logarithm of the share of non-performing loans, because it is has a highly skewed
distribution.
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of 0.04. I assess the overall effects of corporate income taxation on bank risk using the
natural logarithm of Z-score. Z-score measures the losses required to entirely wipe out a
bank’s equity capital and is defined as Z − score = log[(K/A+ROA) /σ(ROA)], where
σ(ROA) is the standard deviation of return on assets and is calculated over the full
sample period. Z-score is thus a measure of distance to default, higher values reflecting
safer banks. Log is taken of Z-score because it has a highly skewed distribution.
The tax variable (CIT ) is the top statutory corporate income tax rate in the country
of a bank’s residency. While the effective marginal tax rate is a better measure in theory
(Graham, 2000), in practice it is difficult to assemble for a multi-country analysis such as
this. There are also good reasons why the top statutory tax rate is a good approximation
of banks’ effective marginal tax rate. First, banks are typically large companies, so the
progressivity of the tax schedule is unlikely to be relevant. Second, the present value
of the tax benefit of an additional unit of debt declines when a bank is unlikely to be
able to take advantage of the tax deduction because of a future possible bankruptcy.
However, banks enjoy significant bailout guarantees and thus the difference between the
effective marginal tax rate and the statutory rate is expected to be smaller for banks
than for non-financial companies.
The main sources of the statutory corporate income tax rates are the OECD database
and, in case of non-OECD countries, the KPMG Corporate and Indirect Tax Surveys
2007, 2010 and 2011, which cover the period between 1993 and 2011. The average tax
rate is 38.6%. This relatively high figure reflects that the sample contains a large number
of banks located in the United States, Germany and Japan, all of which have high CIT
rates (on average 39.3%, 39.5% and 33.3%, respectively).
I control for a range of bank and country level factors related to bank leverage and
assets risk. Since I perform reduced form estimations, I include all control variables in
both the leverage and risk equations. Bank size is commonly found to be positively
related to leverage, which is explained by large banks’ better risk diversification possibil-
ities, better investment opportunities and access to debt capital. Size is taken to be the
natural logarithm of the book value of total assets and to allow for a non-linear effect I
also include the square of this variable. I also control for bank profitability by including
two variables, net interest margin and the return on average assets (ROA): on the one
hand firms may choose riskier asset portfolios in return for higher expected returns, on
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the other hand positive retained earnings improve banks’ capitalization keeping other
factors constant. Fee income, defined as non-interest income over total operating income,
and Wholesale funding, measured by the ratio of non-deposit funding to total short term
funding, control for income diversification and access to whole-sale funding. Both factors
are shown to change the risk/return trade-off that banks face by Demirgüç-Kunt and
Huizinga (2010). DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) show that non-debt tax shields, such
as depreciation and investment tax credits, can crowd out the tax benefits of debt. To
control for differences in access to non-debt tax shields I include Non-interest expenses
relative to total assets, a proxy also used by Gu et al. (2012). The final bank level control
variable in the baseline specification is Market share, the share of total assets relative
to nationwide total bank assets, a proxy for market power. A higher market power may
increase a bank’s charter value, which reduces risk taking incentives. Alternatively, it
can lead to increased risk taking by the bank’s borrowers, which increases bank risk.
In robustness checks I also make use of the ownership data of Bankscope as well as
the database assembled by Claessens and van Horen (2014) in order to control for the
possibility of international debt-shifting by multinational banks. I create three variables:
CIT diff (Local - owner) is the difference between tax rates applicable to the bank and its
owner: for domestically owned banks it is zero (as well as for banks without ownership
data), while for banks owned by a foreign parent it is positive if the local tax rate is
higher than in the country where the parent bank is headquartered. In a similar fashion
CIT diff (Local - frgn subsidiary) is calculated as the difference between the local and
foreign tax rates, but this time the latter is taken to be the average (unweighted) tax rate
of the countries where the subsidiaries are located (domestic subsidiaries are excluded).
Subsidiary data is taken from Bankscope, and not from Claessens and van Horen (2014),
since the latter does not contain information on subsidiaries (only on ultimate owners).
A subsidiary is taken to be owned by a parent company if it has an ultimate ownership
larger than 50%. Bankscope does not contain historic ownership data, therefore I assume
that subsidiary ownership did not change over the sample period (an assumption also
made by Gu et al. (2012)).27 Finally, I include a dummy variable (No ownership data
dummy) indicating if a bank is not in the Claessens and van Horen (2014) database. This
27No dummy variable is created to indicate missing subsidiary data as it is not known if a bank truly
does not have any subsidiaries or it only appears so because of missing data. Furthermore the sample
contains only 24 observations where a bank has exclusively domestic subsidiaries.
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variable controls for the possibility that the availability of ownership data is correlated
with the tax rate difference between owners and subsidiaries.
In addition to the bank level control variables I also add country level macroeconomic
controls. RGDP growth controls for the cyclical variation of leverage and risk related to
business cycle fluctuations. Leverage is expected to be procyclical (high in upturns, low
in downturns) because various constraints, such as collateral and regulatory constraints,
are tighter during downturns (Adrian and Shin, 2010; Geanakoplos, 2010). Asset risk is
also expected to be larger in recessions, when borrowers have lower net worth or because
risk may be overestimated. GDP per capita, calculated on a PPP basis, controls for
differences in the economic development between countries, which might be correlated
with financial and capital market development. The consumer price index (CPI ) serves
as a proxy for expected inflation. The real value of tax deductions (positively) depends
on expected inflation, thus it is an important control variable (as confirmed by Frank
and Goyal, 2009), with a positive expected effect on leverage. Government debt to GDP
serves to control for “financial repression” and/or banks’ incentives to load on highly
indebted governments’ debt. This channel suggests a negative relationship between gov-
ernment indebtedness and RWA, because sovereign debt fetches a low regulatory risk
weight under Basel I and II. The last macroeconomic control variable is the nominal Ex-
change rate change, which has been shown to affect portfolio risk (Bock and Demyanets,
2012). A large nominal exchange rate depreciation might reduce borrowers’ ability to
service debt denominated in foreign currencies, which –ceteris paribus– worsens portfolio
quality. On the contrary, depreciation might be beneficial, if this strengthens interna-
tional competitiveness and improves corporate profits. RGDP growth, GDP per capita,
Government debt/GDP, CPI and Exchange rate change figures were taken form the
World Economic Outlook database. Aggregate credit controls for loan demand, which
is calculated as the sum of gross loans of all other banks in the country, normalized by
the sum of total assets. It is common that corporate income taxes are the same for
financial and non-financial companies, therefore taxes might be correlated with loan de-
mand (through the same tax-shield effect or by influencing firm profitability) as well as
bank leverage and risk. Since loans are generally riskier than other risky assets, such as
government bonds, an increase in loan demand may lead to higher RWA density through
an increased share of loans in total assets.
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Next, I control for the regulatory environment by including minimum Capital require-
ments and two other indicators from Barth et al. (2001). The first, Capital stringency is
a measure of regulatory oversight of how banks calculate capital, which ranges between
0 and 9, with higher values indicating more stringency. Activity restrictions is a vari-
able that measures regulatory restrictions on certain bank activities, such as securities
market, insurance, real estate activities and the ownership of non-financial firms, on a
scale from 4 to 16, with higher values indicating more restrictions. These regulatory
controls are commonly used in the bank risk taking and capital regulation literature (see
Laeven and Levine, 2009, for example). On the one hand stricter regulation may result
in less levered banks and with less risky assets, reflecting the regulator’s preferences for
a more stable banking sector. On the other hand, bankers may compensate for the loss
in utility as a result of regulation by increasing risk taking, which may lead to higher
leverage and/or higher asset risk. Thus, the impact of regulation is ambiguous ex ante.
Bank regulation data are obtained from the World Bank’s Bank Regulation and Super-
vision Survey database. The survey comprises four waves, 2001, 2003, and 2007, 2011
and I replace missing values of interim years by the values of subsequent years (so, for
instance, observations of 2009 are taken from the last wave).
In some specifications I include a dummy variable Buffer dummy, which takes the
value of 1 if a bank has on average over the sample period a capital buffer larger than the
median buffer (calculated over the full sample). I also include the dummy variable Basel
II indicating whether in a given year and a given country the Basel II guidelines were
implemented and in effect. This dummy serves to control for the possibility that Basel II
allows for a more lenient way of calculating regulatory capital. Under Basel II banks can
opt for internal models to determine risk weights, which opens the door to regulatory
arbitrage and risk-weight manipulation through model optimization (Mariathasan and
Merrouche, 2013). The dummy is constructed from data from the BIS progress reports
on the implementation of the Basel regulatory framework.28 Finally, I control for share-
holder protection with Creditor rights, an index of statutory rights of shareholders from
Djankov et al. (2007). The index ranges from zero to four and higher values indicate
28The first year in which this variable is nonzero is 2007, when all EU Member States introduced the
new regulation, along with few other countries. Some countries, however, waited with the implementa-
tion, the US for instance was a slow mover with an adoption year of 2009. By 2011 forty-four countries
had adopted the Basel II rules in the sample.
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more creditor protection. It is expected to be positively related with bank loans and
bank leverage, since creditors are more willing to lend when they have more powers in
case of bankruptcy.
4.5. Results – the relationship between taxes and leverage and asset risk
In this section I present regression results showing that banks have higher leverage and
lower asset risk in high-tax countries. I also explore how robust these observations are
to changing the asset risk measure and I employ various other robustness checks.
4.5.1. Leverage regressions
The left panel of Table 4.3 shows the baseline regressions of bank leverage. Column (1)
reports the between estimates, using the full sample. The estimate of the CIT coefficient
is significant, but at 0.09 it is considerably smaller than what earlier literature found
using similar bank level data (e.g. Keen and de Mooij (2012) and De Mooij et al.
(2013)). These papers find long run tax effects on leverage in the range of 0.14-0.31. In
unreported regressions, which include only the control variables used by the mentioned
studies (Size, Size2, ROA, CPI, RGDP growth), I find that the difference comes mostly
from the inclusion of additional control variables. For example, dropping the dummy
Basel II increases the coefficient estimate of CIT from 0.09 to 0.21. However, dropping
any other further control variable does not change this coefficient estimate by more than
0.02.
The control variables have generally the signs found in other studies: Size is positively
and significantly related to leverage in a non-linear way. Net interest margin is also
significant and obtains a negative coefficient. Similarly, ROA obtains a negative, but
insignificant coefficient. Thus, banks seem to use retained earnings to recapitalize. The
risk characteristics proxies, Fee income and Wholesale funding, are negatively related to
leverage, which is consistent with a substitution effect between various risk types. The
non-debt tax-credit proxy, Non-interest expenses, has a significant, negative coefficient,
as in Gu et al. (2012). Finally, Market share is positively related to leverage, which may
be because banks can borrow against the net present value of their monopoly rents. At
the country level higher Capital requirements and Activity restrictions reduce, stronger
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creditor rights enhance debt financing, as expected. Basel II and GDP growth enter
with negative and significant coefficients, while Aggregate credit enters with a positive
sign.
In column (2) I follow the literature on bank capital structure, and estimate a dy-
namic panel model (equation (4.4) in section 4.3) with the system GMM estimator. The
estimated short run impact is 0.05, significant at 1%, which is about half of what Keen
and de Mooij (2012) find. They, however, find a slower adjustment speed than I do:
the estimate of the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable in column (2) is 0.58,
significant at 1%. These coefficients combine into a long run marginal effect of 0.11
( = γ/(1 − β) = 0.05/(1 − 0.58)), which is close to the long run estimate using the
between estimator in column (1). A 10% increase in the statutory income tax rate is
thus associated with an expected increase in bank leverage by about 0.9-1.1 percentage
points.
4.5.2. RWA density regressions
The right panel of Table 4.3 shows the results of regressions on risk weighted assets to
total assets. The regressions are analogous to the leverage regressions in columns (1)-(2).
In column (3) the OLS regression on the time-averaged variables yields a result that is
consistent with the buffer theory of bank capital: CIT has a negative coefficient of -0.20,
significant at the 1% level. A 10 percentage point higher tax rate is thus associated with
an expected reduction in the long run of about two percentage points, which seems small
compared to the average level of 67%, but it could be significant for the real economy at
the aggregate level through its effect on credit supply.
Next, in column (4) I allow for sluggish adjustment using the system GMM estima-
tor, also controlling for time and bank fixed effects. Along with other time-invariant
bank characteristics, bank fixed effects should control for corporate governance perfor-
mance and ownership structure, which have been shown to be related to bank risk-taking
(Laeven and Levine, 2009). To estimate this regression I restricted the sample to exclude
years up to 2003, because almost all RWA observations prior to 2004 were submitted by
US banks. The rate of adjustment is slow, banks close only about 16% (= 1 − 0.84) of
the gap between target and actual RWA density per year. The short run impact of CIT
is -0.11, which is significant at 5%. This translates into an expected long run elasticity
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of -0.70, significant at 10%, about three times the between estimate. Overall, Table 4.3
suggests that banks have lower asset risk when taxes are higher.
Most control variables obtain the expected signs. Size is positively associated with
risk, which might reflect moral hazard due to too-big-to-fail benefits; but there are
diminishing returns as suggested by the significant, negative coefficient of the quadratic
term. Net interest margin has a positive coefficient, significant in both regressions. This
might be because banks charge higher interest rates for more risky loans. ROA, on
the other hand has a negative coefficient, which could be the result of moral hazard,
to the extent that smaller profitability reduces charter value. Fee income is negatively
associated with RWA, perhaps signaling that more income diversification is accompanied
by more risk taking (consistent with mean/variance optimization).
The negative and significant coefficient of Basel II is evidence of banks reducing risk
weights through the adoption of risk models allowed by Basel II. Exchange rate change
has a significant, negative impact on bank risk, possibly due to a lower income to debt
service ratio for borrowers indebted in foreign currency. Loan demand is positively asso-
ciated with RWA density, probably as a result of increased lending relative to investing
in low-risk securities. Contrary to the expectations, government indebtedness enters
with a positive sign. This could be, however, explained if a larger supply of government
securities relaxes collateral constraints by providing safe assets, which leads to higher
aggregate liquidity and loan supply.
4.5.3. Robustness: restricted samples, ownership structure and
simultaneous regressions estimation
Table 4.4 presents the results of further robustness checks. First, I restrict the sample
to pre-crisis years (up to 2006) and reestimate regressions (1) and (3) of Table 4.3. It is
conceivable that during crisis periods other factors influencing banks’ capital structure
become more important relative to tax incentives. Indeed, in regression (1), when the
dependent variable is Leverage, the long run marginal effect of CIT is 0.16, almost twice
as large as the baseline between estimate. Next, CIT obtains a negative and significant
coefficient in regression (2) using the between estimator. This is in between the estimates
of the between and GMM regressions of Table 4.3.
To deal with the overrepresentation of US banks in the sample I also reestimate
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the baseline between estimates excluding US banks. Columns (3) and (4) show the
corresponding results. In the leverage regression the coefficient on CIT is about the
same size as when run on the full sample (0.11 versus 0.9). In the RWA regressions CIT
remains negative at -0.08, but it is not significant anymore.
Multinational banks have an incentive to shift debt to subsidiaries located in high-
tax countries. Regressions (5) and (6) attempt to control for the possibility that such
debt shifting correlates with risk incentives, which could potentially bias the results. To
that end I include CIT diff (Local - frgn subsidiary), which is the difference between the
CIT rate applicable in the country of residency of a bank and the average CIT rate of
its subsidiaries. Similarly, I add the difference between the local CIT rate and the CIT
rate of the country of the parent bank (which is zero in case of same country parent
banks). I also include a dummy indicating if no ownership data is available. The main
results do not change as the estimated long run marginal tax elasticity of debt is still
around 0.8 and significant, while an offsetting elasticity is measured for RWA at -0.2,
also significant. The tax rate differences do not enter the regressions with significant
coefficients.
The regressions presented so far were estimated as single equations. Next, I estimate
the leverage and RWA regressions as a system of simultaneous equations, which yields
more efficient estimates in theory. The model I estimate builds on Shrieves and Dahl
(1992) and is formulated as:
∆Leverageijt = a1Leverageijt−1 + b1∆RWAijt + d1CITit + e1Xijt + f1Yit + ηt + υijt
(4.5)
∆RWAijt = a2RWAijt−1 + b2∆Leverageijt + d2CITit + e2Xijt + f2Yit + θt + ζijt.
(4.6)
In these equations the adjustment of leverage is allowed to depend on the simultaneous
adjustment of risk and vice versa, which is captured by the terms b1 and b2. Xijt and
Yit are bank and country level determinants of leverage and asset risk, while ηt, θt, are
time effects and υijt are ζijt possibly correlated disturbance terms.
The results of estimating equations (4.5) and (4.6) are presented in columns (7) and
(8) of Table 4.4. In the leverage regression the lag of leverage obtains a coefficient of
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-0.39, which yields a somewhat slower speed of adjustment than the single equation
GMM estimate of regression (2) in Table 4.3. Similarly, the speed of adjustment of RWA
density in the 3SLS model is also smaller (0.13) than the single equation GMM estimate
of regression (6) in Table 4.3 (1− 0.85 = 0.15).
Next, the long run marginal CIT effect on leverage is 0.07 (= −b1/a1 = −0.0268/(−0.386)),
significant at 5%, somewhat smaller then the single equation OLS estimate (at 0.09 in re-
gression 1, Table 4.3). The long run RWA elasticity is -0.76 (= −b2/a2 = 0.099/(−0.130)),
significant at one percent, which is also similar in magnitude to the baseline OLS and
GMM estimates of -0.20 and -0.70 (regressions (3) and (4) in Table 4.3), respectively.
Turning to contemporaneous adjustments in risk and leverage, banks respond to a
positive shock to RWA by contemporaneously reducing leverage as evidenced by the
significant, negative coefficient of D.RWA in column (7), perhaps to buffer themselves
against expected losses or to maintain compliance with capital requirements. Interest-
ingly, the positive coefficient of D.Leverage in column (8) suggests that banks respond
to an increase in leverage by increasing portfolio risk. This behavior is consistent with
moral hazard: as banks become less capitalized their risk taking incentives increase.
4.5.4. Loan-to-assets regressions
Table 4.5 presents single equation regression results on alternative measures of bank
asset risk: the size of banks’ loan portfolio and the ratio of non-performing loans to total
loans, measuring portfolio quality.
I start with loans to assets in Table 4.5. The baseline OLS regression on long run
averages in column (1) shows that CIT is negatively associated with the share of lending
in total assets. CIT has a long run marginal impact of -0.20, which is significant at the
1% level. Most coefficients have the same signs as those in the corresponding regression
on risk weighted assets, which is not surprising given the high correlation between the
two variables. There are differences, however. Basel II is not significant, and has a
positive coefficient now, which is consistent with banks having achieved a reduction
in risk weighted assets by lowering risk weights, and not by cutting lending. Another
difference is in the coefficient estimates of Aggregate credit, yielding a higher estimate in
the loan regression, reflecting a closer association between the two variables. The loan-
to-assets ratio is negatively related to government indebtedness, which is expected, if
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there is regulatory/government pressure on banks to absorb government bonds and this
crowds out lending. Capital requirements also obtains a negative coefficient in column
(1) suggesting that banks adjust to higher regulatory capital requirements by buying
more low risk assets, such as government bonds, relative to lending.
Returning to the effects of taxes, in column (2) the dynamic model gives a qualita-
tively similar result to the between regression, with a short run marginal impact of -0.06
and a long run impact of -0.78, albeit both insignificant.
4.5.5. NPL regressions
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4.5 report results of regressions on portfolio quality. The
dependent variable is the log of the share of non-performing loans to total loans. Column
(3) presents OLS estimates on the long run averages. CIT is estimated to have a long
run marginal effect of -5.98, significant at 1%. The dynamic regression in column (4)
produces a short run marginal impact of -1.44, significant at 5% and a long run marginal
effect of -4.70, significant at 10%. These elasticities are economically quite sizeable. A 10-
percentage-point higher CIT is expected to be associated with a stock of non-performing
loans relative to total assets that is 47-60% lower, which amounts to a difference of 0.28-
0.36 standard deviations.
Among the control variables that obtain significant and robust coefficients ROA has
a negative sign, perhaps because less profitable banks take more risk due to risk shifting.
Market share has a positive and significant coefficient, which is suggestive of laxer lending
standards when loan volume is high. Fee income also has a positive and significant
coefficient. This could be because more fee income yields better diversified banks, which
then allows for increased risk taking. Similarly, Basel II picks up a positive coefficient
in the OLS regression, suggestive of increased risk taking as made possible by the lower
risk weights attained under the Basel II framework. As expected, real GDP growth
facilitates debt repayment and improves bank portfolio quality, while a nominal exchange
rate depreciation is, on average, expected to increase the share of non-performing loans,
which thus seems to dominate the positive effects of larger corporate profits as a result
of the depreciation.
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4.6. Do taxation and bank regulation interact?
Looking at the results of the previous sections the question arises to what extent the
observed pattern, that taxation is positively related with leverage and negatively related
with asset risk, is attributable to bank regulation. To gain some insight on this issue,
first I test whether the association between taxes, leverage and asset risk varies with
regulatory conditions. After this, I look at whether non-financial firms’ leverage and
asset risk choices are similarly related to CIT as those of banks.
4.6.1. The effect of regulation
In this section I test whether banks react differently to taxation if 1) they hold lower
levels of regulatory capital buffers and 2) they are subject to stricter regulatory super-
vision. My approach is to include the interaction terms CIT * Buffer dummy and CIT
* Regulatory stringency in the baseline regressions on bank leverage and asset risk. The
expectation a priori is that especially capital abundant banks increase leverage in re-
sponse to higher tax rates and stricter regulators force banks to reduce asset riskiness if
they wish to increase leverage. The former effect is expected, since banks with higher
regulatory capital buffer targets have more room to increase leverage without changing
their asset allocations while still complying with capital standards. Thus, to the ex-
tent that deviating from asset risk targets is costly, I expect these banks to be more
responsive.
Table 4.6 shows the results of regressions on bank leverage and RWA with the above
mentioned interaction terms included. In column (1) the dependent variable is Leverage.
Using the between estimator I find a CIT coefficient of 0.06 for banks with low excess
regulatory capital, which is significant at the 1% level. This is smaller than the baseline
estimate in column (1) of Table 4.3. Next, the dummy variable Buffer dummy obtains
a significant, negative coefficient, reflecting that better capitalized banks have lower
leverage. The interaction term is also significant and has a coefficient of 0.23. Thus
well-capitalized banks seem to respond more to taxation with an estimated long run
impact of 0.29 (= 0.06 + 0.23) on leverage.
The RWA regression shows mirroring results. The CIT coefficient is significantly
negative at -0.14, about half the value of the baseline estimate in column (3) of Table 4.3.
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Now the capitalization dummy is insignificant, unlike the interaction term, which obtains
a negative and significant coefficient of -0.17, bringing the overall effect of CIT for capital
abundant banks to -0.32. This evidence is consistent with better capitalized banks
having more leeway to increase leverage as a response to higher corporate tax rates
and simultaneously reduce asset risk to maintain a targeted regulatory capital buffer.
Furthermore, as expected, capital-tight banks seem to reduce asset risk relative to a unit
change in leverage more than capital abundant banks: the former adjust leverage and
risk at a ratio of 2.33:1 (= 0.14/0.06), while this is 1.10:1 (= 0.32/0.29) for the latter.
Next, in columns (3) and (4) I add the interaction term between CIT and Regulatory
stringency. In the leverage regression (column (3)) CIT has a positive and significant
coefficient, while the interaction term is negative and also significant. The estimated tax
effect for a bank located in a country with average regulatory stringency is 0.08 (=0.24
- 0.03*5.3, see the descriptive statistics in Table 4.1), close to the baseline estimate
without interactions (regression 1, Table 4.3). In the RWA regression the standalone
CIT variable has a coefficient of 1.133, while the interaction term is negative (-0.27),
with both coefficients estimated to be significant. This means that banks located in
the least stringent regulatory environments are found to increase RWA in response to
taxes, while banks located in countries with a Regulatory stringency index larger than
4.18 (=1.13/0.27) reduce asset risk. These results suggest that more stringent regulation
reduces banks’ incentives (or opportunity) to increase leverage in response to higher
taxes.29 At the same time, banks seem to be forced to cut back on asset risk more
aggressively in more stringent regulatory environments, perhaps in order to be able to
increase leverage.
Overall, Table 4.6 gives some support to the hypothesis that banks trade off leverage
against asset risk because of capital regulation. This conclusion is further reinforced
by the results of the next section in which I look at the leverage and asset volatility of
non-financial firms.
29Nonetheless, for almost all banks the estimated CIT impact on leverage is positive. The marginal
impact of CIT on leverage is zero when Regulatory stringency is equal to 8.44 = 0.27/0.032. There are
only five observations with Regulatory stringency larger than 8.
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4.6.2. Taxation and non-financial firms’ leverage and asset risk
A major difference between banks and non-financial firms is that the latter group are not
subject to bank regulation and as a result they face fewer constraints on their balance
sheets. This suggests that non-financial firms may be able to rely more heavily on debt
financing without having to deviate from their optimal project choices. To see if this is
the case I look at a sample of non-financial firms and run similar regressions to those in
Table 4.3.
The sample includes all publicly listed firms in the Worldscope database, which is
the source of firm level balance sheet data. I restrict the sample to the years 1997-2011
to coincide with the sample period of the sample of banks. The dependent variables
are Leverage, which is defined as total liabilities of total assets; and Asset volatility.
Asset volatility is obtained using Merton’s option pricing model.30 The firm level control
variables are the same as and defined analogously to those in the bank sample, except for
certain variables which are not applicable for non-financial firms (Net interest margin, Fee
income, Wholesale funding). I include all macro level control variables in the regressions
with the exception of bank related variables (Basel II, Activity restrictions, Regulatory
stringency, Capital requirements, Market share, Aggregate credit). Summary statistics of
the firm level variables in the sample of non-financial firms are shown in Table 4.7. The
sample contains 155,099 observations from 16,350 firms in 62 countries.
Table 4.8 presents the results of the regressions on non-financial firms’ leverage and
asset volatility. As before, I look at long run relationships using the between estimator.31
In column (1) the dependent variable is Leverage and I find that CIT obtains a positive
and significant coefficient of 0.352. This estimate is about four times as large as that
obtained in the OLS regression in column (1) of Table 4.3. Thus, non-financial firms
seem to have relatively higher leverage when taxes are higher in comparison to banks.
This is consistent with non-financial firms facing fewer (regulatory) constraints to lever
30See e.g. Appendix A1 of Anginer et al. (2014) for a description of Merton’s method to calculate
firms’ asset volatility. To estimate equity volatility and the market value of equity I use data from
Datastream. I exclude firm-year observations with less than 90 days of nonzero stock returns. The
maturity of firms’ debt is assumed to be one year. Total debt and the dividend yield is taken from
Worldscope. The risk free rate is the yield on the one year US Treasury Bill.
31I also ran dynamic panel regressions using GMM in a similar fashion to the regressions in Table 4.3.
In the leverage regression CIT obtains a negative, but insignificant coefficient. In the Asset volatility
regression CIT obtains a positive and significant coefficient. These results are not reported because the
regressions fail the basic diagnostic tests required for unbiased estimation.
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up. This result is robust to the inclusion of industry dummies as seen in column (2): the
estimated coefficient of CIT is now 0.357. The industry dummies indicate that a firm
belongs to a certain industry according to the three-digit SIC classification system. Frank
and Goyal (2009) show that median industry leverage is a core predictor of firm leverage
and provide several possible explanations (such as peer effects and industry heterogeneity
in the types of assets, business risk, technology, or regulation). The industry dummies
capture these factors.
Next, turning to the asset risk regressions, I find that CIT is positively related to
asset volatility as evidenced by the positive and significant coefficient (at 0.0155) in col-
umn (3). When I add industry dummies in regression (4) the estimate changes slightly
to 0.0146 but remains significant. Thus, for non-financial firms it appears that there
is a positive relationship between corporate income tax rates and asset risk, while for
banks this relationship is negative. The finding of riskier firms in high-tax countries is
consistent with moral hazard: firms choosing more risky projects when their profitability
is weakened by higher taxes. Furthermore, it also suggests that an alternative explana-
tion for the observed negative relationship between bank asset risk and tax rates is not
likely. According to this explanation banks lend to less risky borrowers because taxa-
tion is asymmetric: the government shares from the profits but not from losses, thereby
reducing risk taking incentives.
4.7. Taxes and overall bank risk
In this section I assess how CIT impacts overall bank stability. I regress Z-score on
CIT and the same control variables as before except that I exclude ROA as it is directly
related to Z-score. Table 4.9 reports the results. In column (1) using the between
estimator, I find a significantly positive coefficient estimate of 0.87, which is about the
same as the standard deviation of the log of banks’ Z-score. Thus, a 10% pp tax increase
is associated with an increase of about one tenth of the standard deviation of Z-score –
a modest change by any account. This suggests that the portfolio risk reduction more
than offsets the risk increasing effect of leverage. Since regulation alone does not justify
a full, or more than full offset, it seems likely that taxation has an effect on bank risk
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through other channels as well. One possibility is that taxation reduces the benefit of risk
taking because the government shares in a bank’s profits, but not in the losses.The GMM
regression in column (2) gives further evidence that the quantitative impact of taxation
on banks’ Z-score is small, as the coefficient estimates are statistically insignificant, but
one has to be cautious, since the lagged dependent variable obtains a coefficient close to
one, which makes measurement imprecise (Blundell and Bond, 1998).
4.8. Discussion and conclusions
In the previous sections I established that in countries where corporate income tax rates
are higher banks have higher leverage and less risky assets, irrespective of whether risk
is measured as the average regulatory risk weight, loan to assets ratio or as the share of
non-performing loans. This pattern is consistent with the following story: since taxation
drives a wedge between the cost of debt and equity financing banks’ optimal capital
structure favors debt financing in countries where tax rates are higher; however, in order
to mitigate the likelihood of regulatory noncompliance they reduce the riskiness of their
assets.
I also present evidence that suggests that there is a trade-off between leverage and
asset risk which appears to be driven by bank specific factors, and especially bank regu-
lation. Firstly, well capitalized banks have relatively higher leverage ratios in countries
with higher tax rates than banks that are more close to the regulatory constraint. At
the same time, these banks have relatively less risky assets, presumably to maintain the
level of regulatory compliance. Secondly, the association between tax rates and leverage
is weaker in countries where regulation is stricter, while in these countries the negative
association between asset risk and tax rates is stronger.
The explanation that banks reduce asset risk when CIT rates are higher as a result of
regulatory pressure is reinforced by the results from the sample of non-financial firms. In
particular, I find that the positive relationship between tax rates and leverage for these
firms is larger than for banks. Additionally, the relationship between asset volatility and
tax rates is positive for the sample of non-financial firms, as opposed to the negative
association for banks, probably because these firms do not face an asset-risk dependent
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capital constraint and may take more risk as a result of eroded profits.
While attention in existing literature has mostly focused on the leverage incentivizing
effect of corporate income taxation, the results in this paper imply that the portfolio re-
allocation effects are at least as important. Furthermore, the measured effect of corporate
income taxes on overall bank risk seems to be modest. These results have implications
for recently implemented and potential future policy measures. Firstly, they suggest that
the elimination of interest deductibility of debt will not make banks safer to the extent
that one might have hoped for. In this regard banks are different from non-financial
companies. Secondly, after the crisis several European countries implemented laws that
require banks to pay levies after their liabilities. In some cases the explicit purpose of the
levies is to discourage banks from relying excessively on (short term) debt financing and
thus reduce funding risk. Like CIT, these levies create a wedge between the cost of debt
and equity financing, albeit with an opposite sign. This suggests that the regulatory
induced trade-off between leverage and asset risk will encourage banks to choose riskier
assets after the introduction of the levies. Devereux et al. (2013) present evidence that
this has already occurred in countries that introduced the new duties. Thus, it is unclear
whether the levies will make banks overall safer.
The observation that the estimated tax elasticity of debt for banks is smaller than
that of non-financial firms also suggests that the primary driver for banks’ debt bias is not
corporate income taxation, but rather other factors, such as access to the financial safety
net. An approach that seems more effective at reducing banks’ debt-bias thus involves
the improvement of the resolution regime and the reduction of implicit subsidies to bank
risk taking.
Finally, the relative size of welfare costs associated with the taxation of banks as
compared to that of non-financial firms is not clear. In both cases higher leverage leads
to higher expected costs of bankruptcy. In case of banks, these can be mitigated if they
take less risk in the form of less risky lending because of bank regulation (and if capital
requirements do not fully eliminate inefficient lending in the absence taxation). However,
the converse might also be true: the interaction of taxation and regulation may lead to
an inefficiently low level of lending with adverse effects for the real economy, if firms
cannot switch to other forms of financing.
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4.9. Appendix
Table 4.A1: Variable definitions and source of data
Variable Definition Source





CIT dummy 1 if CIT is higher than the average CIT rate in the






Leverage Total liabilities over total assets. Bankscope,
Worldscope
RWA Risk-weighted assets over total assets. Bankscope
Loans Total loans to total assets. Bankscope
NPL Natural logarithm of non-performing loans to total
loans.
Bankscope
Buffer dummy 1 if a bank has a regulatory capital buffer on average
more than the median, which is 0.074 and 0
otherwise. Regulatory capital buffer is Tier I + Tier








Z-score Natural logarithm of Z-score = (Total equity/Total
assets + ROA ) / standard deviation of ROA. The
standard deviation of ROA is calculated over the
whole sample period.
Bankscope
Size Natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. Bankscope,
Worldscope
Size2 The square of the natural logarithm of the book





Interest income minus interest expenses over
interest-bearing (total earning) assets.
Bankscope
ROA Return over average assets. Bankscope,
Worldscope
Fee income Non-interest income over total operating income. Bankscope
Wholesale
funding









Asset volatility Calculations based on Merton’s option pricing model.









CIT diff (Local -
owner)
Top statutory CIT rate in the country of the bank’s
location minus the top statutory CIT rate applicable
in the country where its owner is headquartered.
Zero if no data is available.
(Claessens and
van Horen, 2014)
CIT diff (Local -
frgn subsidiary)
Top statutory CIT rate in the country where the
bank is headquartered minus the (unweighted)
average of the top statutory CIT rates applicable in
the countries where its foreign subsidiaries are
located. A Parent-subsidiary relationship is
established if the parent has an ultimate ownership
larger than 50% in the subsidiary. Zero if no data is
available.
Bankscope
Market share Total assets relative to the sum of all other banks’
assets in the country of residence.
Bankscope
Aggregate credit Sum of all other banks’ loans relative to all banks’
assets in the country of residence.
Bankscope
Basel II 1 if the Basel II rules were effective in the country of







RGDP growth Annual percentage change of constant price GDP. World Economic
Outlook database




Gvt Debt/GDP General government gross debt to GDP. World Economic
Outlook database

















Chapter 4: Bank Regulation and Taxation
Regulatory
stringency










Minimum capital adequacy requirement expressed as












4.9.1. Partial adjustment model
The partial adjustment model (equation (4.4)) used in this paper is standard in the
bank capital structure literature. It builds on Shrieves and Dahl (1992), who assume
that observed changes in capital and risk have two components, discretionary adjustment
and exogenous shocks. Discretionary changes are the result of banks’ optimal capital
and risk decisions, while exogenous shocks to risk might reflect unexpected changes in
the business cycles or in case of capital, unexpected loan losses. Denoting yijt either
leverage or asset risk, this assumption can be formulated as
∆yijt = ∆y
b
ijt + uijt (4.7)
The econometrician observes ∆yijt, the change of leverage/asset risk of bank i in coun-
try j in year t. However, banks’ planned leverage and risk adjustment ∆ybijt, and the
exogenous shocks uijt and vijt are unobservable. Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and the sub-
sequent literature assume that banks have target leverage and risk levels (y∗). The final
assumption of the model is that banks do not immediately adjust to their target levels
after either leverage and/or risk was hit by a shock in the previous period. Instead, it




ijt − yijt−1) (4.8)
Inserting the equation for banks’ planned adjustment (equation (4.8)) into the ob-
served adjustment equation (4.7) and assuming that the target levels (y∗) are a linear
function of some determinants yields equation (4.4) after some rewriting.
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4.10. Tables
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics – Sample of banks
See Table 4.A1 for variable definitions.
No. of obs. Mean St. D. Minimum Maximum
CIT 148608 0.382 0.0533 0.100 0.560
CIT dummy 148608 0.956 0.206 0 1
Leverage 148608 0.893 0.0678 0.214 0.979
RWA 106688 0.676 0.138 0.238 1.000
Loans 148608 0.632 0.168 0.0659 0.936
NPL 103624 -4.850 1.660 -9.488 -1.465
Z-score 147782 3.219 0.975 .459 5.544
Buffer dummy 127525 0.472 0.499 0 1
Size 148608 12.14 1.470 8.809 16.63
Size2 148608 149.7 38.33 17.68 454.4
Net interest margin 148608 0.0385 0.0150 0.00500 0.134
ROA 148608 0.00707 0.0121 -0.0530 0.0645
Fee income 148608 0.190 0.151 -0.146 0.968
Wholesale funding 148608 0.0793 0.152 0 0.950
Non-interest expenses 148608 0.0323 0.0339 0.00491 0.453
No ownership data dummy 148608 0.945 0.2285654 0.000 1.000
CIT diff (Local - owner) 148608 -0.000564 0.0115 -0.410 0.300
CIT diff (Local - frgn subsidiary) 148608 0.000291 0.0114 -0.338 0.350
Market share 148608 0.00397 0.0329 3.44e-08 1
Aggregate credit 148608 0.605 0.0612 0 1.060
Basel II 148608 0.202 0.402 0 1
RGDP growth 148608 0.0204 0.0227 -0.177 0.164
CPI 148608 0.0253 0.0204 -0.0638 1.087
Gvt Debt/GDP 148608 0.706 0.227 0.0389 1.864
GDP per capita 148608 10.47 0.411 6.567 10.89
Exchange rate chg 148608 0.000119 0.0577 -0.188 2.198
Activity restrictions 148608 10.79 2.104 4 16
Regulatory stringency 148608 5.343 0.671 2 9
Capital requirements 148608 0.0808 0.00487 0.0600 0.190
Creditor rights 148608 1.338 0.738 0 4
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Table 4.2: Correlation matrix of main variables
CIT is the top statutory corporate income tax rate. Leverage is total liabilities over total assets. RWA is
risk-weighted assets over total assets. Loans is total loans to total assets. NPL is the natural logarithm
of non-performing loans to total loans.
CIT Leverage RWA Loans NPL
CIT 1
Leverage 0.165∗∗∗ 1
RWA -0.00755∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 1
Loans -0.0371∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.748∗∗∗ 1
NPL -0.200∗∗∗ -0.0234∗∗∗ 0.0505∗∗∗ -0.0230∗∗∗ 1
105
Chapter 4: Bank Regulation and Taxation
Table 4.3: Single equation leverage and RWA regressions
The dependent variable is Leverage in columns (1) and (2) and risk-weighted assets to total assets (RWA)
in columns (3) and (4). Columns (1) and (3) are estimated with OLS on the between-transformed
variables. Columns (2) and (4) are estimated with the system GMM estimator, where only the lagged
dependent variables are treated as endogenous and both regressions include bank and time effects. In
column (2) only the second lag, in column (4) only the third lag is used to instrument the lagged
dependent variable. The sample in regression (4) excludes the years prior to 2004. The two-step
estimator with the (Windmeijer, 2005) correction is applied. In columns (2) and (4) CIT (Long run) is
the long run marginal effect of CIT calculated as γ/(1−β) in equation (4.4). The standard errors of the
long run marginal effect of CIT are calculated using the delta method and are clustered at the country
level. t statistics in parentheses. See Table 4.A1 for variable definitions. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
Leverage RWA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Between GMM Between GMM
Lagged value 0.576∗∗∗ 0.843∗∗∗
(6.63) (94.04)
CIT 0.0913∗∗∗ 0.0473∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.109∗∗
(7.60) (2.76) (-2.80) (-2.21)
Size 0.0315∗∗∗ 0.0105∗∗∗ 0.0582∗∗∗ 0.00545∗∗∗
(13.58) (4.27) (11.71) (3.98)
Size2 -0.000679∗∗∗ -0.000272∗∗∗ -0.00137∗∗∗ -0.000145∗
(-7.70) (-2.79) (-7.23) (-1.89)
Net interest margin -0.716∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 4.436∗∗∗ 0.564∗∗∗
(-16.08) (3.11) (36.17) (3.51)
ROA -0.0116 -0.947∗∗∗ -2.746∗∗∗ -0.206∗∗∗
(-0.22) (-23.09) (-21.73) (-2.90)
Fee income -0.0343∗∗∗ 0.0105 -0.0685∗∗∗ -0.0303∗∗∗
(-7.57) (1.33) (-5.40) (-5.85)
Wholesale funding -0.0692∗∗∗ -0.00561 0.0712∗∗∗ 0.0175
(-18.98) (-1.44) (5.38) (0.94)
Non-interest expenses -0.341∗∗∗ -0.355∗∗∗ -0.0862 0.212∗∗∗
(-17.12) (-8.22) (-1.31) (6.43)
Market share 0.0673∗∗∗ 0.0312∗ -0.0307 0.0331∗
(5.26) (1.81) (-0.72) (1.71)
Aggregate credit 0.0783∗∗∗ 0.0131 0.207∗∗∗ 0.0585∗∗∗
(8.30) (1.06) (6.71) (3.05)
Basel II -0.0596∗∗∗ -0.00302 -0.149∗∗∗ -0.0169∗∗∗
(-19.63) (-1.59) (-20.95) (-3.35)
RGDP growth -0.358∗∗∗ 0.0811∗∗∗ -1.398∗∗∗ -0.0435
(-6.35) (3.09) (-7.01) (-0.31)
CPI 0.0218 -0.0213 0.596∗∗∗ 0.0874
(0.58) (-0.88) (3.99) (0.63)
Gvt Debt/GDP -0.0220∗∗∗ 0.000977 0.0873∗∗∗ 0.0168∗∗
(-7.41) (0.18) (6.35) (2.47)
GDP per capita 0.00181 0.00232 0.0397∗∗∗ 0.00327
(1.03) (0.96) (6.43) (0.71)
Exchange rate chg -0.0225 -0.0224∗∗∗ -0.783∗∗∗ -0.107∗
(-1.04) (-5.75) (-6.45) (-1.72)
Activity restrictions -0.00425∗∗∗ -0.000895 0.00628∗∗∗ 0.00121
(-10.51) (-1.42) (3.93) (0.77)
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Regulatory stringency -0.000376 0.000674 -0.00932∗∗∗ 0.000599
(-0.45) (0.63) (-3.03) (0.31)
Capital requirements -0.269∗∗ -0.359 0.150 -0.0466
(-2.16) (-1.62) (0.42) (-0.14)
Creditor rights 0.00312∗∗∗ 0.000825 0.0233∗∗∗ -0.00452
(3.53) (0.45) (4.23) (-1.04)
Constant 0.659∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ -0.514∗∗∗ -0.00273
(21.08) (3.78) (-5.36) (-0.03)
Observations 148608 129378 106688 62806
Adjusted R2 0.354 0.212
Number of instruments 57 45
AR(1) test p value 0.000 0.000
AR(2) test p value 0.219 0.00503
AR(3) test p value 0.908
Hansen test p value 0.448 0.911
CIT (Long run) 0.112∗∗ -0.696∗
(2.88) (-2.23)
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Table 4.5: Single equation regressions on alternative portfolio risk measures
The dependent variable is total loans to total assets (Loans) in columns (1)-(2) and log-share of non-
performing loans to total loans (NPL) in columns (3)-(4). Columns (1) and (3) are estimated with
OLS on the between-transformed variables. Columns (2) and (4) are estimated with the system GMM
estimator, where only the lagged dependent variables are treated as endogenous and both regressions
include bank and time effects. In column (2) only the second lag, in column (4) only the third lag is
used to instrument the lagged dependent variable. The two-step estimator with the (Windmeijer, 2005)
correction is applied. In columns (2) and (4) CIT (Long run) is the long run marginal effect of CIT
calculated as γ/(1 − β) in equation (4.4). The standard errors of the long run marginal effect of CIT
are calculated using the delta method and are clustered at the country level. t statistics in parentheses.
See Table 4.A1 for variable definitions. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Loans NPL
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Between GMM Between GMM
Lagged value 0.920∗∗∗ 0.693∗∗∗
(87.53) (38.82)
CIT -0.199∗∗∗ -0.0618 -5.978∗∗∗ -1.442∗∗
(-7.36) (-1.64) (-15.00) (-2.36)
Size 0.0837∗∗∗ -0.00149 -0.00253 0.0691∗∗∗
(16.00) (-0.86) (-0.06) (3.56)
Size2 -0.00231∗∗∗ 0.0000265 0.00141 -0.00163∗∗
(-11.61) (0.48) (0.92) (-1.99)
Net interest margin 2.855∗∗∗ 0.509∗∗∗ 12.53∗∗∗ 3.752∗∗∗
(28.44) (3.24) (15.75) (7.62)
ROA -2.031∗∗∗ -0.538∗∗∗ -30.74∗∗∗ -13.11∗∗∗
(-17.16) (-4.41) (-32.06) (-8.11)
Fee income -0.248∗∗∗ -0.0132∗ 0.446∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗
(-24.29) (-1.94) (5.17) (3.57)
Wholesale funding 0.0458∗∗∗ 0.0139 0.275∗∗∗ 0.0879
(5.57) (1.17) (3.51) (0.87)
Non-interest expenses -0.0602 0.0310 -0.995∗∗∗ 0.0848
(-1.34) (1.13) (-2.81) (0.25)
Market share 0.268∗∗∗ 0.0414∗∗ 1.010∗∗∗ 0.465∗
(9.31) (2.19) (4.19) (1.68)
Aggregate credit 0.685∗∗∗ 0.0900∗∗∗ 0.634∗∗∗ 0.0180
(32.19) (4.49) (3.27) (0.06)
Basel II 0.00602 -0.0148∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ -0.0305
(0.88) (-2.79) (3.80) (-0.80)
RGDP growth -0.256∗∗ 0.0884 -5.991∗∗∗ -4.414∗∗∗
(-2.01) (1.12) (-6.49) (-3.51)
CPI -0.305∗∗∗ -0.0399 -1.939∗∗∗ 0.0332
(-3.57) (-0.41) (-2.62) (0.08)
Gvt Debt/GDP -0.0802∗∗∗ 0.000851 2.429∗∗∗ 0.722∗∗∗
(-12.00) (0.08) (45.00) (12.50)
GDP per capita 0.0282∗∗∗ 0.00399 -0.857∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗
(7.14) (0.66) (-26.41) (-4.61)
Exchange rate chg -0.0771 -0.0326 -1.350∗∗∗ -0.608∗∗∗
(-1.59) (-1.47) (-4.28) (-4.87)
Activity restrictions -0.00606∗∗∗ -0.00220∗∗∗ -0.00121 0.0330∗∗
(-6.64) (-3.08) (-0.12) (2.42)
Regulatory stringency 0.00219 -0.00114 -0.0226 -0.00542
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(1.15) (-0.46) (-1.30) (-0.19)
Capital requirements -1.408∗∗∗ -0.378∗ 12.61∗∗∗ 2.253
(-5.02) (-1.68) (5.56) (0.45)
Creditor rights -0.0118∗∗∗ -0.00272 -0.00578 -0.0587
(-5.95) (-1.42) (-0.25) (-1.27)
Constant -0.470∗∗∗ 0.0377 2.951∗∗∗ -0.327
(-6.67) (0.50) (5.38) (-0.40)
Observations 148608 129378 103624 84882
Adjusted R2 0.233 0.430
Number of instruments 57 55
AR(1) test p value 0.000 0.000
AR(2) test p value 0.943 0.000
AR(3) test p value 0.526
Hansen test p value 0.342 0.145




Table 4.6: Effect of regulation
The dependent variables are Leverage in columns (1) and (3) and risk-weighted assets over total assets
(RWA) in columns (2) and (4). All regressions are estimated with OLS on the between-transformed
variables. t statistics in parentheses. See Table 4.A1 for variable definitions. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Capital tightness Regulatory stringency
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Leverage RWA Leverage RWA
CIT 0.0619∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ 1.331∗∗∗
(3.56) (-1.99) (4.06) (4.84)
CIT * Buffer dummy 0.230∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗
(11.42) (-3.00)
CIT * Regulatory stringency -0.0316∗∗∗ -0.273∗∗∗
(-2.72) (-5.75)
Buffer dummy -0.132∗∗∗ -0.0262
(-17.28) (-1.18)
Size 0.0106∗∗∗ 0.0375∗∗∗ 0.0315∗∗∗ 0.0574∗∗∗
(5.50) (8.11) (13.61) (11.57)
Size2 -0.000278∗∗∗ -0.000971∗∗∗ -0.000680∗∗∗ -0.00132∗∗∗
(-3.83) (-5.52) (-7.70) (-6.97)
Net interest margin -0.0976∗∗ 4.007∗∗∗ -0.709∗∗∗ 4.398∗∗∗
(-2.22) (34.81) (-15.90) (35.86)
ROA 0.101∗∗ -2.635∗∗∗ -0.0152 -2.703∗∗∗
(2.11) (-22.45) (-0.29) (-21.38)
Fee income 0.0328∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗ -0.0338∗∗∗ -0.0702∗∗∗
(7.27) (-8.67) (-7.45) (-5.54)
Wholesale funding -0.0376∗∗∗ 0.0850∗∗∗ -0.0696∗∗∗ 0.0703∗∗∗
(-9.22) (6.87) (-19.08) (5.32)
Non-interest expenses -0.760∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗ -0.346∗∗∗ -0.0923
(-31.91) (2.15) (-17.30) (-1.40)
Market share 0.0734∗∗∗ -0.0493 0.0692∗∗∗ -0.00587
(6.30) (-1.25) (5.40) (-0.14)
Aggregate credit 0.0744∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.0776∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗
(7.85) (4.99) (8.22) (7.70)
Basel II -0.0267∗∗∗ -0.114∗∗∗ -0.0601∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗
(-9.32) (-16.91) (-19.77) (-20.63)
RGDP growth 0.0297 -1.504∗∗∗ -0.364∗∗∗ -1.430∗∗∗
(0.48) (-8.01) (-6.45) (-7.17)
CPI 0.00112 0.701∗∗∗ 0.0257 0.661∗∗∗
(0.03) (5.07) (0.68) (4.42)
Gvt Debt/GDP 0.00600∗∗ 0.0761∗∗∗ -0.0218∗∗∗ 0.0718∗∗∗
(2.08) (5.88) (-7.34) (5.14)
GDP per capita -0.00256 0.0361∗∗∗ 0.000707 0.0327∗∗∗
(-1.46) (6.21) (0.39) (5.20)
Exchange rate chg -0.00663 -0.829∗∗∗ -0.0320 -0.824∗∗∗
(-0.24) (-7.32) (-1.47) (-6.78)
Activity restrictions -0.00257∗∗∗ 0.00804∗∗∗ -0.00434∗∗∗ 0.00408∗∗
(-5.75) (5.25) (-10.68) (2.48)
Regulatory stringency -0.000458 -0.00699∗∗ 0.00867∗∗ 0.0598∗∗∗
(-0.55) (-2.43) (2.53) (4.82)
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Capital requirements -0.769∗∗∗ 0.222 -0.341∗∗∗ -0.289
(-6.51) (0.66) (-2.68) (-0.79)
Creditor rights 0.00676∗∗∗ 0.0214∗∗∗ 0.00360∗∗∗ 0.0260∗∗∗
(6.39) (4.11) (4.00) (4.70)
Constant 0.890∗∗∗ -0.250∗∗∗ 0.624∗∗∗ -0.792∗∗∗
(29.27) (-2.76) (18.54) (-7.38)
Observations 127525 106606 148608 106688
Adjusted R2 0.406 0.325 0.355 0.215
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Table 4.7: Descriptive statistics – Sample of non-financial firms
The table shows descriptive statistics for the sample of non-financial firms and corresponds to regressions
in Table 4.8. CIT is the top statutory corporate income tax rate. Leverage is total liabilities over total
assets. Asset volatility is the volatility of a firms’ assets based based on Merton’s option pricing model.
Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. Size2 is the square of the natural logarithm
of the book value of total assets. Net interest margin is interest income minus interest expenses over
interest-bearing (total earning) assets. ROA is before-tax income over average assets. Non-interest
expenses is non-interest expenses over total assets. GDP per capita is the natural log of GDP per capita
on a US dollar PPP basis. RGDP growth is the annual percentage change of constant price GDP.
Gvt Debt/GDP is general government gross debt to GDP. CPI is the annual end of period consumer
price change. Exchange rate chg is the annual percentage point changes in the nominal exhange rate.
Creditor rights is an index of statutory rights of creditors.
No. of obs. Mean St. D. Minimum Maximum
CIT 155099 0.337 0.0706 0.100 0.568
Leverage 155099 0.500 0.220 0.0534 0.930
Asset volatility 155099 0.0248 0.0174 0.00432 0.0879
Size 155099 12.41 1.934 6.864 16.58
Size2 155099 157.8 48.40 47.11 275.0
ROA 155099 0.00877 0.217 -1.461 0.314
Non-interest expenses 155099 0.972 0.0445 0.755 1
GDP per capita 155099 9.950 0.890 7.164 11.02
RGDP growth 155099 0.0334 0.0328 -0.148 0.148
Gvt Debt/GDP 155099 0.735 0.481 0.0389 2.366
Inflation 155099 0.0298 0.0345 -0.0355 0.685
Exchange rate chg 155099 -0.0000317 0.0773 -0.281 2.198
Creditor rights 155099 1.826 1.227 -1 5
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Table 4.8: Non-financial firms’ leverage and asset risk
The dependent variables are Leverage in columns (1) and (2) and Asset volatility in columns (3) and
(4). All regressions are estimated with OLS on the between-transformed variables. Industry effects
account for three-digit SIC sector-specific factors in columns (2) and (4). t statistics in parentheses.
See Table 4.A1 for variable definitions. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Leverage Asset volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CIT 0.352∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗ 0.0155∗∗∗ 0.0146∗∗∗
(16.05) (16.97) (11.29) (11.04)
Size -0.00965 -0.0224∗∗∗ -0.0185∗∗∗ -0.0173∗∗∗
(-1.53) (-3.68) (-46.74) (-45.20)
Size2 0.00155∗∗∗ 0.00190∗∗∗ 0.000595∗∗∗ 0.000555∗∗∗
(6.13) (7.74) (37.39) (35.96)
ROA -0.0789∗∗∗ -0.0997∗∗∗ -0.0212∗∗∗ -0.0195∗∗∗
(-12.56) (-16.44) (-53.74) (-51.12)
Non-interest expenses -1.293∗∗∗ -1.475∗∗∗ 0.0481∗∗∗ 0.0484∗∗∗
(-43.82) (-48.33) (25.99) (25.21)
GDP per capita -0.0316∗∗∗ -0.0216∗∗∗ 0.00590∗∗∗ 0.00512∗∗∗
(-12.51) (-8.81) (37.27) (33.18)
RGDP growth -0.0722 -0.290∗∗∗ 0.0547∗∗∗ 0.0640∗∗∗
(-0.89) (-3.74) (10.77) (13.12)
Gvt Debt/GDP 0.0481∗∗∗ 0.0267∗∗∗ -0.00548∗∗∗ -0.00425∗∗∗
(12.21) (7.03) (-22.18) (-17.80)
Inflation -0.370∗∗∗ -0.275∗∗∗ 0.0424∗∗∗ 0.0405∗∗∗
(-5.59) (-4.31) (10.22) (10.10)
Exchange rate chg 0.470∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ -0.0151∗∗∗ -0.00579∗∗∗
(14.25) (9.73) (-7.32) (-2.91)
Creditor rights 0.00818∗∗∗ 0.00392∗∗∗ -0.00103∗∗∗ -0.000820∗∗∗
(7.63) (3.82) (-15.33) (-12.68)
Constant 1.796∗∗∗ 1.859∗∗∗ 0.0534∗∗∗ 0.0597∗∗∗
(30.77) (30.14) (14.58) (15.37)
Observations 155099 155099 155099 155099
Adjusted R2 0.188 0.279 0.569 0.615
Industry effects No Yes No Yes
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Table 4.9: Overall bank risk – Z-score regressions
The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the natural logarithm of Z-score (Z-score). Columns
(1) is estimated with OLS on the between-transformed variables. Regression (2) is estimated with the
system GMM estimator with only the lagged dependent variable treated as endogenous, instrumented
only by the third lag. Column (2) includes bank and time effects as well. The two-step estimator with
the (Windmeijer, 2005) correction is applied. In column (2) CIT (Long run) is the long run marginal
effect of CIT calculated as γ/(1 − β) in equation (4.4). The standard errors of the long run marginal
effect of CIT are calculated using the delta method and are clustered at the country level. t statistics












Net interest margin -1.178∗ 1.486∗∗∗
(-1.89) (6.08)
Fee income -0.655∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗
(-9.84) (2.79)
Wholesale funding -0.139∗∗ -0.0877∗∗∗
(-2.52) (-4.86)
Non-interest expenses -3.198∗∗∗ -1.155∗∗∗
(-10.87) (-3.79)
Market share -0.0843 -0.0870
(-0.42) (-1.44)
Aggregate credit 2.704∗∗∗ -0.0260
(18.91) (-0.55)
Basel II -0.0308 0.00401
(-0.67) (0.39)




Gvt Debt/GDP -0.450∗∗∗ -0.000465
(-10.00) (-0.02)
GDP per capita 0.0401 -0.00424
(1.50) (-0.37)
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Exchange rate chg 1.464∗∗∗ 0.0565
(4.30) (1.52)
Activity restrictions -0.163∗∗∗ -0.00656∗∗∗
(-26.37) (-3.07)
Regulatory stringency 0.0191 0.00456
(1.48) (0.94)
Capital requirements 0.744 -0.583
(0.39) (-0.94)






Number of instruments 54
AR(1) test p value 0.000
AR(2) test p value 0.000
AR(3) test p value 0.692
Hansen test p value 0.377




Financial Repression or Risk
Shifting? Determinants and
Valuation Effects of the Home
Bias in European Banks’ Sovereign
Debt Portfolios
Abstract We document that the largest European banks hold sovereign debt portfolios
heavily biased toward their domestic governments. This bias is stronger if (1) both the
sovereign and the banks are weak, (2) the sovereign is weak and shareholder rights are
strong, and (3) the sovereign is weak and the government has positive ownership in the
bank. We also find that the home bias is positively valued by the market as reflected by
a positive association between the home bias and Tobin’s q. The home bias premium
is small when public finances are weak –keeping bank risk constant, but when both
the sovereign and the banks are weak, the premium is positive. These results provide
evidence for both the voluntary hoarding and government repression channels.
5.1. Introduction
The recent European sovereign debt crisis revealed the interrelatedness of the financial
sector and government finances to be a key issue. Specifically, large holdings of domestic
sovereign debt by banks may have a detrimental effect on financial and macroeconomic
stability. Banks that are heavily exposed to their domestic government stand to suffer
heavy losses in case of a domestic sovereign default, making costly distress in the financial
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sector more likely. A government bail-out of distressed banks, in turn, reduces the
financial strength of the government, increasing yields on government debts and reducing
their valuation. This further weakens the financial sector if financial institutions are
heavily exposed to domestic government debt (see Acharya et al., 2014).
The strength of the potentially negative feedback loop between the financial and
government sectors would be reduced, if banks were less exposed to domestic government
debt. This renders it important to understand the determinants of banks’ tendency to
hold relatively much domestic government debt. This paper provides empirical evidence
on the determinants of the observed home bias towards domestic sovereign debt, and of
its implications for bank valuation. Importantly, this work provides tests that can help
discriminate among competing explanations of the home bias.
Two main motivations for a bank’s home bias towards domestic government debt have
been advanced. First, banks may benefit from holding extensive domestic government
debt, if this enables them to increase overall bank risk and shift risk to the banks’
creditors. Domestic government debt may be especially attractive in this regard, as
banks may reason that they will fail anyway when their domestic sovereign defaults. A
home bias towards domestic government debt then benefits shareholders, if the bank’s
cost of funds does not fully reflect the heightened losses in case of a sovereign default,
due to, for instance, the existence of deposit insurance or the availability of cheap central
bank funding.
A second main explanation of the home bias has to do with the fact that govern-
ments use bank regulation and supervision to induce banks to hold extensive domestic
government debt. The zero-risk weighting attached to domestic government debt in the
Basle capital adequacy framework, in particular, provides an inducement for banks to
expose themselves heavily to domestic government debt.
In this paper, we examine the domestic debt home bias for the sample of European
banks that were subject to a series of stress tests over the 2010-2013 period conducted by
the European Banking Authority (EBA), and its predecessor, the Committee of Euro-
pean Banking Supervisors (CEBS). This set of banks includes the largest publicly traded
European banks.
We examine the determinants of the home bias by estimating regressions of any bank’s
exposure to any EU government’s debt – relative to bank assets. We find that a bank’s
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home bias is stronger, if domestic country risk – as proxied by the domestic sovereign
CDS spread – is higher and if bank risk is higher – as proxied by bank leverage. These
results suggest that higher risk on the part of either the government or the bank serves
to intensify the link between the financial sector and government finances, increasing the
chance of joint bank and sovereign failure. While significant, these results by themselves
do not enable us to discriminate between the ‘risk-shifting’ and ‘government-action’
explanations of the home bias, as both are consistent with a greater home bias in the
case of higher country or bank risk.
Three additional results, however, provide more pointed evidence on the relative mer-
its of the explanations of the home bias. First, as evidence in support of a ‘government
action’ explanation of the home bias, we find that the home bias is greater in case of a
risky sovereign especially for government-owned banks. Governments have greater sway
over publicly owned banks, and hence can more easily induce these banks to increase
their funding to a risky sovereign.
Second, as evidence of the ‘risk-shifting’ explanation, we find that the home bias
is greater for a risky sovereign, if the bank-level corporate governance regime is more
shareholder-friendly. Risk-shifting by way of an increased exposure to a risky sovereign
serves the interests of bank shareholders consistent with the risk-shifting hypothesis,
possibly at the expense of bank creditors, management and employees.
Third, we find that bank valuation, as proxied by a bank’s Tobin’s q, is positively
related to a measure of the home bias towards domestic government debt, consistent
with a risk-shifting explanation. However, we find that the positive valuation effect of
the home bias declines with the domestic sovereign’s CDS spread. A lower valuation of
the home bias with a more risky sovereign suggests that banks involuntarily take on the
debts of riskier domestic sovereigns – consistent with a government-action explanation.
There are several papers that have previously investigated banks’ bias towards do-
mestic sovereign debt. Angeloni and Wolff (2012) document a home bias using the
sovereign debt exposure data released by the EBA in July and December 2011. We
document the home bias including data up to 2013. Battistini et al. (2014) examine
the home bias using monthly, disaggregated, country level data on banks’ sovereign debt
exposure. They conclude that banks respond to higher country risk by increasing their
domestic debt exposure (although only in the case of periphery – i.e. already risky –
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countries), consistent with the main competing explanations of the home bias. Going
beyond Battistini et al. (2014), this paper provides evidence of the main explanations of
the home bias separately.
Related to the previous papers, Acharya and Steffen (2015) present evidence of banks’
use of European government bonds to reap carry trade profits. They show that bank
stock returns positively correlate with the returns on Greek, Italian, Irish, Portuguese and
Spanish (GIIPS) long-term government bonds and negatively with northern (German)
bond returns. These patterns are consistent with banks holding large GIIPS government
bond portfolios financed by selling German government debt. The authors show that
this behavior is related to governments pressurizing banks to absorb domestic debt; and
to regulatory arbitrage and/or risk-shifting by under-capitalized banks. We extend their
results by providing further tests to distinguish between these channels.
There are some theoretical results regarding banks’ home bias incentives. Uhlig
(2014) argues that in a monetary union, where banks can pledge government bonds to
obtain central bank financing, regulators in risky countries allow banks to hold more risky
domestic government debt. This way risky countries shift risk onto the central bank of
the union, and eventually to other, safe countries. This leads to biased government bond
portfolios in risky countries. Our results confirm Uhlig’s prediction that the home bias
is stronger in riskier countries and in riskier banks.
The home bias literature is embedded in a broader discussion about the interre-
latedness of bank stability and public finances (cf. BIS, 2011) and as such our paper
is related to papers investigating how government finances affect financial stability and
vice versa. Systemically important banks (or groups of banks) enjoy implicit and explicit
bailout guarantees, which distort their incentives. However, these subsidies are shown
to depend on the fiscal strength of the government (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2013;
Horváth and Huizinga, 2015): as countries become weaker, bank valuation also declines
and bank default risk increases. Attinasi et al. (2009) and Ejsing and Lemke (2009) show
that prior to bank bailouts, country and bank risk moved strongly together and bank
bailouts represented a risk transfer from the banking sector to the sovereign. Acharya
et al. (2014) provide further evidence for the two-way feedback between the government
and the banking sector. These papers estimate the aggregate effect of various channels:
the effect of ongoing bailouts, changes in the value of banks’ government debt exposure
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and changes in the value of explicit and implicit government guarantees. Our paper adds
to this literature by pinning down one channel through which the feedback materializes.
We also contribute to the literature on the optimal institutional setup of a monetary
union. The literature identified a trade-off regarding banks’ government bond holdings:
more integration yields diversification benefits, but it also increases the risk of contagion
(Bolton and Jeanne, 2011; Korte and Steffen, 2014). We show that banks may not fully
take advantage of diversification benefits due to regulatory pressure or because of bad
incentives.
We proceed in the next section by describing the hypotheses of the paper and intro-
duce the methodology to test the hypotheses. In Section 5.3 we describe the data used
in the paper. In Section 5.4 we present the results. Section 5.5 provides a discussion of
the results and concludes.
5.2. Hypotheses regarding the home bias and empirical approach
In the literature, several competing explanations are offered for the tendency of banks to
allocate a relatively large portfolio share to domestic government debt. First, banks that
invest heavily in domestic government debt potentially face heavy losses in the event of
a default of the domestic sovereign. Increased losses in this event do not further harm
bank shareholders, if the bank is going to fail anyway in the event of a domestic sovereign
default. Banks are able to shift risk of joint bank and sovereign failure to tax payers and
possibly to bank creditors to the extent that a bank’s funding cost does not properly
reflect the cost of joint failure, due to deposit insurance or because of the availability
of cheap central bank funding. In the Eurozone, banks have been able to obtain ample
and cheap credit from the ECB through the Long-Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO)
facility starting in the end of 2011. The cost of this financing, at 1% annually at the
time of announcement, does not reflect any additional bank risks resulting from increased
domestic government debt exposures financed by this funding.
Second, bank’s sovereign debt portfolios may display a home bias, as banks are
induced to invest heavily in domestic government debt by government action. An im-
portant inducement is the zero risk weighting attached to government debt by Basle
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capital adequacy rules. Occasionally individual governments use other regulatory in-
ducements to banks to invest in domestic government debts as well. On April 24, 2014,
for instance, the Hungarian central bank announced various measures with the stated
aim of improving Hungary’s debt structure. These measures, including a new interest
rate swap facility, were explicitly designed to facilitate the purchase of Hungarian debt
by Hungarian banks by increasing incentives for them to hold domestic as opposed to
foreign government bonds.
A third motivation has to do with the fact that exposure to domestic government
debt can provide domestic banks with a natural hedge against the risk of Eurozone
break-up. The idea is that after such a break-up domestic government debt is likely to
be denominated in the same currency as main funding categories such as bank deposits,
thereby reducing redenomination risk (see Battistini et al., 2014).
To examine the validity of these hypotheses, our empirical work consists of two parts:
(i) portfolio share regressions with as the dependent variable the ratio of bank’s sovereign
debt exposure to any EU country relative to the bank’s total assets, and (ii) bank
valuation regressions with as the dependent variable a bank’s Tobin’s q constructed as
the approximated market value of the bank’s assets relative to their book value.
The risk-shifting motive for a home bias would predict that the home bias is larger
in case of a risky sovereign (in the empirical work, we will use the sovereign CDS spread
for 5-year contracts to proxy for country risk), as then bank risk can be increased ma-
terially by a higher share of domestic government debt in the sovereign debt portfolio.
However, the government action hypothesis to explain the home bias is also consistent
with a positive impact of country risk on a bank’s domestic debt holdings, as weak gov-
ernments presumably have a greater need for using their domestic banks as a funding
source. Finally, the natural hedge hypothesis can also explain a greater home bias for
banks located in a risky country, as a country’s sovereign default risk can be expected
to correlate with redenomination risk. Overall, we thus expect a positive relationship
between the sovereign debt home bias and country default risk, even if evidence to this
effect does not enable us to establish the relative merit of competing hypotheses of the
home bias.
We further relate sovereign debt shares to bank leverage as a proxy for bank risk.
Risky banks have a risk-shifting motive for a government debt bias as they stand a real
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chance of bank failure. Riskier and weaker banks may similarly be easier to cajoled into
holding additional domestic government debt by a government intent on increasing its
bank funding. A positive relationship between bank risk and the home bias thus does
not enable us to discriminate between the risk-shifting and government action rationales
for the home bias.
We use information on bank ownership and bank-level corporate governance regimes
to test more specific hypotheses concerning the channels underlying the sovereign debt
home bias. First, we hypothesize that banks hold more government debt of risky gov-
ernments if the bank is government-owned. This would be evidence in support of the
government action channel, as governments are more capable of nudging banks towards
a higher portfolio share of domestic government debt if they are government-owned. Sec-
ond, we examine whether banks hold more domestic government debt of risky countries
especially if the bank’s corporate governance regime is rather shareholder-friendly. Ev-
idence of this kind supports the risk-shifting motive for the home bias as risk-shifting
benefits shareholders at the expense of other stakeholders such as the bank’s creditors
and possibly its management and employees.
In addition to the portfolio share analysis, we consider the implication of a bank’s
home bias in its government debt portfolio on bank valuation. To this end, we construct
a home bias variable that reflects to what extent a bank’s share of domestic government
debt in its overall government debt portfolio exceeds the average share of that country’s
government debt in EU banks’ government debt portfolios. A positive valuation of a
bank’s home bias by bank shareholders is consistent with the risk-shifting and natural
hedge motives for such a bias, while a negative valuation suggests that banks are nudged
or forced to hold more domestic debt than they wish consistent with a government action
explanation. A valuation of the home bias that increases with country risk similarly is
consistent with the risk-shifting and natural hedge hypotheses, while a valuation of the
home bias that declines with sovereign risk suggests that banks are forced to hold too
much domestic government debt in case of a risky sovereign consistent with a government-
action explanation of the home bias.
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5.3. Data
We obtain data on banks’ exposures to government debts of EU member states from the
EU-wide stress tests conducted first by the Committee of European Banking Supervisors
for the first quarter of 2010, and subsequently by the European Banking Authority for
the fourth quarter of 2010, the fourth quarter of 2011, the second and fourth quarters
of 2012, and the second quarter of 2013. The first stress test of 2010 included 91 banks,
representing 65% of the European banking market in terms of assets. Subsequent stress
tests involved mostly the same set of banks. Our sovereign debt exposure data are net
of impairment and cover debt in both the banking and trading books. Moreover, the
exposure data are net of derivative positions. As a consequence, the exposure data are
potentially negative. This is the case in about 1% of the observations.
Using the exposure data, we construct the sovereign exposure variable as a bank’s
exposure to any one EU sovereign divided by bank total assets (with bank balance sheet
information taken from SNL Financials; Appendix 5.6 provides variable definitions and
data sources). As seen in Table 5.1, the sovereign exposure variable has a mean of 0.3%,
meaning that a bank’s average sovereign debt exposure to any EU country is about 0.3%
of total assets. The maximum value of the sovereign exposure variable is 0.321 (for the
case of a Greek bank’s exposure to Greek sovereign debt).
In Figure 5.1 we plot banks’ exposure to domestic government debt as a percentage of
their total assets. We report the mean values for three GIIPS countries (Italy, Portugal
and Spain)32 and non-GIIPS banks separately. Throughout the sample period banks in
GIIPS countries have higher exposures to domestic government debt than banks in non-
GIIPS countries. However, this difference becomes dramatically more pronounced after
the second quarter of 2012, with banks in GIIPS countries increasing significantly their
exposures to domestic government debt. Around the same time, banks in non-GIIPS
countries increased their exposures to domestic government debt as well, but to a lesser
degree. This increase in domestic government debt, particularly from banks in GIIPS
countries, may reflect the introduction of LTRO by the ECB in December 2011. Prior to
LTRO, banks in GIIPS countries had limited access to liquidity and their funding costs
32We exclude Greece from the graph, because exposure data for Greek banks is not available for the
fourth quarter of 2011 and the second quarter of 2012. Ireland is excluded because of missing balance
sheet data for Irish banks.
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were sensitive to the risk of their portfolios. With the introduction of LTRO banks in the
Eurozone were able to access liquidity at very low costs and costs that were not sensitive
of their risk or the risk of any additional investments. Figure 1 indicates that banks in
GIIPS countries may have used the liquidity from LTRO to increase their exposure to
domestic government debt.33
The underlying bank exposure data are also used to construct a measure of the home
bias of a bank’s sovereign debt portfolio following Bracke and Schmitz (2008). Let Eijh
be the exposure of bank i to the sovereign debt of country j given that the bank is
located in country h. The share, Sijh, of bank i’s government debt portfolio allocated to





Actual portfolios shares, Sijh, allocated to the debt of country j can be compared to
the portfolio share, CAPMj, for country j that would arise if all banks were to invest








where h takes on different values for banks located in different countries.
The home bias, HBih, for a bank i located in country h is defined as 1 minus the
ratio of the bank’s portfolio share allocated to non-h countries divided by the share of











33Distinguishing between the various GIIPS countries reveals that this increase is more pronounced
for Italy and Portugal. Analyzing the available data for Greek bank reveals an overall declining exposure
to domestic government debt due the assumption of Greek debt by European official bodies.
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The home bias HBih for bank i is zero if the bank’s actual portfolio share allocated to
its home country h, Sijh, equals the available debt share for that country, i.e. CAPMh,
while HBih > 0 if Sijh > CAPMh, and vice versa. The sample mean value of HB is
positive at 0.613.
In Figure 5.2 we plot the sample averages of the home bias variable separately for
banks located in three GIIPS countries (Italy, Portugal and Spain), and banks in non-
GIIPS countries. The figure shows that throughout the sample period the sovereign
debt portfolios of banks in GIIPS countries were significantly more biased towards their
domestic governments than the portfolios of banks in non-GIIPS countries. Furthermore,
the home bias in non-GIIPS countries increased materially over the 2010-2012 period
and it began decreasing for both groups of banks after July 2012. This reduction in the
home bias towards the end of the sample period together with the increase in domestic
government debt documented in Figure 5.1 suggest that banks in GIIPS countries may
have used the LTRO facility to also expand their exposures other countries’ government
bonds, engaging in a carry trade, as well as non-GIIPS-based banks’ higher willingness
to buy GIIPS assets. Banks in non-GIIPS countries, exhibit qualitatively a similar
behavior, but to a lesser degree.
In the portfolio regressions, the sovereign exposure variable is first related to the
domestic variable which is a dummy variable signaling domestic sovereign debt. To
represent country risk, we use the sovereign CDS spread for 5-year senior sovereign debt
available from Datastream. As an index of bank risk, leverage is the total liabilities
divided by total assets, with a mean of 0.942.
In some specifications, we consider how a bank’s sovereign debt portfolio decision
depends on the share of government ownership taken from SNL Financials. On average,
the share of government ownership is 5.4%.
In addition, we consider the impact of bank-level corporate governance. We use
indices of corporate governance as formulated by Aggarwal et al. (2010). The indices
increase with the power of minority shareholders, and are based on individual gover-
nance attributes assembled by Institutional Shareholder Services. The individual char-
acteristics are dummy variables that take on a value of 1 if the attribute is relatively
shareholder-friendly, and zero otherwise. The corporate governance variable is an overall
index that summarizes information on the full set of 44 attributes. Furthermore, there
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are four sub-indices, called board, compensation and ownership, auditing and takeover
that summarize information on 25, 10, 3 and 6 attributes related to the pertinent as-
pects of corporate governance. The takeover sub-index, for instance, reflects the extent
to which there are corporate governance-related barriers to takeovers.
In the valuation regressions, Tobin’s q is computed as the market value of equity
plus the book value of total liabilities divided by the book value of total assets. The
average Tobin’s q is 0.984. This bank valuation measure is first related to the assets
variable which is the logarithm of total assets. Larger banks may attain higher market
valuation as a reflection of their too-big-to-fail status. Deposits to liabilities is the ratio
of total deposits to total liabilities with a mean of 0.5. Deposits funding may increase
bank valuation as it is relatively cheap and stable. The return on equity is the ratio
of operating income to equity, with a mean of 0.11. A higher return on equity may be
mirrored in a higher Tobin’s q.
The income diversity variable measures to what extent a bank’s income is diversified
between net interest income and non-interest income. Specifically, this variable takes on
a value of 1 if net interest income and non-interest income are equal (in this case the
bank’s income is taken to be well-diversified), while it declines with the absolute value
of the difference between these the two types of income. Similarly, the asset diversity
variable equals 1 if its loans and securities portfolios are of equal size, while it decreases
with the divergence in the size of these two bank asset categories. Banks with highly
diverse income streams or asset portfolios may possibly be valued less, as they are more
difficult to manage effectively (Laeven and Levine, 2007).
Finally, the asset growth variable is the rate of change of a bank’s assets, while the
operating income growth variable is the growth rate of a bank’s operating income. Banks
with growing assets or operating income may be valued more highly as a reflection of
growth opportunities as perceived by bank stock investors. Table 5.2 provides infor-
mation on correlations among the bank-level variables. The table shows that Tobin’s
q and the home bias have a positive correlation of 0.0508, but this correlation is not
statistically significant.
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5.4. Empirical results
5.4.1. Portfolio share regressions
The portfolio share regressions explain a bank’s sovereign exposure to any of the EU
governments as a share of the bank’s total assets. In regression 1 of Table 5.3, the
sovereign exposure variable is related only to the domestic dummy variable. The regres-
sion includes bank and time fixed effects, and errors allow for clustering at the bank
level. The domestic variable obtains a coefficient of 0.059 that is significant at the 1%
level. This confirms a positive home bias towards bank investments in domestic gov-
ernment debt as displayed in Figure 1. The coefficient of 0.059 implies that a bank’s
exposure to domestic government debt is on average almost 6% of assets higher than
for any foreign government. This home bias is economically significant as the sovereign
exposure variable has a mean of only 0.3% with a standard deviation 1.5% as seen in
Table 5.1. In regression 2, we include country-time fixed effects instead of time fixed
effects, again yielding a coefficient of 0.059 for the domestic variable that is significant at
the 1% level. Including bank-time fixed effects, as in regression 3, similarly yields results
that are virtually unchanged.
Next, we examine how the home bias is affected by country risk as represented by the
sovereign CDS spread, and by bank risk as represented by bank leverage. Starting with
country risk only, regression 1 in Table 5.4 includes an interaction term of domestic with
the sovereign CDS spread in addition to bank and country-time effects (the inclusion of
the latter fixed effects precludes an estimation of the effect of the sovereign CDS spread
per se on the portfolio share). The interaction term obtains a positive coefficient of
0.016, but it is statistically insignificant. Regression 2 instead includes bank-time effects
yielding almost identical results.
Next, regressions 3 and 4 additionally include the leverage variable, interactions of
this variable with domestic and sovereign CDS, and a triple interaction of this variable
with domestic and the sovereign CDS spread, starting from regressions 1 and 2. In
regression 3, the interaction of domestic and sovereign CDS obtains a negative coefficient
of -0.301 that is significant at the 10% level, while the triple interaction of domestic,
sovereign CDS and leverage has a positive coefficient of 0.332 that is significant at the
10% level. These two estimated coefficients together imply that the home bias declines
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with the sovereign CDS spread for lowly leveraged banks and vice versa. Specifically,
the home bias declines with the sovereign CDS spread if leverage is below 0.907, and
vice versa. A bank with average leverage of 0.942 is estimated to increase its home bias
with the sovereign CDS spread.
The tendency for the home bias to decline with the sovereign CDS spread for lowly
leveraged banks suggests that such banks try to diversity away part of the risk associated
with highly risky domestic government debt. Highly leveraged banks instead increase
their domestic exposure with the riskiness of domestic government debt consistent with
the risk-shifting as well as the government action hypotheses.
In regressions 3 and 4, the domestic variable and its interaction with leverage are
highly correlated leading to collinearity. Regressions 5 and 6 are similar to regressions
3 and 4 but exclude the interaction of the domestic and leverage variables. In these re-
gressions, the domestic variable is estimated with a positive coefficient that is significant
at the 1% level, while its interactions with the sovereign CDS spread, and jointly with
the sovereign CDS and leverage, obtain negative and positive coefficients, respectively,
that are both significant at the 5% level. Estimated coefficients in regressions 5 and 6
imply that the home bias increases with the sovereign CDS spread for banks if leverage is
greater than 0.832 (=0.099/0.119) and 0.825 (=0.099/0.120), respectively. This applies
to all banks in the sample, as the minimum leverage is 0.848 from Table 5.1.
Next we consider how the home bias depends on the government ownership share
in a bank. Governments have greater control over government-owned banks than over
privately owned banks, and hence a greater home bias for government-owned banks in
case of a risky sovereign suggests that governments force these banks under their control
to hold more government debt. Regressions 1 and 2 of Table 5.5 includes an interac-
tion between domestic and the government ownership share in regressions 1 and 2 of
Table 5.4, yielding positive coefficients that are statistically insignificant. The govern-
ment ownership share is time-invariant, and hence subsumed by the bank fixed effects
in these regressions. Regressions 3 and 4 additionally include a triple interaction term
of domestic, the sovereign CDS spread, and the government ownership share. In these
regressions, the domestic variable, its interaction with the sovereign CDS spread, and the
triple interaction term obtain positive coefficients that are statistically significant at 1%,
10%, and 1%, respectively. Hence, the home bias increases with country risk as proxied
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by the sovereign CDS spread, and it is especially strong in case of both high country
risk and a high government ownership share of the bank. The latter result could imply
that governments force their government owned banks to purchase domestic government
debt especially if country risk is high, and hence is consistent with a government action
explanation of the home bias.
A home bias with a risk-shifting motive serves the interests of shareholders. Thus we
may expect a greater home bias towards a risky sovereign if the corporate governance of
the bank is relatively shareholder-friendly. To examine the impact of corporate gover-
nance, we first include interactions of domestic and corporate governance in regressions
1 and 2 of Table 5.4, with the results reported as regressions 1 and 2 of Table 5.6. Es-
timated coefficients for this interaction term are negative but statistically insignificant.
Regressions 3 and 4 in addition include triple interactions of domestic, and sovereign
CDS spread, and corporate governance. In both regressions, this triple interaction term
is estimated with a positive coefficient that is significant at the 1% level. The home bias
towards the debts of risky domestic sovereigns thus appears to be strong especially if
corporate governance is shareholder-friendly. This is evidence in favor of a risk-shifting
motive for the sovereign debt home bias.
The overall corporate governance index can be broken down into four subindices that
represent corporate governance attributes related to the board, auditing, takeover mat-
ters, and compensation and ownership. To examine the separate roles of these aspects
of corporate governance, we include these one at a time in regressions 1-4 of Table 5.7,
analogously to regression 4 of Table 5.6. The triple interactions of the board, audit and
takeover subindices with domestic and sovereign CDS obtain positive and significant
coefficients in columns 1-3, while the triple interaction of compensation and ownership
with domestic and sovereign CDS spread obtains a negative but insignificant coefficient
in regression 4. Regression 5 in turn includes the triple interactions involving the four
subindices jointly. In this instance, the triple interaction involving the board subindex
is estimated with a positive and significant coefficient, while the other three triple inter-
actions are estimated with insignificant coefficients. This suggests that board attributes
that are shareholder-friendly particularly contribute towards a home bias towards risky
sovereigns, consistent with a risk-shifting motive.
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5.4.2. Bank valuation regressions
This subsection examines the implications of the sovereign debt home bias in banks’
portfolios on bank valuation, as proxied by Tobin’s q. The relationship between bank
valuation and the home bias potentially provides us with additional information on the
underlying determinants of the home bias. A positive valuation of the home bias should
arise if banks invest in domestic government bonds with a view to shifting risks. A home
bias which is valued negatively by bank stock investors, on the other hand, is consistent
with banks beings forced in one way or another by their governments to invest in domestic
government debt.
To start, we relate Tobin’s q to the home bias variable in a regression that includes
bank and country-time fixed effects. The estimated coefficient for the home bias variable,
as reported in column 1 of Table 5.8, is positive at 0.00687 and significant at the 5%
level. A bank with average home bias of 0.613 thus is estimated to have a Tobin’s q that
is 0.4% (= 0.613*0.00687) higher, consistent with a risk-shifting explanation of the home
bias. In regression 2, we include a set of control variables in regression 1 to control for
time-varying bank characteristics. The home bias variable obtains a positive coefficient
of 0.0057 that is significant at the 1% level. Among the controls, Tobin’s q is positively
and significantly related to leverage, while it is negatively and significantly related to
bank size as measured by total assets.
Regressions 3 and 4 include an interaction term of the home bias and sovereign CDS
variables in regressions 1 and 2. The coefficients on these interaction terms are negative
and statistically significant at the 1% level in regression 4. The home bias thus is
relatively negatively valued if the home country is more risky. This suggests that banks
in risky countries are forced to increase their home bias beyond the level consistent with
maximum bank valuation.
Regressions 5 and 6 additionally include interaction terms with leverage. The in-
teractions of home bias with sovereign CDS continue to have negative and significant
coefficients, while the triple interaction terms between home bias, sovereign CDS, and
leverage have positive coefficients. Banks thus stand to benefit more from a home bias,
if the country and the bank are both risky. This is consistent with the notion that
risk-shifting by risky banks through a higher home bias increases bank valuation. The
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coefficient of leverage is positive and statistically significant, while its interaction term
with sovereign CDS spread is negative and statistically significant indicating that banks
with higher leverage are positively valued unless they are located in riskier countries.
Regressions 7 and 8 exclude the home bias and leverage interaction variable from
regressions 5 and 6 on the ground that this variable is highly correlated with home bias.
Results with respect to the interaction terms remain unchanged, while the coefficient of
the home bias variable gains statistical significance. Finally, regressions 9 to 12 present
augmented specifications of the previous four regressions including the sovereign debt
exposures to each country as a percentage of the bank’s total sovereign debt portfolio.
This allows to additionally control for differences in the pricing of different government
bonds on Tobin’s q. A similar approach was used, for example, in Huizinga and Laeven
(2012). Results are unaffected.
Overall, our findings in Table 8 indicate that home bias is positively valued, par-
ticularly if both the country and the bank are risky. Home bias in risky countries is
otherwise negatively valued suggesting that less risky banks in risky countries may be
forced to hold more domestic government debt than what is consistent with maximum
bank valuation.
Next, we examine how the value of home bias varies over time. In Table 9 we estimate
separate valuation regressions for each of the six stress tests dates in our sample. Using
the estimates from these specifications we compute the marginal value of home bias
on each of these dates (the first derivative of Tobin’s q with respect to the home bias
variable). Figure 3 displays the resulting marginal values. We report the estimated
mean values and their 95% confidence intervals. As can be observed in Figure 3, prior to
LTRO, home bias had on average a positive marginal valuation (i.e., an increase in the
average bank’s home bias was associated with an increase in the average bank’s value).
After LTRO, the average marginal value of home bias declined significantly as the crisis
became less severe over time. In combination with results in Figures 1 and 2, these
results indicate that despite the positive marginal value of home bias during the first
part of the sample, banks could increase their domestic government debt exposures only
marginally. The introduction of LTRO increased banks’ access to cheap liquidity. This
allowed banks, and in particular banks in riskier countries, to expand their holdings of
domestic government debt, which in turn brought down the marginal value of home bias
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as the crisis began to subside and spreads in risky government bonds began to drop.
5.5. Policy implications and conclusions
In this paper we analyzed banks’ sovereign debt portfolios and found that there is a
significant bias towards domestic government debt. This poses threats to financial sta-
bility in countries where sovereign default is perceived as a real possibility and can have
implications for macroeconomic stability through its impact on credit supply (Popov and
Van Horen, 2014). This is all the more troubling since the bias is largest in countries
where the risk of sovereign and bank default are the highest.
When we look deeper at the composition of banks’ sovereign debt portfolios we find
support for two hypotheses of home bias: more government ownership is associated with
larger home bias in weak countries, supporting the government action story; while more
shareholder-friendly corporate governance is positively correlated with the home bias in
weak countries, in line with the risk-shifting explanation. The bank valuation regres-
sions corroborate these results. We find a premium associated with a government bond
portfolio tilted towards the domestic sovereign. This premium declines with sovereign
CDS spreads, but less so for highly leveraged banks, suggesting that the risk-shifting
and government suasion channels are both operative.
These results provide a rationale for mitigating the risk of interconnected government
finances and bank stability by way of encouraging less biased sovereign debt portfolios.
Applying positive risk weights for sovereign debt is one such avenue. Risk weights that
increase with the likelihood of default should reduce banks’ incentives to shift risk to
creditors and tax payers by increasing the cost of loading on risky domestic government
bonds. Risk weights may also limit governments’ willingness to force banks to absorb
their debt as such an action would weaken banks’ regulatory capital position and would
risk a credit crunch exactly at a time when banks already face difficulties in meeting
capital requirements.
Further integration of bank supervision at the European level should also be con-
sidered, since one way governments can induce banks to absorb sovereign debt is by
applying regulatory forbearance for banks under domestic oversight. A common Euro-
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pean supervisory framework could alleviate such concerns by removing the tools from
local governments’ hands. In this respect bank stakeholders will benefit from the recent
creation of eurozone level regulatory and supervisory bodies, such as the EBA and the












Home bias 1 minus the ratio of a bank’s sovereign debt
portfolio share allocated to foreign EU countries
divided by the share of foreign EU country
sovereign debt in all EU sovereign debt held by
banks in the sample
EBA, CEBS
Domestic Dummy variable indicating domestic sovereign
debt exposure
EBA, CEBS
Sovereign CDS CDS spread for five-year senior sovereign debt (in
basis points/10,000)
Datastream
Leverage Total liabilities divided by total assets SNL Financial
Government
ownership





Overall corporate governance index ISS
Board Corporate governance index based on board
attributes
ISS
Audit Corporate governance index based on auditing
attributes
ISS





Corporate governance index based on
compensation and ownership attributes
ISS
Tobin’s q Tobin’s Q computed as market value of equity




Assets Logarithm of total assets SNL Financial
Deposit to
liabilities
Total deposits divided by total liabilities SNL Financial
Return on
equity
Operating income divided by total equity SNL Financial
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Income diversity 1-Abs((Net interest income - (Net noninterest
income))/Total operating income)
SNL Financial
Asset diversity 1-Abs((Net loans - Total securities)/(Net loans
+Total securities))
SNL Financial
Asset growth Quarterly rate of change of total assets SNL Financial
Operating
income growth
Growth rate of operating income SNL Financial
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5.6.1. Corporate governance attributes
Board attributes
1. All directors attended 75% of board meetings or had a valid excuse
2. CEO serves on the boards of two or fewer public companies
3. Board is controlled by more than 50% independent outside directors
4. Board size is greater than 5 but less than 16
5. CEO is not listed as having a related-party transaction
6. No former CEO on the board
7. Compensation committee composed solely of independent outsiders
8. Chairman and CEO are separated or there is a lead director
9. Nominating committee composed solely of independent outsiders
10. Governance committee exists and met in the past year
11. Shareholders vote on directors selected to fill vacancies
12. Governance guidelines are publicly disclosed
13. Annually elected board (no staggered board)
14. Policy exists on outside directorships (four or fewer boards is the limit)
15. Shareholders have cumulative voting rights
16. Shareholder approval is required to increase/decrease board size
17. Majority vote requirement to amend charter/bylaws
18. Board has the express authority to hire its own advisors
19. Performance of the board is reviewed regularly
20. Board-approved succession plan in place for the CEO
21. Outside directors meet without CEO and disclose number of times met
22. Directors are required to submit resignation upon a change in job
23. Board cannot amend bylaws without shareholder approval or can do so only under
limited circumstances
24. Does not ignore shareholder proposal
25. Qualifies for proxy contest defenses combination points
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Auditing attributes
26. Board independence: Audit committee
27. Consulting fees paid to auditors are less than audit fees paid to auditors
28. Auditors ratified at most recent annual meeting
Antitakeover attributes
29. Single class, common
30. Majority vote requirement to approve mergers (not supermajority)
31. Shareholders may call special meetings
32. Shareholder may act by written consent
33. Company either has no poison pill or a pill that was shareholder approved
34. Company is not authorized to issue blank check preferred
Compensation and ownership attributes
35. Directors are subject to stock ownership requirements
36. Executives are subject to stock ownership guidelines
37. No interlocks among compensation committee members
38. Directors receive all or a portion of their fees in stock
39. All stock-incentive plans adopted with shareholder approval
40. Options grants align with company performance and reasonable burn rate
41. Company expenses stock options
42. All directors with more than one year of service own stock
43. Officers’ and directors’ stock ownership is at least 1% but not over 30% of total
shares outstanding
44. Repricing is prohibited




Figure 5.1: Banks’ exposure to domestic government debt in GIIPS and non-GIIPS
countries
The graph displays the average domestic government debt to total assets ratios for banks in three
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Figure 5.2: Average home bias for GIIPS and non-GIIPS countries
The home bias is calculated as 1 minus the ratio of a bank’s sovereign debt portfolio share allocated
to foreign EU countries divided by the share of foreign EU country sovereign debt in all EU sovereign





















Figure 5.3: Marginal value of home bias during the sample period
The graph displays the average marginal value of home bias during the sample period and the 95%
confidence intervals around the estimated mean values. The estimates are obtained using the estimated
coefficients of the Tobin’s q regressions in Table 9, calculated using the first derivative of these
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5.8. Tables
Table 5.1: Summary statistics
Sovereign exposure is a bank’s holdings of EU government debt to total assets. Home bias is 1
minus the ratio of a bank’s sovereign debt portfolio share allocated to foreign EU countries divided
by the share of foreign EU country sovereign debt in all EU sovereign debt held by banks in the
sample. Domestic is a dummy variable indicating domestic sovereign debt exposure. Sovereign
CDS is the CDS spread for five-year senior sovereign debt (in basis points/10,000). Leverage is
total liabilities divided by total assets. Government ownership is the share of domestic government
ownership of a bank. Corporate governance is an overall corporate governance index. Board is a
corporate governance index based on board attributes. Audit is a corporate governance index based
on auditing attributes. Takeover is a corporate governance index based on antitakeover attributes.
Competition and ownership is a corporate governance index based on compensation and ownership
attributes. Tobin’s q is computed as market value of equity plus book value of liabilities divided by
book value of assets. Assets is the logarithm of total assets. Deposits to liabilities is total deposits
divided by total liabilities. Return on equity is operating income divided by total equity. Income
diversity is 1-Abs((Net interest income - (Net noninterest income))/Total operating income). Asset
diversity is 1-Abs((Net loans - Total securities)/(Net loans + Total securities)). Asset growth is the
quarterly rate of change of total assets. Operating income growth is the growth rate of operating income.
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Sovereign exposure 9044 0.003 0.015 -0.034 0.321
Home bias 253 0.613 0.393 -3.187 1.064
Domestic 9044 0.036 0.186 0 1
Sovereign CDS 253 0.0663 0.259 0.00108 1.49
Leverage 253 0.942 0.0264 0.848 1.033
Government ownership 241 0.0538 0.149 0 0.828
Corporate governance 183 24.66 2.688 20 31
Board 183 12.8 2.085 8 17
Audit 183 1.71 0.755 0 3
Takeover 183 3.967 0.479 2 5
Competition and ownership 183 6.175 1.372 4 9
Tobin’s q 253 0.984 0.0329 0.928 1.195
Assets 191 11.97 1.354 8.556 14.59
Deposits to liabilities 191 0.498 0.155 0.189 0.927
Return on equity 191 0.111 0.0947 -0.565 0.569
Income diversity 191 0.697 0.204 0.00527 0.998
Asset diversity 191 0.56 0.216 0.144 0.996
Asset growth 191 -0.00249 0.0677 -0.144 0.731
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Table 5.3: Determinants of bank exposure to sovereign debt
The dependent variable is a bank’s exposure to the sovereign debt of an EU country divided by total
assets. Domestic is a dummy variable indicating domestic sovereign debt exposure. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
(1) (2) (3)
Domestic 0.0592∗∗∗ 0.0592∗∗∗ 0.0592∗∗∗
(9.41) (9.37) (9.28)
Observations 9044 9044 9044
Adjusted R2 0.522 0.519 0.510




Level of clustering Bank Bank Bank
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Table 5.4: Determinants of bank exposure to sovereign debt
The dependent variable is a bank’s exposure to the sovereign debt of an EU country divided by total
assets. Domestic is a dummy variable indicating domestic sovereign debt exposure. Sovereign CDS is
the CDS spread for five-year senior sovereign debt (in basis points/10,000). Leverage is total liabilities
divided by total assets. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Domestic 0.0583∗∗∗ 0.0583∗∗∗ 0.322 0.322 0.0584∗∗∗ 0.0584∗∗∗
(8.95) (8.87) (1.33) (1.32) (8.95) (8.86)
Domestic * Sovereign CDS 0.0159 0.0159 -0.300∗ -0.301∗ -0.0986∗∗ -0.0993∗∗
(1.41) (1.39) (-1.73) (-1.71) (-2.09) (-2.07)
Domestic * Leverage -0.279 -0.279
(-1.08) (-1.07)
Domestic * Leverage * 0.331∗ 0.332∗ 0.119∗∗ 0.120∗∗
Sovereign CDS (1.78) (1.77) (2.45) (2.43)
Leverage 0.0140 0.00623
(1.22) (0.81)
Constant -0.00118∗∗∗ -0.000777∗∗∗ -0.0145 -0.000661∗∗ -0.00714 -0.000779∗∗∗
(-4.97) (-3.32) (-1.33) (-2.27) (-0.97) (-3.32)
Observations 9044 9044 9044 9044 9044 9044
Adjusted R2 0.521 0.512 0.527 0.519 0.521 0.512
Bank effects Yes Yes Yes
Country*time effects Yes Yes Yes
Bank*time effects Yes Yes Yes
Level of clustering Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
147
Chapter 5: Sovereign Debt Home Bias
Table 5.5: Government ownership and bank exposure to sovereign debt
The dependent variable is a bank’s exposure to the sovereign debt of an EU country divided by total
assets. Domestic is a dummy variable indicating domestic sovereign debt exposure. Sovereign CDS is
the CDS spread for five-year senior sovereign debt (in basis points/10,000). Government ownership is
the share of domestic government ownership of a bank. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at 10%, 5%,
and 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Domestic 0.0515∗∗∗ 0.0515∗∗∗ 0.0518∗∗∗ 0.0518∗∗∗
(8.51) (8.43) (8.84) (8.76)
Domestic * Sovereign CDS 0.0281∗∗ 0.0281∗∗ 0.0239∗ 0.0239∗
(2.09) (2.07) (1.91) (1.89)
Domestic * Government ownership 0.0497 0.0497 -0.0338 -0.0343
(0.97) (0.96) (-1.11) (-1.12)
Domestic * Sovereign CDS * Government ownership 4.701∗∗∗ 4.728∗∗∗
(4.33) (4.31)
Observations 8232 8232 8232 8232
Adjusted R2 0.535 0.527 0.618 0.613
Bank effects Yes Yes
Country*time effects Yes Yes
Bank*time effects Yes Yes
Level of clustering Bank Bank Bank Bank
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Table 5.6: Corporate governance and bank exposure to sovereign debt
The dependent variable is a bank’s exposure to the sovereign debt of an EU country divided by total
assets. Domestic is a dummy variable indicating domestic sovereign debt exposure. Sovereign CDS is
the CDS spread for five-year senior sovereign debt (in basis points/10,000). Corporate governance is an
overall corporate governance index. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Domestic 0.128∗ 0.128∗ 0.150∗∗ 0.150∗∗
(1.92) (1.90) (2.22) (2.20)
Domestic * Sovereign CDS 0.0305∗ 0.0305∗ -0.170∗∗∗ -0.172∗∗∗
(1.77) (1.75) (-3.06) (-3.03)
Domestic * Corporate governance -0.00328 -0.00328 -0.00413 -0.00414
(-1.21) (-1.20) (-1.52) (-1.51)
Domestic * Sovereign CDS * Corporate governance 0.00776∗∗∗ 0.00782∗∗∗
(3.61) (3.57)
Observations 5152 5152 5152 5152
Adjusted R2 0.499 0.491 0.509 0.501
Bank effects Yes Yes
Country*time effects Yes Yes
Bank*time effects Yes Yes
Level of clustering Bank Bank Bank Bank
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Table 5.7: Corporate governance subindices and bank exposure to sovereign debt
The dependent variable is a bank’s exposure to the sovereign debt of an EU country divided by total
assets. Domestic is a dummy variable indicating domestic sovereign debt exposure. Sovereign CDS
is the CDS spread for five-year senior sovereign debt (in basis points/10,000). Board is a corporate
governance index based on board attributes. Audit is a corporate governance index based on auditing
attributes. Takeover is a corporate governance index based on antitakeover attributes. Competition
and ownership is a corporate governance index based on compensation and ownership attributes. ∗, ∗∗
and ∗∗∗ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Domestic 0.143∗∗∗ 0.0473∗∗∗ 0.00517 0.0527 0.139∗
(3.44) (2.89) (0.13) (1.65) (1.73)
Domestic * Sovereign CDS -0.152∗∗∗ -0.0336 -2.165∗∗ -0.0536 -0.103
(-4.47) (-0.99) (-2.42) (-0.86) (-0.05)
Domestic * Board -0.00745∗∗ -0.00830∗∗∗
(-2.38) (-2.74)
Domestic * Sovereign CDS * Board 0.0146∗∗∗ 0.0735∗
(5.57) (1.99)
Domestic * Audit 0.000461 0.00612
(0.05) (0.61)
Domestic * Sovereign CDS * Audit 0.0263∗ 0.220
(2.02) (1.00)
Domestic * Takeover 0.0106 -0.00228
(1.02) (-0.16)
Domestic * Sovereign CDS * Takeover 0.548∗∗ 0.159
(2.45) (0.35)
Domestic * Compensation and ownership -0.000770 0.00177
(-0.15) (0.40)
Domestic * Sovereign CDS 0.0107 -0.249
* Compensation and ownership (1.40) (-1.44)
Observations 5152 5152 5152 5152 5152
Adjusted R2 0.524 0.478 0.494 0.477 0.550
Bank*time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.9: Bank valuation and the sovereign debt home bias over time
This table reports separate valuation regressions for each of the six stress tests dates in our sample. The
specification corresponds to regression 5 in Table 5.8. The dependent variable is Tobin’s q computed as
the market value of equity plus book value of liabilities divided by book value of assets. Home bias is 1
minus the ratio of a bank’s sovereign debt portfolio share allocated to foreign EU countries divided by
the share of foreign EU country sovereign debt in all EU sovereign debt held by banks in the sample.
Sovereign CDS is the CDS spread for five-year senior sovereign debt (in basis points/10,000). Leverage
is total liabilities divided by total assets. Assets is the logarithm of total assets. Deposits to liabilities is
Deposits to liabilities is total deposits divided by total liabilities. Return on equity is operating income
divided by total equity. Income diversity is 1-Abs((Net interest income - (Net noninterest income))/Total
operating income). Asset diversity is 1-Abs((Net loans - Total securities)/(Net loans +Total securities)).
Asset growth is the quarterly rate of change of total assets. Operating income growth is the growth rate
of operating income. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
31/03/10 31/12/10 31/12/11 30/06/12 31/12/12 30/06/13
Home Bias 2.147 2.208 2.710∗ 3.210∗∗ 1.874 2.338∗
(1.24) (1.34) (2.08) (2.65) (1.71) (2.12)
Home Bias * Sovereign -22.64 -19.57 -18.16 -31.61∗∗ -0.989∗∗ -1.065∗∗∗
CDS (-0.44) (-1.31) (-1.53) (-2.23) (-2.27) (-3.41)
Home Bias * Leverage -2.254 -2.344 -2.834∗ -3.354∗∗ -1.990 -2.483∗∗
(-1.24) (-1.34) (-2.06) (-2.64) (-1.72) (-2.13)
Home Bias * Sovereign 23.47 21.72 18.62 32.14∗∗ 1.095∗∗ 0.958∗∗∗
CDS * Leverage (0.43) (1.38) (1.50) (2.19) (2.31) (3.04)
Leverage * Sovereign -0.189 -1.122 0.0550 0.426∗ -0.0654∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗
CDS (-0.10) (-1.66) (0.52) (2.01) (-2.22) (12.04)
Leverage 1.028∗ 1.095∗ 1.700∗∗∗ 1.775∗∗∗ 1.523∗∗ 1.976∗∗
(2.02) (1.97) (3.58) (3.55) (2.37) (2.82)
Constant 0.00909 -0.0413 -0.644 -0.714 -0.455 -0.883
(0.02) (-0.08) (-1.43) (-1.51) (-0.75) (-1.34)
Observations 44 49 38 39 42 41
Adjusted R2 0.163 0.165 0.330 0.445 0.223 0.145
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Le Leslé, V. and Avramova, S. (2012). Revisiting risk-weighted assets. IMF Working
Papers 12/90, International Monetary Fund.
Malherbe, F. (2013). Optimal capital requirements over the business and financial cycles.
London Business School, mimeo.
Marcus, A. J. (1983). The bank capital decision: A time series-cross section analysis.
The Journal of Finance, 38(4):1217–1232.
Mariathasan, M. and Merrouche, O. (2013). The manipulation of basel risk-weights.
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9494.
162
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Mart́ınez-Miera, D. and Suarez, J. (2012). A macroeconomic model of endogenous sys-
temic risk taking. mimeo, CEMFI and Universidad Carlos III.
Myers, S. C. and Rajan, R. G. (1998). The paradox of liquidity. The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 113(3):733–771.
Orgler, Y. E. and Taggart, R. A. (1983). Implications of corporate capital structure the-
ory for banking institutions: Note. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 15(2):212–
221.
Perotti, E. and Suarez, J. (2011). A Pigovian Approach to Liquidity Regulation. Inter-
national Journal of Central Banking, 7(4):3–41.
Perotti, E. C. and Suarez, J. (2002). Last bank standing: What do I gain if you fail?
European Economic Review, 46(9):1599–1622.
Popov, A. and Van Horen, N. (2014). Exporting sovereign stress: Evidence from syndi-
cated bank lending during the euro area sovereign debt crisis. Review of Finance.
Rajan, R. G. (1994). Why bank credit policies fluctuate: A theory and some evidence.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(2):399–441.
Repullo, R. and Saurina, J. (2011). The countercyclical capital buffer of Basel III: A
critical assessment. CEPR Discussion Papers 8304, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Repullo, R. and Suarez, J. (2013). The procyclical effects of bank capital regulation.
Review of Financial Studies, 26(2):452–490.
Rime, B. (2001). Capital requirements and bank behaviour: Empirical evidence for
switzerland. Journal of Banking & Finance, 25(4):789–805.
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